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INTRODUCTION 
The development of foreign investment rules already started in the 19th century and continued as 
part of international law. In the 1950s to 1970s when states sought to entrench these rules at a 
multilateral level, the rules proposed by the majority went through a debacle, and the rules for 
foreign investments culminated being defined by Bilateral Investment Treaties (BITs), which are 
the current framework for international investments, instead.  
The first multilateral level forum in which the rules for international investment were proposed 
was at the United Nations. However, there was a clear debate between developed countries and 
developing countries on the rules that would form the framework for international investments. 
Developed countries wanted to establish a mechanism that surpassed international law and by 
which, for any mistreatment on foreign property, developing countries would pay a prompt, 
adequate and effective compensation and that any disputes arising thereof be detached from 
domestic courts. Developing countries wanted to build a framework by keeping what 
international law and their domestic laws stated on foreign investments, and to have disputes 
arising from these foreign investments to be ruled by the courts where the investment was made.  
The formal structure of the forum allowed developing countries’ interests to outweigh those of 
developed countries because developing countries formed alliances with all developing countries 
sharing the same interest. Thus, UN resolutions had passed, which favoured developing 
countries’ interests on matters of foreign investments. 
However, noting that UN resolutions are not binding, only a few years after the last UN 
resolution favouring the interests of developing countries on international investments, 
developed countries initiated bilateral programs. Interestingly, around the 1990s South American 
countries signed Bilateral Investment Treaties (BITs) which contained rules on international 
investment that reflected the exact rules that were proposed by developed countries in the debate 
and which were the opposite to what developing countries were fighting for at a multilateral 
level. 
Facing the boom of BITs in the 1990s, scholars concentrated on the question of why suddenly so 
many BITs were signed and especially by developing countries since BITs contained less 
favourable rules than those proposed at a multilateral level. Scholars found in the actions of 
developing countries a paradox. It was a paradox because developing countries agreed to a 
framework that did not benefit them. In the search of answering this phenomenon some 
explanations arose.  
When trying to overcome this paradox, some scholars saw the rationale of BITs in the benefits. 
Dolzer (1981) claimed that developing countries accepted BITs because of all the benefits that 
BITs provide for them.1 Vandevelde (2000) has disclosed the debates in political economy 
                                                 
1
 Dolzer, R. “New Foundations of the law of Alien Property” 75 AM J.INT’L 1981. p. 567 
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theories between liberal theories and interventionist theories, claiming that only productivity is 
sought under the liberal model.2 Vandevelde (2005), Salacuse and Sullivan (2005) and some UN 
reports also stated that developing countries have liberalized their markets in order to increase 
their foreign direct investments (FDI).3 And indeed, the preamble of the BITs discloses as their 
purposes to have mutual benefit and increase the country’s prosperity.4 
Other scholars argued that BITs were instruments that arose from competition among developing 
countries.5  Guzman (1998) concluded that there were conflicting interests when a country acted 
on its own or when it acted as group, and so that developing countries are in the prisoner’s 
dilemma. Elkins, Guzman and Simmons (2006), on the other hand, with an empirical study, 
claimed that BITs emerged from the international competition among developing countries and 
that it is a “take it or leave it” deal for developing countries. 
Although the scholarship proposes these two theories as the rationale for BITs, the development 
on the area of international investments did not end there. The UN forum was not the only forum 
were investment provisions were sought to be regulated at a multilateral level. In the last decade, 
rules for the regulation of foreign investments were also proposed at the World Trade 
Organization (WTO). What developed countries proposed at the 1996 Singapore, 1999 Seattle, 
2001 Doha and 2003 Cancun WTO Ministerial Conferences, was not accepted by South 
American countries, and because of this those negotiations failed. So in the same sense as it once 
happened in the UN forum, South American countries, once again, united and upheld their 
interests against those of developed countries. This was only possible due to the alliances that 
developing countries formed.  
However, also similarly to what once happened at the UN level, paralelly to the WTO 
conferences, South American countries continued to sign BITs. In these BITs these developing 
countries have agreed to investment and other issues (under the umbrella of investment 
protections) that they opposed at the WTO. 
Thus, the current framework for international investments resulted from rules created in a 
bilateral and not in a multilateral framework.  This framework for international investments (also 
referred to as the BIT regime) provides the rules for actors to operate on matters of foreign 
                                                 
2
 Vandevelde, K. “The Economics of Bilateral Investment Treaties” 41 Harv. Int’l L. J. 469 2000 p. 484 
3
 See for example Vandevelde, K “A Brief History of International Investment Agreements” University of 
California. Davis Journal of International Law and Policy.Vol.12. 2005–2006; Salacuse, J. and Sullivan, N. “Do 
BITs Really Work?:An Evaluation of Bilateral Investment Treaties and Their Grand Bargain” 46 Harvard 
International Law Journal  67 2005; UNCTAD, Bilateral Investment Treaties in the Mid-1990s. U.N. Doc. 
UNCTAD/ITE/IIT/7 (1998) p.145 
4
 See Appendix IV. 
5
 Arguing that BITs were a necessity because of all the confusion concerning international laws and the dispersed 
regulation of international investment, the contracting parties of BITs wanted to make the rules for international 
investment clear through them. See Sornarajah, M. The international law on foreign investment (Cambridge 
University Press, Cambridge. 2004) p.213; Kaushal, A. “Revisiting History: How the Past Matters” Harvard 
International Law Journal. Vol 50 Issue 2. 2009.; and Kononov, O. “International Investment Law. Is it Time to 
Change the Traditional BIT System?” Czech Yearbook of International Law. 2011. 
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investments; it is the platform in which actors relate to each other when there are matters of 
foreign investment involved. The framework comprehends the treaties as the main core of it, but 
it also comprises of international arbitration conventions, national arbitration laws, and 
international arbitration institutions, the combination of which are necessary for the operation of 
the framework.  
So a prima facie, the paradox of why developing countries agreed to a framework for 
international investment that has been defined by bilateral relations in which their interests did 
not prevail, still stands. However, none of the given theories sufficiently explains the paradox, as 
both theories, that taking the benefits and that taking the competition as explanations, can be 
counter argued. On the theory that claims that developing countries have signed BITs to increase 
their FDI, many empirical studies performed to check this fact have proven otherwise, and 
empirical studies from international organizations have all claimed that there is no correlation 
between a BIT and FDI increase.6 The competition theory is also contested since in the South 
American region there is Brazil which has the highest FDI in the region and yet has not signed 
any BITs with developed countries.  
Furthermore, these theories have the presumption of conceptualizing BITs as a bargain or as a 
product of coercion. This correlation, however, derives from specific lenses used to analyze the 
BIT regime. Therefore, what I argue is that there is no paradox and that what is lacking is the 
analysis of this phenomenon through a different lens. I argue that what lacks in the literature of 
international investment is an analysis of power as a holistic phenomenon in the framework for 
international investments.  
So far, BITs have been studied as a localized factor, the focus remained on just the treaty. 
However, there are more elements that must be seen in connection to the treaties because these 
elements are also part of the framework for international investments. Then, we can see 
something that the existing literature has not considered, namely, that is that power is a holistic 
phenomenon in the framework or the BIT regime and it is a feature of relationships when 
entering into force BITs.  
Therefore, my purpose is to analyze the role of power in relation to the BIT regime as a whole. 
This includes the analysis of power in the multilateral attempts to regulate international 
investments and in the bilateral relations that created the framework for international investments 
through BITs. From this it can also be determined which consequences the use of BITs can have 
vis a vis the power that developing countries have gained at international level.  
For this challenge my analysis of power in the international investment framework picks a 
developing country perspective. As pointed out by Robert W. Cox: “All theories have a 
perspective. Perspectives derive from a position in time and space, specifically social and 
                                                 
6
 Chapter V describes these studies in detail.  
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political time and space.”7 The deadlock at multilateral level is being produced by developing 
countries’ insistence of including their interests in the agenda. It is also developing countries that 
have entered into force BITs that award foreign investors special protection in their territory and 
they are the ones having more fundamental issues as delegation of their sovereignty as a 
consequence. Therefore, the issue should be analysed from a developing countries’ perspective 
and I restrict it to the South American region.  
In regard to my theoretical approach, I use Susan Strange’s theory (in Chapter I). Strange tries to 
come closer to analyse the world and actors’ relationship considering state and non-state actors. 
Accordingly, she has explained the effects of power in international relations in a way that 
becomes more accurate for this work. 
Susan Strange has long ago pointed out that international relations should not be analysed with 
the sole consideration of states. She has criticized the classical theories and researchers using 
them because if they are concentrated just in their theory, they would not see the clear overall 
picture. She was open for flexibility and has sought to see things by adapting ourselves to the not 
ordinary events that could affect international relations.  This is quite accurate especially because 
the studies of social sciences will always be dynamic due to the social element which is always 
in motion: developing itself, erring and progressing. She writes: 
 
 “If the myopia of international relations theorists is derived from their obsession 
with the problematic of war and peace and conflict between states, the equal 
myopia of western political theorists is derived from a similar obsession with 
values of political liberalism. Their current literature focusses a great deal on the 
nature, extent and promotion of democracy and liberty.  Look in vain for any 
consideration of the structural power in democratic states based on the financial 
system which - as Polanyi clearly perceived - could directly affect both the 
international political system - the gold standard - and the relative influence of 
social classes over domestic politics.”8  
 
She brings to our attention how researchers are too concerned either with realist or liberalist 
theories, and that further research with structural power theory is lacking. This thesis takes this 
challenge. By an analysis of exemplary treaties and investment disputes, it intends to show that 
indeed the framework for international investments can and should be analyzed through the lens 
of structural and relative power theory. 
 
Susan Strange mentions three forms of power maintained by the actors which affect international 
relations, namely, structural power, relational and relative power.  She developed only the first 
                                                 
7
 Cox, R. and Sinclair, T.J. “Approaches to World Order” Cambridge Studies in International Relations. 40. 
Cambridge University Press. 1996. p. 87 
8
 Strange. S. “What Theory? The theory in Mad Money” CSGR Working Paper No 18/98. December 1998. p. 6 
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one. However, even though relative power is mentioned in a superficial manner by Strange, with 
the work in this thesis, I pursue to give keen attention and research further the concept of relative 
power. My intention is to continue the development of such a concept that for unknown reasons 
was left without further research by Susan Strange. By complementing the concept of relative 
power with that of structural power, I intend to establish a connection between both forms of 
power when analyzing the bilateral and the multilateral context of the international investment 
framework. 
 
While at the multilateral level, developing countries have maintained their interests thanks to 
their coalitions and alliances, also due to the emerging countries’ strength and economic 
relevance,9 by doing so, developing countries are also influencing the development of the future 
framework that would establish the rules on a given issue. This is the relative power of 
developing countries at the multilateral level. 
 
Relative power, as it is described by its attribute, is neither full control nor power to command 
others, it is a power allowing those bearing it to have certain influence -even though it could be a 
minor influence- in the structure of international relations which pertains to the formation of the 
international investment framework. When this happens, those bearing relative power are not 
subjects who just abide such structure; instead they are part of its development.   
 
On the other hand, the bilateral relations by developed countries which have the purpose of 
regulating international investments can be analyzed using the lens of structural power. The 
indicators of structural power in the BIT regime can be spotted when analysing how developed 
countries can obtain a more predictable outcome regarding their preferences on investment 
matters.  
 
Therefore, I use this new lens- Susan Strange’s theory of structural and relative power – to 
explore and explain the changes caused by BITs and bilateralism, and also the changes taking 
place at multilateral level. However, Susan Strange has also left many questions without an 
answer, hoping they would be answered in the future. Her future is our present and I accept the 
challenge of providing explanations and answers while maintaining the focus on bilateral 
investment treaties and their enforcement in developing countries.   
 
Under this theoretical lens, my hypothesis is that Bilateral Investment Treaties (which resulted 
from the structural power of developed countries) weaken the relative power of developing 
countries at the multilateral level. The clash of these powers produces the weakening of one of 
them. This explains developed countries’ preference over bilateralism, which is how the current 
international investment framework is constructed. 
                                                 
9
 Chapter II will describe some of international investment history at a multilateral level will disclose the 
development of efforts to have rules and norms on international investment. 
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The methodology of the work comprises an analytical and empirical study of the BIT regime. 
The thesis aims to work multi-disciplinary, taking law and political sciences as the building 
blocks for the research.  
 
Firstly, the analysis of the multilateral level includes the analysis of the attempted regulations for 
international investments at the multilateral level and the relationship of countries. The 
developing countries efforts, firstly at the UN and then, the lack of agreement among countries at 
the World Trade Organization, and the reasons for it are going to be analyzed insofar as 
investment issues are concerned. 
 
Therefore, the empirical analysis for the multilateral level shall include the analysis of the UN 
General Assembly Resolutions pertaining to investment, and the statements of the South 
American countries’ representatives at the WTO ministerial conferences in which investment 
regulations were proposed between 1996 and 2003. (In Chapter II) 
 
Secondly, for the analysis of the bilateral level, I use all the South American BITs (from 12 
countries) that have been entered into force with the US and with Germany, France, UK and 
Spain, in total 39 BITs. These developed countries are chosen based on the criteria of being 
strong world economy countries and their presence in the region.  The reason for choosing the 
USA is due to the power and influence they have on South American countries. The reason for 
choosing the EU countries is due to the effect of strong economies in the region, namely, 
Germany, France and United Kingdom and Spain.10 These EU countries and their transnational 
companies are also major investors in South America.11 This selection of developed countries 
will also allow finding the differences, if any, of the US and European policies regarding 
investment in South America.   
 
The comparative analysis among BITs will include the BITs structure, its clauses and its 
enforcement. I will also focus on the history of the development of the framework for 
international investments that we have today, as it intends to reveal factors that support the 
thesis. (In Chapter III and IV). 
 
Considering the empirical results, I return to the explanations of why South American countries 
have signed BITs and show the loopholes in these explanations. (In Chapter V). Last but not 
least, I analyze other surrounding factors that aided the development of the framework, some 
                                                 
10
 Although the latter is not such a strong economy in the EU, it has a lot of historical and therefore strong 
connection to the South American region. 
11According to a statistic provided by the firm América Economía, companies from France, Spain and Germany are 
among the first five companies investing in Latin America with gains reaching 20.000 million dollars. America 
Economia. Sub-ranking based on foreign property. Available at 
http://rankings.americaeconomia.com/2010/500/privadas-extranjeras.php (last visited March 12, 2013) 
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news changes introduced to the framework and the case law derived from the disputes on foreign 
investments that were submitted by investor companies against South American countries to the 
International Centre for Settlement of Investment Dispute (ICSID). I will concentrate on disputes 
that show legal tension or that infringe the sovereignty of South American countries.  
 
The analysis of the enforcement of BITs is very important because the enforcement of BITs 
provokes a chain reaction which affects all actors and their relationships. The results of this 
analysis, coupled to that of the development of the framework for international investment, 
shows indicators of structural power in the BIT regime. They can be classified in two categories: 
internal (considering the indicators derived from the substance of BITs) and external 
(considering the indicators derive from external factors to BITs). 
 
In the internal category, the indicators are the overall acceptance of developed countries’ Hull 
principle by developing countries (when it was already multilaterally settled something else that 
was more beneficial for developing countries). Also, the conflicting views between developed 
and developing countries with the Calvo clauses, which although they exist on BITs, in practice 
the investment cases are taken to an international jurisdiction.  
 
In the external category, the indicators are the developing country’s acceptance of liberal policies 
favouring foreign investors; international arbitration as part of the liberalization process; the use 
of ICSID as the main arbitration institution; the unintended sovereignty costs for developing 
countries for entering into force BITs; and the element of conditionality when developing 
countries receive credits from international institutions. Another indicator that comprehends both 
categories as it defines the framework is the one that points out how the framework is being 
changed as to include the preferences of a party. (In Chapter VI). 
 
For the conclusion, the results provide sufficient explanations not only to reject the idea of a 
paradox in the BIT regime, it further contributes to answering challenging questions of the 
international investment framework: (i) why developing countries have agreed to the BIT 
regime, (ii) why the international investment framework is evolving (contrary to the popular 
thinking that it is collapsing), (iii) why developing countries are reacting against the BIT regime, 
and (iv) why the multilateral attempts to regulate international investments failed. 
 
Ultimately, the analysis leads to important international consequences resulting from BITs. The 
BIT regime has strengthened companies’ access to international relations at a level that was 
traditionally reserved for states. In this sense, through BITs, the distinctions between public and 
private actors become less relevant for having an influence on international investment relations. 
This reflects how states, by accepting transnational activities such as these, are getting away 
from their own established control over their activities, in this case, on foreign investments. 
 
8 
 
The effect of these activities on the rules for foreign investment, however, translates into the 
definition of a framework. The definition of the BIT regime under structural power, and through 
bilateral relationships, which contain the preferred rules for developed countries, conflicts or 
clashes with the relative power of developing countries, which express interests favouring 
developing countries, at a multilateral level. And it is in this sense that the relative power that 
developing countries have at the multilateral level gets weakened by BITs.   
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CHAPTER I: Fitting a Theory of Power into the BIT Regime.  
Kuhn (1968) has argued for an alternative conception of “theory” according to which a theory 
amounts to what Kuhn calls a “paradigm.” A paradigm provides the scientific community 
believing in it with a world-view, a set of coloured glasses through which its members see the 
world.12 A paradigm can be described in a narrow and a wider sense according to Kuhn. A 
paradigm in the narrow sense is an exemplary solution of a given problem which has been so 
successful that future research tries to mirror the pattern of that solution when trying to solve 
other problems.  
A paradigm in the wider sense (which Kuhn termed “disciplinary matrix”) is a complicated 
structure made up of hypotheses, values, practices, exemplars and shared tacit knowledge of the 
members of a scientific community which belong to the same disciplinary matrix, and which 
thus look at the world through glasses of the same colour. It is in this sense of a disciplinary 
matrix, or paradigm in the wider sense, that I will use the term “theory” in this work. 
When analyzing the international investment framework, I claim that some issues that have been 
regarded a paradox can be rejected as such when viewing the international investment 
framework through a theory of power. This is because the complex questions surrounding the 
framework, like, for example, why developing countries have signed BITs, why the international 
investment framework is evolving, why developing countries are reacting against the BIT regime 
and why the attempts to regulate investment at a multilateral level have failed; all these questions 
can be sufficiently explained using a theory of power when analyzing the international 
investment framework.  
For the theoretical approach, the main challenge is to find out which theory of power will better 
suit the explanation of an international investment framework. On an abstract level, theories of 
international relations encompass the different concepts of power that can be developed in each 
theory. On the other hand, international political economy theories translate these concepts into 
the explanation given for trade and investment. I keep the focus of these on the area of 
international investments. In order to combine both disciplines and using elements of their 
theories, I provide a simplified taxonomy of the theories that is relevant for understanding my 
paradigm in the present work. 
Menzel (2001) has classified the theories of international relations in four main groups, namely 
realism, idealism (liberalism), institutionalism and structuralism. For realism the aim is security 
and its ideas can be traced back to Hobbes; for idealism the aim is peace and its ideas can be 
traced back to Kant; for institutionalism the aim is cooperation and its ideas can be traced back to 
Grotius; and for structuralism the aim is function and its ideas can be traced back to Marx.13 
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 Kuhn, T. The Structure of Scientific Revolutions  2nd Edition. University of Chicago Press. 1974.  
13
 Menzel, U. Zwischen Idealismus und Realismus. Die Lehre von den Internationalen Beziehungen Suhrkamp. 
Main. 2001 
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However, because there are convergent elements in what idealism and institutionalism pursue, 
for the purpose of understanding power in the realm of theories, I will focus on realism, 
liberalism and Marxism. 
Firstly, realism claims that the state is the main unit or actor, and its behavior should always be 
considered as aiming for the survival of the state.14 There is a notion of self-help to achieve these 
purposes and the value cherished is security. How exactly can the state’s objectives be achieved? 
This theoretical approach leads us to power.  
The underlying assumptions of the theory can be traced back to Hobbes.15 Hobbes defined the 
power of a man as “his present means, to obtain some future apparent Good.”16 However, 
Hobbes speaks of a ‘grim equality’ which is the power of men to kill each other (eg. Cain and 
Abel), a power that is always there, it just has been ‘managed’.17  
This management of power entertains realists in numerous ways.18 From Morgenthau’s ‘struggle 
for power’19 or Bull’s idea of the ‘anarchical society’ in which power meant a capability of 
order20 to the neorealism of Waltz,21 which “presupposes that states are security-maximizing 
units”22, the balance of power theories’ importance was without a doubt recognized in the 
discipline of international relations.  
Under the realist perspective, power is given by “material resources” of one state, which mainly 
involves military resources. Power is seen as a justification for the state’s survival and any state 
regulation should be in a way that power is never lost.23 Therefore, the government should 
                                                 
14
 Refering to Morgenthau and E.H.Carr in Menzel, U. Zwischen Idealismus und Realismus. Die Lehre von den 
Internationalen Beziehungen Suhrkamp. Main. 2001 
15
 ibid 
16
 Hobbes for example presents the idea of instrumental powers (acquired by a natural power: faculties of the body 
or mind) that serves ‘to acquire more’ riches, reputation, etc. Hobbes, T. (1651) Leviathan  Penguin Books. London 
1985. p. 150 
17
 The analogy is mentioned in Claude, I.L. Power and International Relations Random House. New York. 1962 
18
 Within realism there are theoretical approaches, namely balance of power (again with different models –
Morgenthau; Bull, Waltz, Mearsheimer) collective security and world government. See Claude, I.L. Power and 
International Relations Random House. New York. 1962 and Little, R. The Balance of Power in International 
Relations  Cambridge University Press. 2007 
19
 Morgenthau, H.J. Politics Among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace 5th edn. New York: Alfred A. 
Knopf. 1973 
20
 Bull (1977) had stated “…to pursue the idea of world justice in the context of the system and society of states is 
enter into conflict with the devices through which order is at present maintained.” Bull, H. The Anarchical Society  
The Macmillan Press LTD. Great Britain 1977. p. 88 
21
 Waltz refers to power being fungible, i.e. military power means economic power. In Waltz, K. Theory of 
International Politics  Addison-Wesley. London. 1979 
22
 Little, R. The Balance of Power in International Relations  Cambridge University Press. 2007 p.170 
23
 See Gilpin, R. Global Political Economy Princeton University Press. 2001. p. 15-23 and Gilpin, R. The Political 
Economy of International Relations  Princeton University Press. 1987. pp. 25 and 26 
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operate, control and regulate the citizens and their economic activities (mercantilism, 
interventionism).24 
This means, however, that the power growth of one state means the power loss of another state.25 
Even under the regime theory which is based on an underlying assumption of the existence of 
cooperation in an anarchical world, realists like Grieco (1988) have suggested that cooperation 
implies the loss of independence and security.26  
This material power entitles one state to make another state do something that it does not want to 
do. Therefore, power under a realist perspective is a conception of ‘power to’, materializing this 
faculty in the power to coerce.  
Secondly, according to liberalism or idealism the aim of actors’ behavior in world politics is 
peace and by understanding human behavior as rational, proponents of the theory believe that 
peace can be achieved through cooperation, and that cooperation as such could be achieved 
through institutions.27 Under the liberal lens, actors pursue to cooperate because it will allow 
actors to maximize their gains by coordinating actions at international level. Arendt (1970)28 for 
example stated that “power corresponds to the human ability not just to act but to act in 
concert.”29  
When translating these assumptions into the economy, liberal theories typically depart from 
ideas of intervention and promote free trade,30 achieving interdependence among states. All the 
efforts are aimed to achieving the best possible situation in the states’ economy and social 
welfare.31 The pluralists consider the non-state actors in the international system which together 
with states can be part of the system. The international system, through multilateral endevours 
and agreements among actors, can set the regulations that affect all countries.  There is the idea 
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 Friedrich List for example was an early promoter of the protection and the active intervention of state. In List, F. 
The national system of political economy London : Longmans, Green. 1885 
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 Expressed as Morgenthau’s law in Little, R. The Balance of Power in International Relations  Cambridge 
University Press. 2007 p. 97 
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2nd American Edition. J.B. Bell. Washington. 1830. p. 107-134 
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of an interdependence relationship among actors, which can nevertheless be asymmetrical. In 
such a case the actors just have a bargaining advantage.32 
Therefore, although the liberal conception tends to depart from power,33 the concept of power 
has remained as a bargaining advantage. Keohane and Nye describe sources of influences that 
give actors a better bargaining position which then results in asymmetries. On the other hand, 
Nye (2002) developed the concept of soft power34 by which an actor like the United States, with 
resources that are attractive to others (attractive culture, ideology and institutions) can make 
other actors to do (and wanting to do it) what the United States wants, instead of coercing 
them.35  
Ergo, power under this lens is no longer achieved only through material resources, but through 
resources ‘and’ capabilities. These resources or capabilities position actors on a bargaining 
advantage in relation to the other actors.36  Thus, the conception presupposes the idea of a 
bargain.  
Thirdly, marxism, dependency and world system theories have dealt with the ills of capitalism 
and the struggle of classes or the structure of the market, which mainly encore the capitalist 
world-economy.37 These theories have claimed the existing exploitation of classes by those in 
control of production means and have pointed out inequalities in the international operation of 
states. In this sense, this theory also considers a material basis, namely the inequality of power 
and welfare. The value which these theories cherish is, therefore, to get rid of inequalities and 
have justice.38 
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Power viewed under this lens is derived from the control over labour39 and therefore a control of 
the production means.40 Thus, the relationship between an actor that has the control of the 
production means and one that does not, turns into an exploitation relationship in which the ones 
being exploited remain in dependence.41  
However, as Wallerstein (1984) has expressed it, “In a capitalist world-economy, the states are 
expressions of power.”42 This is because the state can continue to control capital flow and labour, 
for example. Therefore, the control on the production means is what gives an actor power to 
persuade, to impose on weak states.43 
When translating these theories into the economy, they converge on capitalism as the structure of 
the world economy. Under these theories mercantilism is a mechanism of defense by capitalist 
states,44 because it is a way of creating national barriers. Formerly, the Marxist and dependency 
theories gave the justification that states invest in other states to extend the capitalism structures 
to their colonies.45   
Thus, under this paradigm, power has traditionally been seen as power to influence and impose, 
and just like the realists have claimed, to coerce. However, power under this lens is also seen as 
resources or capabilities because it considers a material basis and because power is given by 
those in control of production means, who can make others actors dependent on them.  
                                                 
39
 Marx defines labour power in the following way: “By labour-power or capacity for labour is to be understood the 
aggregate of those mental and physical capabilities existing in a human being, which he exercises whenever he 
produces a use-value of any description.” In Marx, K. Capital Vol I. Chapter VI. Translated from the third German 
edition by Samuel Moore and Edward Aveling and edited by Frederick Engels. Elecbook London. 1998 p. 242 
40
 Another form of power under marxist theories are those refer to the class itself. Wallerstein commenting on Mao 
Tse Tung has said that the political power refers to the dictatorship of the proletariat. See Wallerstein, I. “The Rise 
and Future Demise of the World Capitalist System: Concepts for Comparative Analysis” Comparative Studies in 
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Therefore, what the three paradigms or lenses (realist, liberal and Marxist) have in common is 
the view of power as resources or capabilities and the view of power “in relation” to another 
actor, i.e. relational power.  
Weber defined power as the “probability that one actor within a social relationship will be in a 
position to carry out his will despite resistance, regardless of the basis on which this probability 
rests.”46 Weber further states that “All conceivable qualities of a person and all conceivable 
combinations of circumstances may put him in a position to impose his will in a given 
situation.”47 On the other hand, Dahl (1957) defined power in the following way: “A has power 
over B to the extent that he can get B to do something that B would not otherwise do.”48 Under 
both conceptualizations of power, the perspective is concentrated on the actors of the 
relationship, of which one does not want to do something or resists it. Furthermore, there is an 
intention when manifesting power. The actor intends to use power cognitively and there is also a 
cognitive intention on the other party of doing what he does not want to do.49 
To clarify it with an example, if I am the big brother and my mother only allows my little brother 
to go out and play if I am with him, knowing this advantage allows me, the big brother, to decide 
which game I will make my brother play with me. My brother also knows that if he does not play 
my game, I will go inside and he will not be allowed to play outside. Therefore, he does 
something (consciously) that he does not want to do. This analogy relates to the power that I, as 
big brother, have in relation to my little brother.  
Under this scheme, therefore, the idea of one actor not wanting to do something is easy to spot 
when we consider the two brothers’ relationship. However, one has to note that the mother’s 
condition is not included in the relationship. The mother’s condition is contained in a bigger 
dimension that includes the actors’ relationship. 
The problem of not noticing the bigger dimension is exactly what happens when we only 
consider one lens when viewing power. I do not want to dispute the appropriateness of any lens 
but the overall picture of a situation might change if we choose a lens that considers not only the 
focus on the actors, but also the factors surrounding the relationship and the whole framework in 
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which the relationships stands. This is the reason why I argue that we need a lens that allows us 
to view power as a holistic phenomenon. 
1.1. Power in the BIT regime 
In the international investment framework or the BIT regime, the assumptions of power in the 
BIT regime are not evident. However, I find a similarity between the political science and law 
literature, which converge in the use of ‘bargain’ and ‘coercion’. I apply the ideas of these 
theories to the international investment framework as it has resulted that BITs have been 
contemplated firstly, as a bargain and secondly, as a result of coercion; and sometimes as a 
product of coercion in the bargain. 
The theory of asymmetrical interdependence of Keohane and Nye (2001), indirectly relates to the 
international investment context, as it sees power in terms of bargaining, whereas, from the 
theories of Simmons, Dobbin and Garret (2006) and in the theory of soft imperialism of Hettne 
and Söderbaum (2005), power is contemplated in terms of coercion.  
With regard to the first, Keohane and Nye’s theory has suited the explanation of how states 
needed each other for the development of their relations. Keohane and Nye have explained the 
relation between states in a form of interdependence. They state that “Interdependence in world 
politics refers to situations characterized by reciprocal effects among countries or among actors 
in different countries.”50 Thus, for interdependence to exist, Keohane and Nye state that the 
transactions’ costs also need to be reciprocal, otherwise it would not be interdependence, it 
would just be interconnectedness.51  
However, Keohane and Nye extend the definition of the interdependence concept further from 
just mutual benefit because otherwise relationships between developed and developing countries, 
for example, could not easily be explained.52 For this they use a cost/benefit criterion53 and claim 
that it is not the case of one party gaining from the other party’s loss; instead, they can all gain 
from the relationship.54 So for them, this would lead to a cooperative relationship from which all 
actors would gain.55 
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When defining the interdependence relationship, they say: “interdependent relationships will 
always involve costs, since interdependence restricts autonomy; but it is impossible to determine 
a priori whether the benefits of a relationship will exceed the costs. This will depend on the 
values of the actors as well as on the nature of the relationship.”56 (my highlights) 
It is in these mutual dependencies that are not balanced (i.e. they are asymmetrical) when the 
actors get sources of influences.57 These sources of influences give actors power, which under 
Keohane and Nye’s theory, translates into having an actor with a superior position when 
bargaining over an issue. This is what Keohane and Nye have called the political bargaining 
process that results from the asymmetrical interdependent relationship. 
Keohane and Nye define power as “the ability of an actor to get other to do something they 
otherwise would not do (and at an acceptable cost to the actor).”58 Keohane and Nye see power 
as a resource or capabilities and they therefore say: “When we say that asymmetrical 
interdependence can be a source of power we are thinking of power as control over resources, or 
the potential to affect outcomes.”59 They stress the word potential because they say that in the 
asymmetrical interdependence relationship, even if one of the parties has political resources in 
his benefit, the control over the outcomes cannot be guaranteed.  
Therefore, the bargaining advantage of an actor, which translates the power resource into power 
over outcome (political bargaining process) is a translation of that potentiality into effects. 
However, Keohane and Nye have pointed out that the political bargaining process or the 
translation (of the potential into effects) does not guarantee the outcomes. The outcome of the 
asymmetrical interdependent relationship cannot be determined.60 
To sustain and explain this idea, Keohane and Nye distinguish two dimensions which they claim 
exists in every interdependent relationship, those are sensitivity61 and vulnerability.62 Sensitive 
amounts to the responsiveness of actors, “the liability to costly effects imposed from outside 
before policies are altered to try to change the situation”63 and the vulnerability amounts to the 
costs’ alternative which actors have, “an actor’s liability to suffer costs imposed by external 
events even after policies have been altered.”64 
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The vulnerability dimension, for Keohane and Nye, is more important in the interdependent 
relationship than the sensitivity dimension because by the fact that an actor can have alternatives 
when facing liability to costs, then that already is a power resource.65 
Therefore, under this theoretical framework, Keohane and Nye’s theory of asymmetrical 
interdependence might seem to be a possible lens with which we can find explanations for the 
BIT regime, in the sense that treaties imply reciprocal effects (costs) in relationships that are 
characterized not only by mutual benefit. Also, because of its connection to power, Keohane and 
Nye’s asymmetrical interdependence theory establishes the existence of sources of influences 
that give power to bargain. The outcome, however, cannot be determined.  
On the other hand, referring to the second approach that considers coercion, Hettne and 
Söderbaum (2005) when trying to describe Europe as a global actor and its foreign policy, make 
interesting remarks in their analysis of power. In these relationships, the idea of bargaining is not 
contemplated. They propose that the EU has a kind of relative power which relates to the 
strength of its counterpart and to the extent of EU actorness.66 These factors influence the 
application of two different forms of power that the EU could use: “Civilian power” which 
comprehends dialogue, pluralism, democracy or a “soft imperialism” by which there is an 
imposition of norms coming from the EU’s own interests. 
However, which of the two kinds of power will be used depends on whether the counterpart 
actor is weak or strong. They state: “The stronger the counterpart, the more concessions are 
given by the EU and the more relevant is the use of civilian power and pragmatic diplomacy. 
With weaker partners, the EU dictates much more of the conditions for interregional cooperation 
which tends to lead to more imperial relations.”67 This is a very important consideration of a 
previous type of power which an actor has that would determine the type of model which would 
be applied. In the interregional relations between the EU and Latin America, they claim that both 
models apply because the relations are still evolving. However, when weaker parties are 
involved, Hettne and Söderbaum considered an element of coercion (i.e. in the application of soft 
imperialism).  
In a similar vein, Simmons, Dobbin, and Garrett (2006) claimed that the behavior of actors is 
determined by four elements, namely, coercion, learning, competition and emulation. They have 
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claimed that coercion, as a diffusion mechanism, explains the spread of liberalism and that “this 
mechanism may involve the threat or use of physical force, the manipulation of economic costs 
and benefits, and/or even the monopolization of information or expertise—all with the aim of 
influencing policy change in other countries.”68 In this way, countries with power, according to 
Simmons, Dobbin and Garrett, can make weaker countries do what the powerful countries want 
them to do.  
Thus, when contrasting these perceptions to the BIT regime, even if the relation to it is not 
directly, it would view power in the BIT regime, if any, in terms of coercion.  
I have brought to light these two approaches, of a bargaining on the one hand and of coercion on 
the other, because of what happens in the scholarship of BITs: Even though the bargaining 
account is what prevails when seeking to explain why developing countries have agreed to the 
rules that have formed the BIT regime, coercion is also mixed in the ideas of bargaining power.  
In the legal literature, the direct connotation of power in the BIT regime is given by the 
following: Kaushal (2009) claimed that BITs are a bargain: with BITs, states have bargained 
away their sovereignty in order to have foreign investment. “The regime of bilateral investment 
treaties has shifted the line between the protection of foreign investments and of state 
sovereignty.”69 Kaushal says that the bargain is in the expansion of property and contract rights 
for the home investor country and the trade-off of regulatory sovereignty for host states.  
Although Kaushal refers to the conditionality that developing countries have as part of receiving 
credits from the IMF and the World Bank, implying that coercion could be a factor, he 
nevertheless thinks that developing countries are bargaining with developed countries when 
signing BITs.  
Kalderimis (2004) refers to a “bargaining” power when entering into force BITs. According to 
Kalderimis this bargaining power is the power that rich countries have and use to exploit 
developing countries which cannot bargain because of the conditionality to the IMF. Poor 
countries are ‘coerced’ to accept the bargain in which “its inherent asymmetry is troubling.”70  
Supnik (2009) has also referred to a bargaining power but has concluded that: “Unequal 
bargaining power often translates into a developing country’s acceptance of international 
investment agreements on a take-it-or-leave-it basis”.71 This ‘take it or leave it’ momentum is, 
according to Elkins, Guzman and Simmons (2006), the choice of developing countries when 
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signing BITs. However, they conclude that: “It may be that potential hosts are coerced or at least 
strongly encouraged to enter into BITs”72 and expressly agree with a theory of power, but only in 
terms of coercion as suggested by Simmons, Dobbin and Garrett.  
A more independent acknowledgement of the role of power per se in the BIT regime, however, 
can be found in what pertains to one of the BIT clauses, namely, the dispute settlement clause. 
Kaushal (2009) has pointed out the following: “The creation of the dispute settlement 
mechanism is an instance in which power has played an important role in shaping international 
norms.”73  
Allee and Peinhardt (2010) have mentioned that introducing or delegating investment disputes to 
an specific international arbitration institution (ICSID) in the dispute settlement clauses has been 
possible due to a kind of relative bargaining power.74 They assume that with BITs both parties 
bargain on equal terms, but that due to the asymmetries in bargaining this power often plays a 
major role in negotiated outcomes, which they say is the inclusion of ICSID.   
Likewise, Dieter (2006), when contrasting the dispute settlement mechanisms of bilateral trade 
agreements and that of the WTO,75 concludes that concepts of power and hierarchy have 
returned to international trade. He mentions the existence of an asymmetrical relationship in 
bilateral agreements which involve a larger country and a smaller country and that by having an 
alternative with bilateral agreements, the step forward gets deteriorated because powerful 
countries take advantage of bilateral agreements to promote their cases. Dieter concludes that 
instead of complementing the WTO bilateral agreements compete with it. 
All these scholars, although referring specifically to BITs, find the use of power in the dispute 
settlement clauses contained in BITs as the only argument to explain the rationale of their 
existence. However, they limit themselves to just one clause of the treaty. 
1.2. What is lacking with BITs and the concept of power?  
The theories that have analysed power in connection to BITs, have ended with concepts of 
bargain and coercion. Thus, we can be aware of the lenses used to reach these conclusions. The 
problem is that analyzing the BIT regime through only one specific theory has not provided 
sufficient explanation for questions like: 
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• Why have developing countries agreed to BITs? (the literature in the scholarship 
considers this fact a paradox);  
• Why is the international investment framework evolving?  
• Why are developing countries reacting against the BIT regime? (feared by some as a 
signal of collapse) and,  
• Why have the attempts to regulate investment at the multilateral level failed?  
 
Thus, both conceptions leave many loopholes in reaching an explanation for the establishment of 
the international investment framework and its current challenges. Keohane and Nye’s 
asymmetrical interdependence theory which focuses on the concept of bargaining is presented 
with the following problems. According to Keohane and Nye’s asymmetrical interdependence 
theory the interdependent relationships have reciprocal effects (not only of mutual benefit); in 
interdependent relationships it is impossible to know a priori whether the benefits of the 
relationships exceed their costs because the values and nature of the relationship are impossible 
to know; and the interdependent relationship is characterized by a bargaining process which does 
not guarantee outcomes. 
In BITs, the rights and obligations are allegedly reciprocal and BITs were supposed to entail a 
benefit for both parties. Empirical studies have contested both claims. Hallward-Dreimeier 
(2003) has pointed out that: “It should be noted that the rights secured in a BIT are reciprocal; 
investors from country A investing in B are the same as those given to investors from country B 
investing in country A. However, in practice there is usually tremendous asymmetry as almost all 
the FDI flows covered by BITs are in fact in one direction.”76 Using Keohane and Nye’s 
terminology, we cannot have interdependence if we do not have reciprocal effects as then the 
relationship is just ‘interconnectedness’. 
Furthermore, in the BIT regime the values and nature of the relationship can be known contrary 
to the interdependent relationship where it is impossible to know them. The document 
establishing the relationship, namely the treaty, is what describes the parties’ values and nature 
of the relationship. In the negotiation of a BIT, the actors are states and the values of these actors 
are disclosed in the preamble of the treaty. In law it is what is called the ratio legis of the legal 
instrument. The nature of the parties’ relationship is formalized by the type of instrument that the 
parties use, so the nature of their relationship, formalized with BITs, is characterized by its 
international foreign investment public nature.77  
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The bargaining process is also a fundamental feature of the interdependent relationship. For 
Keohane and Nye, their idea of power is expressed as the sources of influences that provide 
political bargaining advantage, but which nevertheless does not guarantee outcomes. If we 
assume that the sole purpose of BITs has been to increase FDI of the parties, then it is true that it 
will remain uncertain whether that happens or not beyond the negotiation point.78  However, one 
has to look at the development of the framework for international investments to see what the 
parties really wanted to achieve with BITs: the establishment of foreign investment rules that 
every country should comply with.79 
For this reason, the work herein does not consider the negotiation period but the rules given by 
the framework or BIT regime. One has to consider the fight of interests to achieve the set of rules 
for international investment at multilateral level and how these were agreed upon and written in 
the special treaties for that purpose (BITs). Furthermore, although the rules of international 
investments are mainly comprised by BITs, there are other rules that are needed in order to make 
these treaties work. All these issues that have formed the framework or BIT regime go beyond 
just the negotiation. 
From a legal perspective, for a bargaining to take place, in whatever form, it needs the consent of 
the parties, and for consent to take place, it needs freedom. Parties have to be free to express 
their consent and thus perform a bargain. When parties are not free to express this consent, the 
relationship will be characterized by distress and not bargain.80  Alvarez and Khamsi (2009) have 
even suggested that these agreements, for the reason of parties’ inequalities, should be null and 
void.81 
Alvarez (1992) has pointed out: “A BIT negotiation is not a discussion between sovereign 
equals. It is more like an intensive training seminar conducted by the United States, on U.S. 
terms, on what it would take to comply with the U.S. draft”82 The outcome in such a scenario is 
likely be determined. 
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A power-bargaining concept does not include the broad perspective of the whole framework and 
that is why under this lens the outcomes cannot be determined, when per definition, power per se 
“is the capacity to produce, or contribute to, outcomes.”83 However, we can see the inadequacy 
of the theory of asymmetrical interdependence in Keohane and Nye’s own explanation of a 
foreign investment situation under their theory: 
 “For instance, in a concession agreement, a multinational oil company may seem to have a 
better bargaining position than the host government.  The agreement may allow the company to 
set the level of output, and the price, of the petroleum produced, thus making government 
revenues to company decisions.  Yet such a situation is inherently unstable, since the government 
may be stronger on the vulnerability dimension.  Once the country has determined that it can 
afford to alter the agreement unilaterally, it may have the upper hand.  Any attempt by the 
company to take advantage of its superior position on the sensitivity dimension, without 
recognizing its weakness at the vulnerability level, is then likely to end in disaster.”84 
With their example Keohane and Nye claim that if a set of rules puts an actor in a 
disadvantageous position, that actor will probably try to change those rules if it can do so at a 
reasonable cost.85 However, in this typical example of a foreign investment situation, such an 
argument cannot be upheld the moment a BIT is involved.  In such an example, and considering 
the existence of a BIT, if a host government unilaterally modifies the concession agreement, the 
multinational company can immediately sue the host state. This is because the foreign 
investment of the multinational company in the host country is subject to the rights and 
obligations of the treaty and therefore, in such a case, a unilateral modification entails a breach of 
the treaty. In such event the company can submit a claim to an international arbitration 
institution, leaving the host country with absolutely no bargaining position whatsoever at any 
stage of the investment’s existence.86 The inadequacy results for considering only the actors of 
the relationship and not the overall structure of the framework of international investments.  
However, viewing the BIT regime only in terms of coercion also presents its challenges. In 
Hettne and Söderbaum’s analysis, power and its connection to BITs is indirect. Their conception 
of power in terms of coercion comes about in the form of ‘soft imperialism’ but they only 
mentioned power from the EU perspective and have a focus on interregionalism and not direct 
bilateral relationships with each individual country.87  This would give us a different picture than 
                                                 
83
 Outhwaite, W. and Bottomore, T.B. The Blackwell Dictionary of Twentieth-century Social Thought. In Blackwell 
Reference. Blackwell. 1994 
84
 Keohane, R. and Nye, J. Power and Interdependence  3rd Edition. Longman. New York. 2001. p. 15 
85
 ibid p.16. Keohane and Nye’s argument regarding the unilateral decision on changing the relationship might apply 
for developed countries. For example, when developed countries were in a disadvantageous position of reaching a 
negotiation at multilateral level, they did change the rules and started operating bilaterally, even if it meant 
competing with the WTO system.  
86
 See sovereignty costs in Chapter VI. 
87
 The only reference with bilateralism is when describing the relation with the USA but still not with individual 
countries but a whole region, in this case with Latin America, and  they said that bilateralism complements 
23 
 
the bilateral relationships with developed and developing countries alone, which will strengthen 
the weakness of the counterpart.  Therefore, what Hettne and Söderbaum’s analysis lacks in 
order to apply it to the BIT regime, is assessing power in strictly bilateral relations between 
developed and developing countries where power can play an important role.88   
On the other hand, Simmons, Dobbin and Garrett have also focused on coercion but also only as 
a diffusion mechanism to explain the spread of liberalism. They do not develop a concept of 
power and do not use the factor of coercion in the context of particular relations. Although both 
Hettne and Söderbaum as well as Simmons, Dobbin and Garrett’s theories could be reconciled 
with  those of realist, Marxist and dependencies theories that have connected and viewed power 
in terms of coercion, these scholars do not specifically address the possibility that power could 
be applied in the context of international investments. 
However, the scholars who have maintained a direct connection of the assumptions of the 
aforementioned theories (with the elements of bargain and coercion) with international 
investments, still provide theories with loopholes for the following reasons.  
Kalderimis (2003) analyses coercion but overlooks the element of power in the BITs regime. 
Although he claims how the conditionality of the IMF has affected the investment regime and 
that liberalizing markets is not necessarily good for developing countries, he did not focus on 
explaining this issue considering any kind of power that the aforementioned may attribute to 
developed countries in the system or in the BITs regime. Kalderimis keeps the conception of 
BITs as bargains. 
Kaushal (2009) also speaks of a bargain many times and how this bargain involves developing 
countries giving away their sovereignty to expand property and contractual rights of developed 
countries. Furthermore, he points out that through this grand bargain foreign investors are the 
ones who benefit the most from the BITs regime.  It is, however, worth pointing out that Kaushal 
gives explanations of all the tensions in the BITs regime but he cannot escape the idea of a 
paradox when explaining why developing countries have shifted their policies in favour of 
signing BITs.  
Kaushal makes strong remarks that can witness the influence of power in the BIT regime when 
analyzing the conditionalities of the IMF and the World Bank for providing credits to developing 
countries. However, because his arguments are based on the historical evolution of the BIT 
regime, he sees this conditionality also as just part of BIT’s evolution and therefore he does not 
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focus on the element of power in the framework and does not relate to the issue when analyzing 
the BITs regime.89 
Elkins, Guzman and Simmons (2006) and their theory of competition for explaining why 
developing countries sign BITs only considers the relationship of developing countries in a 
horizontal level but it does not analyze the relationship of the parties to the treaty per se.  As well 
as Supnik (2009) these scholars have also seen BITs as results of bargaining power but in a 
characterization given by a ‘take it or leave it basis’ in which coercion is added to the formula. 
Neither, however, analyzed power in the BIT regime.  
In regard to the scholars who did consider directly that power in some way plays a role in the 
BIT regime, Dieter (2006) uses a concept of power but only when relating to the dispute 
settlement mechanisms (by contrasting the multilateral dispute mechanism of the WTO and the 
dispute settlement mechanism on BITs). He does not consider that power may be found in the 
whole structure of the WTO regime and BITs and that it could be the reason from changing 
multilateral relations to bilateral relations. Similarly to Dieter, Kaushal (2009), Allee and 
Peinhardt (2010) have considered power but only in relation to the ICSID clause contained in 
BITs which involves the dispute settlement mechanism.90  
Therefore, the allusions referring to bargaining91 and coercion do not directly address the concept 
of power in the relationships nor as the ability of defining the framework for international 
investments. On the other hand, the scholars that found an element of power in BITs have only 
analyzed it restrictively, concentrating on just one clause of BITs. This is nothing more than just 
the tip of the iceberg; an analysis of power should reside on its basis, the framework.  
What is lacking in the literature of international investments is an analysis of power as a holistic 
phenomenon in the international investment framework. The loopholes and paradoxes are found 
because of concentrating on only one theory. These, however, may be overcome when we use an 
alternative lens with which we can view the holistic phenomenon of power in the framework for 
international investments. It allows the possibility of including the whole framework rather than 
focusing on specific elements such as just the treaties.  
1.3. An Alternative for Understanding Power in the BITs Regime: Susan Strange’s Theory 
of Structural Power. 
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A theory which can allow us to understand some key questions about the BIT regime and lead us 
to understanding its consequences at the international level is extremely important. Such a theory 
should consider all actors involved and the changing developments throughout the foreign 
investment and BIT regime history. I will use Susan Strange’s theory of structural and relative 
power as the lens for analyzing the international investment framework, and argue that it can 
help us substantially in this endeavour.  
The critical theories challenge the traditional approaches summarized above and with the 
consideration of a new perspective, new theories can be built. Robert Cox (1981) has stated that 
to give rise to a critical theory, we have “to become clearly aware of the perspective which gives 
rise to theorizing and its relation to other perspectives; and to open up the possibility of choosing 
a different valid perspective from which the problematic becomes one of creating an alternative 
world.”92 Strange’s theory lines up with Cox’s (1981) conception of a critical theory because 
Strange was aware of the existing perspectives and yet showed us another perspective which 
allowed for an alternative. Susan Strange’s structural power theory derived from an international 
political economy perspective93 and gives room to an alternative in understanding the complexity 
of power in our times. She provided a new lens to view international relations and how power is 
affected in it. Thus, this critical theory of power constitutes a paradigm comprehending a bigger 
dimension. 
 
Susan Strange’s theory differs from the traditional theories in the sense that realists, according to 
Strange, lack the grasping of the effect of power as to affect the outcome because they are mainly 
concerned with just states as the main actors, and are obsessed with the power of hegemons -
especially the United States- and do not consider power in other spheres. She claimed: “the 
evidence used still dealt only with power derived from resources, not from the capacity to 
influence outcomes.”94 Susan Strange, in her book “Retreat of the State” has given an example of 
Gilpin’s suggestion95 to show how power was still conceived in terms of resources as capabilities 
and “not as a feature of relationships, nor as a social process affecting outcomes.”96 
Liberal theories too have seen power as resources or capabilities of the one possessing it. The 
difference between Keohane and Nye’s theory and that of Susan Strange is that Strange suggests 
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that outcomes can be determined because power allows to put certain preferences above the 
preferences of others, and by doing so, a result can be expected.  
Furthermore, Strange criticized that the word ‘asymmetrical interdependence’ was just an 
euphemism; that even if it was agreed by many writers that the term “interdependence” does not 
really describe the inequalities of the parties’ dependences, the use of this terminology “serves to 
dull or even conceal the reality of relationships, the crude facts of structural power over other 
governments and over other societies.”97  
Susan Strange also criticized Keohane and Nye’s claim of greater asymmetries in the 
vulnerability of states by claiming that Keohane and Nye did not analyze the effects of unequal 
power that could alter and shape the economic structure; “whereas this is precisely the sort of 
‘structural’ power to which attention to key decisions inevitably and naturally draws attention.”98  
Strange’s theory differs, however, from concepts of power under the Marxist lens because for 
Strange, power is not imposed nor coerced: the actors are unaware of structural power.  
However, the power contained in these relationships is what according to Susan Strange affects 
the outcomes.  
Waltz stated that a “structural approach can provide the foundations for a successful theory of 
international politics.”99 This can be achieved with Susan Strange’s theory because Strange’s 
theory sees power neither as capabilities or resources (such as the realist, liberalist and Marxist 
theories) nor that it is coerced or imposed, and contrary to a focus on the evident intention of 
actors to use power, she claims that structural power happens unnoticed. Strange has claimed that 
the aforementioned theories have concentrated excessively on a ‘state as actor’ perspective, and 
states that the complexities and changes in the world allow for viewing the world, if not 
imperatively, from a different perspective than that of the traditional theories which still consider 
the state as managing the world economy. Strange highlights that the changes in the structures 
provide for new analysis and explanations for the relationship of states and other actors.100 
Strange’s structural power theory does not disregard the actors’ asymmetries but contrary to the 
traditionally approaches, considers power as a feature of relationships. Power is viewed as 
determined by the relationship in which actors convene; thus, the outcome will definitely be 
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affected. I argue that because of analyzing power in this broader sense, this theory better explains 
the relationships among actors in the international investment framework. It considers all the 
actors involved in international relations (state and non-state actors) and it has the assumption 
that power has slightly moved from states to markets, international organization and 
corporations, which affects the structures of the system.  
Therefore, Susan Strange has defined power quite differently from it being resources or 
capabilities, she defines power in the following way: “Power is simply the ability of a person or 
group of persons so to affect outcomes that their preferences take precedence over the 
preferences of others.”101  That means quite straightforwardly that I have power when in a 
contested issue my preference overrides the preference of others, a circumstance which affect the 
outcome.  
Susan Strange discussed three kinds of power altogether: structural power, relational power and 
relative power. Structural power has been defined by Strange as “the power to shape and 
determine the structures of the global political economy within which other states, their political 
institutions, their economic enterprises and their scientists and other professional people have to 
operate.”102 Relational power is “the power of A to get to B to do something they would not 
otherwise do”103 and relative power is: “The relative power of each party in a relationship is 
more or less, if one party is also determining the surrounding structure of the relationship.” 104 
The difference between the forms of power lies in the awareness of the party when using one or 
the other kind of power. For example, with structural power, the fact that it is less visible makes 
the one using it unaware of its existence. A contrario sensu, with relational power, one has 
always the comparison of one actor in relation to the other, it comes to a situation where party A 
already knows that party B does not want to do what A wants but A consciously uses its superior 
power, in comparison to that of B, to make B do what A wants. There is intention. With regard to 
this differentiation, Susan Strange claimed: “In relations with others, it is much harder to think of 
power being exercised by one party over another unconsciously, without deliberate intent. But 
when you think of power in terms of power over structures, it is easier to understand that 
relations existing within those structures are affected, even though it may be inadvertently.”105 
Strange’s idea of conceptualizing structural power as the ability to shape the framework is what 
makes her theory most relevant for this work. According to Strange, “Structural power, in short, 
confers the power to decide how things shall be done, the power to shape frameworks within 
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which states relate to each other, relate to people, or relate to corporate enterprises.”106 The 
power comes from having control on the structures of the system, and that is structural power.107  
Structural power determines this framework, it affects different layers, it is not just vertical 
because it does not imply a hierarchy; it is neither horizontal because it does not affect just one 
level, it merges in all layers operated by actors, national and international. 
According to Strange, within structural power, there are four dimensions: security, production, 
finance and knowledge. The security structure, provided by the protection against violence and 
the ability of providing this protection becomes power over others; the production structure, with 
the combination of factors like labour, capital, technology, which now have no territorial 
boundaries, gives power to the one controlling this production; financial structure provided by a 
form of power held by the one in control of credit provision; and finally, knowledge structure, 
which provides a form of power to the one in control of its communication, and who also has the 
ability to deny access, acquire or develop knowledge (technology). 
Due to this division, structural power becomes less noticeable than just, for example, military 
power; the control over the four main structures -security, production, finance and knowledge- 
already sets the framework in which parties operate. In this sense, Susan Strange proposes that 
power is not conceived in the traditional form. Therefore, while others claimed that the US is 
losing its hegemony, she had the opinion that it did not because the US still held structural power 
by having control on the other dimensions of structural power.  
It is important to notice that with this division of the structures of power and because they are 
less noticeable there is no need for the one bearing it to coerce others with it, the choices parties 
have will just become less narrow when one of the parties have structural power.  
Susan Strange gives the example of parenthood, as a comparison to structural power: “When 
Mother or Father says, ‘If you’re a good boy and study hard, we’ll give you a bicycle for your 
birthday’, the boy is still free to choose between studying hard and going out to play with 
friends.  But the choice is weighted more heavily in favour of studying by the parents’ structural 
power over the family budget.”108 
When explaining the trading system, Susan Strange said that the rules contained in it were the 
product of the translation of the structural power over security (one of the four elements forming 
the structure). She claimed “the nuclear protection given to the allies by US missiles and nuclear 
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weapons was translated into structural power over the rules of the international trading 
system.”109 
In her concept of structural power Susan Strange acknowledges not only states but other actors, 
namely all those who operate in the framework. All actors get affected by structural power it but 
not in direct relation to each other, they can also get indirectly affected because one of them can 
alter the framework where they have to operate.  
Susan Strange claimed: “[P]ower over others, and over the mix of values in the system, is 
exercised within and across frontiers by those who are in a position to offer security, or to 
threaten it; by those who are in a position to offer, or to withhold, credit; by those who control 
access to knowledge and information and who are in a position to define the nature of 
knowledge: Last but not least, there is the production structure, in which power is exercised over 
what is to be produced, where, and by whom on what terms and conditions.”110 
Susan Strange criticizes Keohane’s adoption in his theory of a liberal economic concept of 
rational actions motivated by a single objective because of it being static.111 Depending on the 
actors’ values, priorities will surface but these priorities can change and so the actors’ actions.112 
As mentioned previously, Susan Strange has claimed that structural power is exercised by those 
who have power over others and over the mix of values in the system.113  
Strange has claimed a shift of the power normally conceived, in which the balance of power was 
just an issue among states. She has pointed out the greater authority that other actors have in the 
system. She claimed: “the main outcome of this structural power has been a shift in the balance 
of power from states to markets.”114 
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Susan Strange’s structural power is helpful for analyzing the BITs regime because it does not 
concentrate on just states but also not on the actors per se. Instead it analyses the effects that the 
control over the structure, the framework which is the foundation of the system, in this case 
limited to the relations of actors in foreign investments and trading issues. The three assumptions 
that Susan Strange mentions in her book “The Retreat of the State”, are namely that politics is 
not limited to politicians and their officials, it is a common activity; that markets can exercise 
power over outcomes and that non-state actors also have authority.  
These assumptions make her theory very interesting in relation to the BITs regime because from 
these three assumptions, three conjectures can be made when we apply them to the BITs regime: 
1) Although BITs are only entered into force by states, the BIT regime through its enforcement, 
shows us that some disputes arose from civil society’s interests which attempted against the 
interests of corporations. In this way, these actors are part of politics, which is a common 
activity.  2) The activities of corporations exceed the control of the state´s territory; states have to 
react with policies against global market conditions, so in certain circumstances, it is the market 
which determines in which way and which policies states will have.  It is not something new that 
the activity of transnational companies has influenced markets, but their activities extend beyond 
a particular state’s reach. The major change in the production structure is due to technology, and 
technology is owned by corporations and not states.  3) BITs show us that actors other than the 
state are involved. Foreign investors, who are mainly multinational companies, have gained the 
right to sue host states, without intervention of their own states. They can enforce this right when 
a host country does anything that would go against the security of their investment in such 
territory. Corporations are having a preponderant role in the BITs regime. 
The above mentioned considerations make the theory of Susan Strange an adequate theory to be 
applied and juxtaposed to the BITs regime because of comprehending the awareness of changes 
in the traditional conceptions of power, of actors and politics.  
1.4. Working beyond Susan Strange’s concept of Relative Power 
There have already been attempts to expand on the theory of Susan Strange, especially in regard 
to structural power.115 Strange’s concept of structural power, according to the position of 
Pustovitovskij and Kremer, lacked operationalization and application. Therefore, they provided 
more insight to the concept of structural power. According to Pustovitovskij and Kremer, 
structural power provided resources which could be turned into goods and needs. Furthermore, 
these resources can also turn into the outside options that a party can have which determines their 
structural power.  
In regard to the outside options which refer to alternatives, the idea of viewing power in relation 
to these alternatives, would lead us to the line of thought of Keohane and Nye regarding the 
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vulnerability element in relationships. The approach of Pustovitovskij and Kremer does not, 
therefore, reject the possibility of a connection of Susan Strange’s theory with Keohane and 
Nye’s theory of interdependence. This claim, though, is difficult to sustain considering all the 
criticism that Strange gave to the asymmetrical interdependence theory of Keohane and Nye.116  
Depending on the outside options, it can be said that the party’s structural power can be 
relativized. Pustovitovskij and Kremer claim “structural power does not operate per se but 
through relativization.”117 The relativization implies the fact that a third party in the relationship 
can also have outside options, and in this way influence the relationship of the two original 
parties.118  
This approach however, concentrates on the power which actors as individuals have in relation to 
each other. Susan Strange has already pointed out the ‘relational’ type of power when contrasting 
the power in relation to another. On this point, this approach, just like Keohane and Nye’s 
relational power, are captured on only one form of power (relational) which Susan Strange 
criticizes for being intentional. 
Furthermore, there is a contradiction between this approach and Strange’s theory. Pustovitovskij 
and Kremer’s approach considers that structural power provides resources, the issue that Strange 
criticized the most, for structural power is not about resources or capabilities, it is a feature of 
relationships by which players can define the rules of the game. Therefore, I depart from such an 
approach because my approach focuses on working further Strange’s theory which does not 
consider relational power nor a relativization of a relationship in regard to their resources or 
alternatives.  
Susan Strange only developed the concept of structural power and its implication in world 
politics in her work. However, she has also defined a relative power as a distinct type of power. 
Thus, considering the importance of the definition provided, relative power should not be 
underestimated as it can also affect the structure. For this reason, I concentrate on elaborating 
further the concept of relative power. 
As mentioned above, Strange’s definition of relative power was: “The relative power of each 
party in a relationship is more or less, if one party is also determining the surrounding structure 
of the relationship.” 119 Relative power in this context is not seen as a power of a party in relation 
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to another. It is seen as an element which can modify the structure which those having structural 
power have determined. 
The development of this concept is important because of its application to the analysis of the 
international investment framework in a way that complements the existing definition of 
structural power. In this way, the criticism given to Susan Strange’s theory in regard to the lack 
of operationalization and application can be overcome by further developing Strange’s concept 
of relative power and contrasting it to structural power. With this, one could implement the 
operationalization and application of her theory in the international investment framework.  
Let us return to the example of the mother telling the little brother that he can only go out and 
play if the big brother is with him. I have described this power as relational power because the 
big brother has power in relation to his little brother (for example when deciding the game they 
are going to play-even if the little brother does not want to play that game). The moment that the 
mother sets the conditions or rules by which the little brother can play, the whole relationship –
mother-big brother-little brother- is characterized by structural power.  
Relative power comes into existence in this example when there is more than one little brother. 
Let’s say the mother has three or even four children and she establishes the same conditions 
under which the younger children can go out and play. When they all go out and play and the big 
brother wants to determine the game they are going to play, the two younger brothers, which 
have a different game in mind that they both want to play, can unite against the big brother. In 
such an event, it will not be so easy for the big brother to just go in and not play with his younger 
brothers, because his younger brothers can jointly tell the mother what is going on and point out 
the unfairness of the situation. In such circumstances, the mother most likely will tell the big 
brother to play what his younger brothers want. The younger brothers, by uniting with a shared 
interest, have been able to modify, even if by only a bit, their relationship under their mother’s 
conditions.  
It is in this sense that relative power works. It differs from other concepts of relative power: it 
does not concentrate on the actors but on the effect given to the framework. Relative power can 
be viewed in addition to structural power with the difference that whilst structural power holds 
control on all structures, actors with relative power can also affect these structures, even if it is to 
a lesser degree.120 While structural power builds or shapes the initial framework in which actors 
operate, relative power jumps at the already built framework and interacts with structural power 
by also determining the surroundings of the structure (in this case the framework), partially 
modifying it.  
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Thus, structural power allows the one bearing it to shape the framework where actors relate, it 
implies only the one bearing it to determine the structure. However, at the same time that 
structural power is held by one party, if there is a group united by the same interests, this group 
gains relative power that, to a lesser degree, can modify the already existing structure.  
For this reason, relative power is an important concept that scholars should be aware of because 
it affects the structure, the grounds, or framework which is the basis provided for countries to 
operate at international level.  
Relative power in comparison to structural power is even less noticeable (the group might not 
realize the power over the other actor because structural power might still obscure it) but it is 
equally important as structural power when we want to understand the international investment 
framework. 
In the work herein, I apply this concept, showing that two moments in history have shown that 
relative power exists at multilateral level. I restrict it to the formation and/or attempts of the 
international investment framework. Firstly, the existence of relative power in a United Nations 
setting and secondly, the existence of relative power in the negotiations performed at the World 
Trade Organization (WTO). Relative power resulted in these settings from the building of 
coalitions of actors to stand against the powerful actors who held structural power. The ones 
bearing relative power are developing countries when acting in coalitions at the multilateral level 
to include their interests in a proposed framework. 
These multilateral settings allowed including all countries’ interests to establish a framework. In 
the UN, the General Assembly adopted their resolutions by the majority vote of its members.121 
At the WTO though, with the peculiarity that the resulting decisions are not democratic -the will 
of the majority does not get upheld in lieu of the will of the minority. Instead, their decisions are 
carried out by consensus, with one state, one vote.122 Therefore, the legal formality proclaimed in 
the UN Charter and in the Agreement establishing the WTO is crucial because without it, relative 
power could not be used.  
By viewing the framework of international investment through the lenses of structural and 
relative power, I reject the idea of a paradox for explaining why developing countries agreed to 
the international investment framework because the answer is far from being unclear. We will 
see that the BIT regime has been possible due to the existence of structural power in the BIT 
regime. Apart from explaining why developing countries have signed BITs, this further explains 
why the international investment regime is changing or evolving; why developing countries are 
reacting against the BIT regime and why the multilateral attempts to regulate foreign investment 
have failed. 
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As the following chapters will show, the analysis of the international investment framework, 
viewed through the lens of structural and relative power, also shows that there is an international 
consequence derived from the strength of one form of power over the other. At the point where 
both structural and relative power clash, the formidability of structural power gets mitigated by 
the modification that relative power can make to the framework. Both forms of power, structural 
and relative, determine the framework. However, having and maintaining a preferable option, 
namely, the route where one’s “preference take precedence over the preference of others”123 
weakens the relative power that developing countries have been able to achieve at the 
multilateral level. 
The next chapter II describes two multilateral attempts to regulate international investments. As 
it will be described, these two multilateral attempts show evidence of the relative power of 
developing countries to modifying the framework for international investments.  
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CHAPTER II: International Investment at the Multilateral Level 
 
It is important to recognize the attempts to create international investment rules at the 
multilateral level because it reveals the intention of states to define a framework for international 
investments at the multilateral level which has balanced interests.124 
 
The first intention to define international investment rules in which participation was also given 
to developing countries happened at the United Nations (UN) forum. Around the 1960s and 
1970s, the UN enacted resolutions concerning foreign investments which contained provisions 
that favoured developing countries interests. This was achieved by the coalitions of developing 
countries which allowed them to preserve their interests in these resolutions, in contrast to only 
those of developed countries being a priority. However, the establishment of these rules as the 
framework of international investment failed.  
 
From 1994 to 2003 there were once again further attempts to regulate international investments 
at the multilateral level. This time these attempts had been forwarded to the World Trade 
Organization (WTO) forum. Once again, at this forum, an attempt to insert rules that favour 
developing countries was possible through the coalitions of developing countries. However, the 
establishment of foreign investment rules in this multilateral framework, once again, failed. 
 
This chapter describes these two periods in history that have defined an attempt to establish a 
framework for international investments at the multilateral level; in these two periods, the 
coalitions of developing countries played an important role. In both examples, the coalitions 
formed by developing countries influenced the attempts to establishing a framework for 
international investments at multilateral level by including their interests in what would have 
become the rules of the game. In both setting however, the attempts failed.  
 
Understanding why the attempts failed is part of the objective of this thesis. The first section 2.1. 
deals with the history of the UN resolutions and the role that coalitions had for these resolutions 
to be enacted.  Section 2.2. describes the negotiations at the WTO Ministerial conferences and 
further attempts to regulate investments. Section 2.3. describes the position of developing 
countries in the Ministerial conferences and how shared interests of developing countries 
developed at the WTO. Finally, section 2.4. highlights the importance of the coalitions of 
developing countries at the multilateral level and gives concluding remarks about how they 
brought about the relative power of developing countries. 
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2.1. The development of United Nation’s Provisions on Foreign Investments 
 
Developed countries have been the leaders in establishing the rules constituting a framework in 
which countries should relate to each other. Trade and investment are intertwined in this 
framework. The framework that developed countries established for the regulation of trade is the 
same one that made possible the creation of a framework for international investments, 
particularly characterized by the BIT regime.125 
 
Regulations for foreign investment protection can already be found in the 19th century, when the 
international duty of states to give compensation in case of expropriation of foreign property was 
recognized. One of its main problems, however, was to determine how compensation would be 
made.126 
 
In 1945, the United Nations was established. So was the Bretton Woods system, with the 
creation of new institutions that would govern the world economy, the International Monetary 
Fund, the World Bank and one component of it, the International Bank for Reconstruction and 
Development (IBRD). Two years later, in 1947, 23 countries agreed to establish the General 
Agreement on Trade and Tariffs (GATT). This institution was the result of the efforts, 
predominantly of the US, to reduce tariffs.127  
 
The GATT and its correlation to the US law can be summarized in what Brand (2012) has 
written: “The General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade had its origins in a U.S. State Department 
publication of 1945 that included a “Proposal for Consideration by an International Conference 
on Trade and Employment.”128 
 
On November 1947, the UN conference on Trade and Employment took place. It was referred to 
as the Havana Convention which started with the participation of 50 countries. At this 
Convention, its members intended to create another institution that would support the world 
economy; this institution was the International Trade Organization (ITO).129  
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The already existing GATT “formed the basis for the negotiation of a Charter for an 
International Trade Organization (ITO).”130 In 1948, the ITO draft or Havana Charter was agreed 
by the participants; it contained rules dispersed in different agreements, inter alias, on trade, 
tariffs, employment, investment. However, because of the already negotiated tariff reductions, 
the US congress did not ratify the ITO and without their participation the initiative to create the 
ITO failed.131 
 
In spite of the failure of the ITO, some elements of it were then transported to the GATT which 
became operative in 1948. At this time, there was a wave of newly independent countries and 
governments, which adopted measures that included expropriations. The regulation of foreign 
investments’ protection at this time was therefore critical.132 In 1949, the International Chamber 
of Commerce (ICC) prepared a draft of an International Code of Fair Treatment of Foreign 
Investment, and in 1957, private parties (with the leadership of the Deutsche Bank) gathered to 
prepare a draft of International Convention for the Mutual Protection of Private Property Rights 
in Foreign Countries or Abs-Shawcross Convention.133 I do not focus on these drafts because 
they did not consider developing countries’ interests and because for other reasons they were 
nevertheless not adopted.134   
 
The UN, as the predominant multilateral organization at the time, supported the newly 
independent countries. In 1952, the UN General Assembly passed Resolution No. 626/1952 
“Right to Exploit Freely Natural Wealth and Resources”, which recommended all states to 
respect the sovereignty of any state over its natural resources.135 In 1955, however, the GATT 
enacted a resolution that “urged countries to conclude bilateral agreements to provide protection 
and security for foreign investment.”136  
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In 1962, the UN enacted the UN Resolution No. 1803/62 “Permanent Sovereignty over Natural 
Resources” which established that the expropriation of foreign investments and the 
compensation thereof were going to be ruled by the law of the host country and international 
law. The expropriation provision stated:  
 
“Nationalization, expropriation or requisitioning shall be based on grounds or reasons of public 
utility, security or the national interest which are recognized as overriding purely individual or 
private interests, both domestic and foreign. In such cases the owner shall be paid appropriate 
compensation, in accordance with the rules in force in the State taking such measures in the 
exercise of its sovereignty and in accordance with international law. In any case where the 
question of compensation gives rise to a controversy, the national jurisdiction of the State taking 
such measures shall be exhausted. However, upon agreement by sovereign States and other 
parties concerned, settlement of the dispute should be made through arbitration or international 
adjudication.”137 (my highlights) 
 
Developing countries were questioning the Bretton Woods system because they claimed it 
benefited only those who created them. Due to such an uprising of developing countries’ 
demands, the United Nations Commission for Trade and Development (UNCTAD) was created 
in 1964 to support developing countries.138 
 
There were intellectual gatherings of developing countries’ representatives who stopped 
believing in the western liberal model when discussing these issues. These gatherings then 
became known as the Third World Forum which was a network created by official and non-
official representatives of developing countries.139 
 
Many developing countries shared the same ideas and it was these shared interests which 
resulted in the formation of a coalition at multilateral level to support developing countries 
interests.140 In the first session of the UNCTAD, the biggest coalition of developing countries 
formed, it was called the ‘Group of 77’.141 The strength of this coalition allowed developing 
countries to fight for including their views at the multilateral level and so it was that more UN 
resolutions that favoured developing countries interests on foreign investments were enacted.  
 
                                                 
137
 UN General Assembly Resolution No. 1803 (XVII) of 14 December 1962, "Permanent Sovereignty over Natural 
Resources" Articles 3 and 4. 
138
 History of the UNCTAD available at http://unctad.org/en/Pages/About%20UNCTAD/A-Brief-History-of-
UNCTAD.aspx (last visited November 1, 2012). The first Secretary General of this Organization was Raul Prebisch, 
one of the predominant exponents of dependencies theories (mentioned in Chapter I). 
139
 Cox, Robert “Ideologies and the New International Economic Order. Reflections on some recent Literature” 
International Organization Vol.33 No.2. 1979. p. 262-263 
140
 ibid; also Narlikar, A. International Trade and Developing Countries. Bargaining coalitions in the GATT & WTO  
Routledge. 2003 
141
 Establishment of the Group of 77, available at http://www.g77.org/doc/ (last visited November 29, 2012) 
39 
 
In 1966, the UN Resolution No. 2158/66 “Permanent Sovereignty over Natural Resources” 
recognized the right of countries to participate in the administration of foreign enterprises and 
established a duty for foreign investors to train local personnel.142  
 
The UN resolutions so far were in favour of the sovereignty of developing countries over their 
resources. They also contained provisions promoting the development of the host countries and 
determined that in case of compensation for expropriation or disputes the law of the host 
countries should be applied. It is in this sense that these resolutions gave many advantages to 
developing countries for the treatment of foreign investments. In 1967, however, there was a 
counter reaction by the OECD which attempted to create a draft on the Protection of Foreign 
Property.143 This draft was not adopted; on the contrary, because of the strength of the coalition 
of developing countries, there were more UN resolutions favouring developing countries. 
 
In 1973, the UN Resolution No. 3171/73 “Permanent Sovereignty over Natural Resources” 
supported developing countries by stating: “the application of the principle of nationalization 
carried out by States, as an expression of their sovereignty in order to safeguard their natural 
resources, implies that each State is entitled to determine the amount of possible compensation, 
and the mode of payment, and that any disputes which might arise should be settled in 
accordance with the national legislation of each state carrying out such measure”144 
 
In 1974, the UN Resolution No. 3201 established a New International Economic Order to correct 
the inequalities between developed and developing countries.145 Furthermore, also in 1974, the 
UN enacted Resolution No. 3281/74 “Charter of Economic Rights and Duties” which stated: 
“1. Every State has and shall freely exercise full permanent sovereignty, including possession, 
use and disposal, over all its wealth, natural resources and economic activities. 
2. Each State has the right: 
(a) To regulate and exercise authority over foreign investment within its national jurisdiction in 
accordance with its laws and regulations and in conformity with its national objectives and 
priorities. No State shall be compelled to grant preferential treatment to foreign investment; 
(b) To regulate and supervise the activities of transnational corporations within its national 
jurisdiction and take measures to ensure that such activities comply with its laws, rules and 
regulations and conform with its economic and social policies. Transnational corporations shall 
not intervene in the internal affairs of a host State. Every State should, with full regard for its 
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sovereign rights, cooperate with other States in the exercise of the right set forth in this 
subparagraph; 
(c) To nationalize, expropriate or transfer ownership of foreign property, in which case 
appropriate compensation should be paid by the State adopting such measures, taking into 
account its relevant laws and regulations and all circumstances that the State considers 
pertinent. In any case where the question of compensation gives rise to a controversy, it shall be 
settled under the domestic law of the nationalizing State and by its tribunals, unless it is freely 
and mutually agreed by all States concerned that other peaceful means be sought on the basis of 
the sovereign equality of States and in accordance with the principle of free choice of means.” 146 
(my highlights) 
 
These UN resolutions and their provisions favoured developing countries, as they not only 
included their interests; the resolutions were showing a consensus on the recognition of their 
sovereignty. The fact that the UN passed these resolutions was only possible through the coming 
together of developing countries, which, by acting together and maintaining their interests at the 
multilateral level, managed to have a consensus favourable to them at the international level.  
 
This is the first evidence of developing countries’ relative power at the multilateral level. In a 
setting that has the purpose of determining rules for the future framework for international 
investments, developing countries achieved to modify it in a degree that such a framework will 
also include developing countries’ interests.  
 
However, other developments and formalities have not allowed for these rules to be the 
framework for international investments. Although the UN General Assembly Resolutions could 
reflect state practice and thus reflect customary international law,147 the UN General Assembly 
Resolutions are only recommendations and they can be used by its members to enter into treaties 
but they are not binding, their value is considered de lege ferenda.148 
 
However, although states ought to pursue treaties deriving from the content of these resolutions, 
in Europe, there was a wave of Bilateral Investment Protection Agreements, which gave more 
protection to the home countries of where the investment was coming from, to the foreign 
investment per se and naturally, to the foreign investor. Germany was the first country to enter 
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into force a BIT with Pakistan in 1959.149 One has to consider though that the plausible cause 
was the way that other countries treated Germany after the World War II.150  
 
On the other hand, the US that did not have the same excuse, only three years after the last UN 
Resolution, in 1977, started its Bilateral Investment Treaty program. With it, the US was 
determined to customize their interests (opposite to the recommendations of the UN resolutions) 
through bilateral investment treaties.151 
 
2.2. The Attempt to Regulate Investments through the WTO and its Ministerial 
Conferences 
 
The second moment in history that attempted to regulate international investment at the 
multilateral level, which ought to include developing countries’ interests, was sought at the 
World Trade Organization (WTO), “which has evolved from the General Agreement on Tariffs 
and Trade (GATT), and U.S. trade law.”152 
 
Weiss (2008) stated: “International trade and investment, considered complements not 
substitutes by economists, have for a considerable time coexisted side by side…sometimes in the 
same international agreement.”153 And indeed, investment rules have been around since the time 
of the GATT through the WTO. 
 
In the Tokyo Round of the GATT (1973-1979) the US wanted to include investment in the 
agenda but it was unsuccessful.154 However, in the 1986 Uruguay Round of the GATT the US 
tried to include in the negotiations an agreement on investments155 and the Uruguay Round 
report stated that foreign investments were an important issue. The Declaration of the Uruguay 
Round in 1986 stated: “Following an examination of the operation of GATT Articles related to 
the trade restrictive and distorting effects of investment measures, negotiations should elaborate, 
as appropriate, further provisions that may be necessary to avoid such adverse effects on 
trade.”156 It was established that further provisions to avoid adverse effects on trade should be 
taken and this was something that all countries had to comply with.  
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In 1994, after the last Uruguay Round of the GATT, the WTO was established. This same year 
the members agreed on rules provided in three documents that are also relevant to investment 
rules: the General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS), the Trade Related Aspects of 
Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS) and the Trade Related to Investment Measures (TRIMS).157 
 
The GATS introduced the regulation of investments insofar as it governs services supplied 
through a commercial presence, and therefore, it allows for foreign investment.158 The TRIPS 
touches on investments insofar as it regulates the intangible assets of companies (intellectual 
property rights) and protects them; and the TRIMS prohibits governments to impose investment 
regulations that would restrict trade (for eg. requiring only domestic products for a particular 
project). 
 
The Trade Related Investment Measures (TRIMs) is the agreement among all which touched the 
most on investment. There was a five year period given for its review and so during these years 
the general investment measures remained always a point to negotiate at the WTO Ministerial 
Conferences yet to come.159 What is particularly relevant is that on the same round in which the 
WTO was created, so was the TRIMs and the TRIMs was proposed by the United States as a 
mechanism to solve the investment mechanism that distorts trade.160 
 
However, conflicting scholarly views define the posture of developing countries regarding 
TRIMS: On the one hand, Kumar (2003) has stated that developing countries resisted the 
TRIMS: “…despite the resistance of developing countries, the final act of the Uruguay round 
included an Agreement on Trade Related Investment Measures (TRIMs).”161 On the other hand, 
Hertel, Hoekman and Martin (2002), analyzing the subsequent negotiations rounds, had the view 
that developing countries fought to keep this multilateral agreement on investment measures. 
“Many developing countries have resisted the requirement to abolish TRIMS, arguing that they 
need such instruments to encourage industrialization”162  
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The TRIMS, although limited in applicability and not covering all the protections conceded by a 
bilateral investment treaty, is nevertheless a powerful instrument for countries to pursue 
interests.163 As an example, there is the claim presented by the United States, the EU and Japan 
against Nigeria, India and Indonesia in 2011. Nigeria, India and Indonesia were in the process of 
implementing some developments in their countries stated a mandatory requirement of using 
local products.164 The developed countries, pursuant to the TRIMs, submitted a claim against 
Nigeria, India and Indonesia to prevent them from using only local products. One important 
disposition of TRIMS is that there should not be a form of protectionism as to allow only 
national products for a certain activity.165   
 
Nevertheless, the importance of the treatment of foreign investment by developed countries was 
put into evidence again, since only one year after the creation of TRIMS, in 1995, the OECD 
tried to make a Multilateral Agreement on Investment (MAI). The MAI covered issues beyond 
of what was agreed in TRIMs, which was an instrument between countries only, with limited 
protections for the investments and investors. However, it failed because of the OECD country 
members’ lack of consensus on the matter.166 
 
And so the WTO remains the multilateral forum which although it establishes a framework for 
trade, with the intention of regulating trade related aspects, other issues apart from trade are 
sought to be regulated. It intends to include investment through the regulation of ‘investment 
trade related measures’. 
 
The Ministerial Conferences of the WTO are in theory the forum where developed and 
developing countries come together to agree on a framework in which they are going to relate. 
The multilateral setting, in which the international trade regime was set, provided a type of 
global governance approach by which at least pursuant to formalities, countries can decide 
together on issues of world trade.167 
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Such a setting intends to reduce the asymmetries between states and pursues to have a more 
balanced relation of power when negotiating.168 A description of the advantages of a multilateral 
regime is described by Blum (2008) in the following way: “The multilateral setting also compels 
every party to contract with every other party. This limits the ability of stronger powers to design 
discriminatory regimes that may favor some at the expense of others. The conjoining of efforts 
and resources also allows weaker states to participate more cost-effectively in multilateral 
negotiations, whereas in the bilateral setting they would have had to independently shoulder the 
burden of negotiating… Consequently, arrangements that are devised within a multilateral 
framework, as in the areas of international trade or the environment, are perceived as more equal 
and fair.”169 
 
Although from a developed countries’ perspective, environment, health, labour and investment 
among others, are issues that should be considered as connected to trade in order to aim at freer 
trade which is the ultimate objective of the WTO, the regulation of investment at multilateral 
level was said to be a strategy protecting the developed countries’ interests.170 On the other hand, 
for developing countries, jumping onto a framework defined by developed countries means to 
enter into commitments such as liberalizing their economies, reducing protectionism and opening 
their markets and to achieve these, they have to adapt their legislation respectively. 
 
This is the context in which investments rules are attempted to be materialized at multilateral 
level. The area of investment, however, cannot be analyzed in isolation in this context, since for 
the agreement of investment provisions at WTO level, other issues that were intended to be 
incorporated in the negotiations played a major role for the decisions, or lack of them. 
Agricultural issues have been, for example, a main issue for developing countries, which in 
many opportunities have expressed, that because of not having concessions by developed 
countries in these areas, chose to not agree on any of the other issues proposed, like public 
procurement, trade facilitation, competition, investment, labour and environment.  
 
                                                 
168
 Although Payne (2010) claimed marked asymmetries in the WTO, see Payne, A. “How many Gs are there in 
‘global governance’ after the crisis? The perspectives of the ‘marginal majority’ of the world’s states” International 
Affairs 86: 3. 2010.  
169
 Blum, G. “Bilateralism, Multilateralism, and the Architecture of International Law”  Harvard International Law 
Journal. Vol 49. 2008. p. 341 
170
 Kumar (2003) stated: “The attempt of developed countries to seek a multilateral regime on investment through 
multilateral trade negotiations is a part of their strategy to secure more favourable conditions for overseas operations 
of their enterprises that use FDI as a more of servicing foreign markets more than trade now.” Kumar, N. 
“Investment on WTO Agenda. A Developing Country Perspective and Way Forward for Cancun Ministerial 
Conference” Economic and Political Weekly. 2003. p. 3177 
45 
 
From the Uruguay round that created the WTO to the Cancun round, negotiations, which touched 
investment issues, have experienced problems of reaching an understanding and having a lack of 
consensus between developed and developing countries.171  
 
It is important, however, to analyze what happened to the efforts of including investment rules in 
the WTO because it can enlighten us on why having a multilateral framework for international 
investments is still not possible. By analyzing the countries’ statements at the WTO Ministerial 
Conferences, it can be pointed out that many other issues contributed to the lack of agreement. 
These events are worth discussing since they strengthen the claim developed in this thesis, 
namely, that there is relative and structural power in the investment regime, and that one 
weakens the other.  
 
2.3. The Developing Countries’ Positions at the WTO Ministerial Conferences 
 
In the following, I analyze both developed and developing countries’ perspectives at the WTO 
Ministerial Conferences in which investment was sought to be regulated. All these WTO 
conferences have been polemic due to the incorporation of new issues in connection to trade to 
the agenda, inter alias the proposal to regulate investment. 
 
Thus, the analysis includes the statement of the representatives of the US and EU on the one 
hand, and of South American countries on the other hand. This analysis is relevant for disclosing 
firstly, if developing countries made any propositions at such conferences or if they were there 
just giving an answer to the developed countries’ proposals; secondly, if there were any shared 
interests among developing countries and thirdly, how these shared interests allow or turned to 
the formation of coalitions.  
 
As a background, it is important to note that the Uruguay Round, which created the WTO, also 
included other agreements which were included as an Annex to the agreement establishing the 
WTO. These were: GATT 1994; Agreement on Agriculture; Agreement on the Application of 
Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures; Agreement on Textiles and Clothing; Agreement on 
Technical Barriers to Trade; Agreement on Trade-Related Investment Measures; Agreement on 
the Implementation of Article VI of the GATT 1994; Agreement on the Implementation of 
Article VII of the GATT 1994; Agreement on Preshipment Inspection; Agreement on Rules of 
Origin; Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures; and the Agreement on 
Safeguards. 
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Among these, one very relevant for South American countries is the Agreement on Agriculture, 
naturally, because these countries have an important agricultural sector. This agreement was 
established for the purpose of reducing agricultural support and other forms of protectionism 
which creates an unfair trade practices for countries. The Agreement on Agriculture establishes: 
“[T]he above-mentioned long-term objective is to provide for substantial progressive reductions 
in agricultural support and protection sustained over an agreed period of time, resulting in 
correcting and preventing restrictions and distortions in world agricultural markets"172 
 
This Agreement has become the justification for South American countries to reject the 
proposals presented by developed countries, as they have claimed that developed countries did 
not comply with the commitments therein. Developed countries on the other hand, have 
concentrated on including new issues which are related to trade to the agenda of the WTO 
Ministerial Conferences, and among these, the regulation of investment.173  
 
- 1996 WTO Ministerial Conference, Singapore. 
 
The first WTO ministerial meeting was at the 1996 Singapore Ministerial Conference. This was 
the first meeting in which some new issues connected to trade, proposed by developed countries, 
were included in the agenda. The issues were investment, trade facilitation- specially referring to 
freeing trade in IT products (proposed by EU and US) competition (proposed by EU) and 
government procurement (proposed by US). These issues- investment, trade facilitation, 
competition and public procurement- became also known as the Singapore issues. However, 
labour standards and environment issues were also discussed at this conference.174   
At this conference, the EU encouraged the WTO to include other issues and investment was the 
“top priority.” The EU representative stated: “WTO must also pick up the new subjects like 
investment and competition…the arguments offered against negotiations in these subjects seem 
short-sighted and ultimately wrong…. Investment indeed seems to me the top priority for the 
WTO in the years ahead. Investment brings benefits to all... It is also an issue which is primarily 
for the WTO because it involves the development of an appropriate framework of binding 
rules.”175 (my emphasis) 
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The EU was, however, also already concerned with including issues like environmental issues 
and labour standards, and made the opening comment that they were willing to make the efforts 
and commit in order to allow market access to least developed countries.  
 
The US, apart from mentioning also a concern on reducing tariffs of technological products, 
added that government procurement should be more transparent and in the WTO these standards 
of transparency as well as due process for it should be agreed. The US further proposed to reform 
the WTO Agreement on Agriculture. Furthermore, they expressed their concerns on 
implementing the TRIPS Agreement (intellectual property) and that the WTO should be 
concerned with the environment. The US, interestingly, said that the WTO should fulfill “the 
mandate for sustainable development which resulted from the Rio Summit”176 (Note that the 
Kyoto Protocol resulted from the Rio Summit which was not ratified by the US).177  
 
The US also expressed their support to the EU proposals on working with investment and 
competition and stressed their concern regarding the respect of labour standards and basic human 
rights. They proposed working with the International Labour Organization (ILO), but added a 
disclaimer178 by stating: “We are not proposing an agreement on minimum wages, changes that 
could take away the comparative advantage of low-wage producers, or the use of protectionist 
measures to enforce labour standards. We are proposing that the concerns of working people - 
people who fear that trade liberalization will lead to distortion - be addressed in a modest work 
programme in the WTO.”179 
 
On the other hand, developing countries indeed answered these proposals. South American 
developing countries said that there was a lack of commitments of the Uruguay Round 
agreements by the WTO members. Therefore, they raised their concerns by pointing out that all 
members should respect the commitments of the Uruguay Round in order to fulfill the objective 
of a freer trade. 
  
Interestingly, developing countries also stated quite markedly that they have complied with the 
requirements discussed at the Uruguay Round and held to their commitments. They had opened 
up their markets and liberalized their economy, and had established the whole dispute settlement 
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regime so as to fit the WTO regime. Therefore, South American developing countries stated that 
they expect the other members (mostly referring to developed countries), would do the same.180 
 
Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Guyana, Ecuador, Paraguay, Uruguay, and Venezuela (9 out of 
12 sovereign South American countries) complained about the lack of compliance by developed 
countries of the WTO Agreement and especially on the agricultural issues. 
 
In terms of the answer given by South American countries to the new issues that were proposed, 
the perspectives on each of them varied. Bolivia did not seem to have any problems with 
investment issues, since they stated that they supported the Working Group. Furthermore, they 
did not object to environmental norms, which they saw as being part of a broader framework and 
something which all had to share responsibility for.  
 
Regarding labour standards, however, Bolivia was against negotiating on labour standards 
because the WTO was not the appropriate organization for that and stated that they nevertheless 
had ratified many international labour conventions of the ILO which gave their juridical order 
advanced labour laws. 
Ecuador referred to the ‘new issues’ as disguised forms of protectionisms proposed by developed 
countries: “…it is of fundamental importance that the commitments agreed should be respected 
and that there should be no disguised forms of protectionism, linked to labour standards or to 
environmental protection, for example.”181 
Ecuador questioned why in such a short time labour propositions were submitted which was a 
matter that affected developing countries and not developed countries and that the WTO’s sole 
objective was freer trade. Ecuador, furthermore, mentioned the risk of ending up with a lack of 
consensus because of including these issues and said that the WTO was not the forum for 
discussing, for example, labour issues. 
The inclusion of environmental protection was for Ecuador “a pretext to apply unjustified 
restriction within the markets of developed countries.”182 As for investment, Ecuador did see the 
necessity of having improved agreements. “Ecuador believes that special consideration should be 
given to the need to make progress in examining the relationship between integration schemes 
and multilateral rules and conclude improved and more suitable agreements in the areas of 
services, telecommunications and investment.”183 
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With regard to the new issues, Paraguay stated that they should be analyzed in the light of the 
interests of all WTO members, by mentioning: “… the raising of new issues in the WTO should 
be the result of a process which takes into account the interests of all its Members and does not 
favour the special interests of some of them. The terms of reference need to be adjusted in the 
light of the fundamental rule of balance and negotiations must take into account the need for 
transparency and fairness.”184 
As for Brazil and the ‘new issues’, it is very interesting to see that Brazil was in favour of most 
of them.  Most importantly, although Brazil had not ratified any BITs with developed 
countries,185 Brazil was in favour of creating a multilateral investment regime under the WTO. 
Brazil’s representative stated: “We have already indicated our readiness to accept the creation of 
a working group within the WTO to address the issue of trade and investment. This working 
group should allow Members to fully understand all the implications of the relationship between 
trade and investment. We shall be prepared to engage in full negotiations on an Agreement 
on Investments and we consider that these should be carried out within the framework of a 
truly multilateral organization such as the WTO.”186 (my emphasis) 
Brazil suggested the creation of a Working Group for Public Procurement. Regarding labour, 
they said that they have ratified almost all ILO’s Conventions and thus, the proposed labour 
standards were part of its legislation. Brazil claimed, as the other Latin American countries, that 
their legislation already contemplated all those labour standards that were discussed in the 
negotiations. Furthermore, that it was the ILO the competent authority to enforce those measures 
and not the WTO.  
As one can see, the similarity of the claims by South American countries in this 1996 WTO 
conference, which introduced the new issues, is striking. First of all, there were common grounds 
on the statements referring to the fact that developing countries complied with their 
commitments to liberalize their markets and economies, because that ought to bring freer trade 
and eliminate trade barriers, and it was what was agreed at the Uruguay Round. Developing 
countries claimed that they expected developed countries to do the same, and this leads to the 
second point of claim that referred to agricultural issues. Nine out of twelve statements further 
expressed that developing countries have opened their markets, whereas developed countries did 
not eliminate their trade barriers and subsidies which was affecting the agricultural sector of all 
South American countries.  
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Another point related to the new issues connected to trade, shared interests were also disclosed. 
Whereas some were in favour of discussing and further working on these issues, there were 
others who opposed to their treatment.  
Regarding investment, the views were more varied. Some countries said that they already had the 
protection by BITs, others said that they needed improvement in this area, and others, like Brazil, 
the country which ratified no BITs with developed countries, pushed for having a multilateral 
investment agreement.  
Regarding environmental issues, the opinions also varied. Bolivia, Brazil and Chile were in 
favour of it due to their importance, Ecuador rejected it, Peru said there should be further study 
and Paraguay, although it did not reject them, said that it was an issue that should be treated 
respecting all members’ interests.187 
 
Regarding labour however, the majority of the South American countries (7 countries) did not 
agree to include these issues in the negotiations. They claimed that the labour standards were 
already complied with in their countries because of the ratification of the ILO conventions.188 
Argentina, Peru and Uruguay did not mention them, Paraguay said this had to be discussed in the 
interest of developing countries and only Chile was in favour of it. 
Other issues were also commented on, like the dispute settlement mechanism which South 
American countries expressed their agreement of further work on it because of its importance; 
and intellectual property, mentioned by Paraguay and public procurement, mentioned by Brazil, 
Chile and Suriname.  
The Conference ended with the agreement of establishing working groups for the new issues for 
further discussion and analysis and to have cooperation with other international organizations 
like the ILO for the labour standards and the UNCTAD for investment issues.  Most importantly 
for investment was that in this conference a Working Group on Trade and Investment was 
created with the task of coordinating the relationship between trade and investment. Although 
this group could have been the middle ground for negotiations, issues regarding trade and 
investment remained controversial in WTO negotiations. 
 
- 1999 WTO Ministerial Conference, Seattle.  
The second 1998 Ministerial Conference did not consider issues of investment. However, they 
were mentioned again in the third 1999 Ministerial Conference in Seattle. At the 1999 
Conference, countries had to negotiate on issues that although they were not new - as the 
developing countries’ statement disclosed- the negotiation of these issues expanded their reach to 
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society. Society took interest in these issues (trade being connected to other issues affecting 
society) and expressed their concerns through NGOs. The 1999 WTO Ministerial Conference 
held a major social demonstration against the meeting held in Seattle because the issues treated 
in the meeting meant for them a negative impact on society and the environment.189 Therefore, 
what also got involved in the multilateral level is more social concern.  
 
Therefore, O´Brien, Goetzz, Scholte and Williams (2000) speak of a ‘contesting of global 
governance’ because of the encounter between multilateral economic institutions and social 
groups.190 On the other hand, Cox (1997) sees in this phenomenon that multilateralism tries to 
“reconstitute civil societies and political authorities on a global scale, building a system of global 
governance from the bottom up.”191 It is bottom up because actors other than the state and 
especially civil society participate at multilateral level.  
 
However, after the developing countries had expressed their concerns in the last Ministerial 
Conference (Singapore), the EU addressed the developing countries’ worries on protectionism 
and made reference to the importance of the demonstrations because, as they claimed, it reflected 
on the importance of the matters under discussion.  
 
The concept of ‘multi-functionality’ in agriculture was raised in the meeting.192 The European 
model of agriculture was a multi-functional model. This meant that one has to consider other 
issues connected to agriculture like preserving the landscape, rural labour, environmental 
protection, and food security. On the one hand, this was seen as the bridge that the EU needed to 
include these issues in the WTO forum, on the other, it was seen as a justification for keeping the 
agricultural subsidies in its economies.193  
The EU made no comment on the issue of multi-functionality in their statement, rather, they 
expressed a strong position on the issues that they had proposed in Singapore. It was determined 
by their statement that they would be willing to reduce subsidies ‘if’ the new issues were 
accepted. The EU statement, furthermore, made the following remark: “In years to come, people 
will wonder why the world hesitated to start negotiations over investment, competition, and trade 
                                                 
189
 The EU Statement of the Seattle Ministerial Conference referred to 50.000 to 100.000 demonstrators.  
190
 O’Brien, R., Goetzz, A., Scholte J. and Williams, M. “Contesting Global Governance” Cambridge Studies in 
International Relations No. 71. Cambridge University Press. 2000. p. 3 
191
 Cox, R. The New Realism: Perspectives on Multilateralism and World Order Basingstoke: Macmillan/United 
Nations University Press. 1997. p. xxvii 
192
 According to the WTO’s Glossary, the term multifunctionality is the idea that agriculture has many functions in 
addition to producing food and fibre, e.g. environmental protection, landscape preservation, rural employment, food 
security, etc. 
193
 See Potter, C. and Burney, J. “Agricultural multifunctionality in the WTO: legitimate non-trade concern or 
disguised protectionism?” Journal of Rural Studies 18. 2002 
52 
 
facilitation…if we do not start these negotiations here and now, it could be ten years before we 
really tackle these vital issues.”194 
The issues concerning the environment and labour were again raised. The worries of developing 
countries were discussed and it was stated that these issues had the purpose of “not just to 
prevent the possibility of unfair protectionist sanctions, but to avoid even the suggestion that this 
could happen.”195 
The EU proposal at this meeting also mentioned their intention towards benefiting developing 
countries in respect to aiding their development: “That is why we are calling for all the richer 
countries to offer duty free access to the least developed.  That is why we are looking afresh at 
what we do by way of capacity building, technical assistance, and special and differential 
treatment.”196 
The US, as the host of the meeting, made similar comments to that of the EU in the sense of 
readdressing the issues of Singapore, and in the same sense, they stated they were willing to 
reduce for example the agriculture trade barriers, if their terms were to be accepted. The US 
representative declared: “If we approve a Ministerial Declaration that meets these tests, we can: 
…Aggressively reform agricultural trade by lowering trade barriers, substantially reducing trade-
distorting subsidies and other measures.”197  (my emphasis) 
In their statement, the US promoted the use of biotechnology products, and the way they ought to 
be approved which would establish commitments on many countries which disapproved the use 
of these products.198 It was further mentioned: “…and by helping us to ensure that farmers and 
ranchers can use biotechnology products approved through transparent, science-based, and 
timely regulatory processes, and consumers enjoy the benefit of safe and beneficial products.”199 
The US also addressed, upon conditionality of accepting the agenda they proposed, the provision 
of technical assistance for least developed countries to use the WTO dispute settlement 
mechanism. With regard to the environment, the US mentioned their desire of improving 
environmental protection but it is interesting to note that the US referred to a solution for the 
environment which would be to stop an activity which they themselves created, like the 
agricultural subsidies (which  had long been criticized by developing countries). The US 
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representative stated:  “Ensure sustainable development, by opening trade areas such as 
environmental goods and services that improve environmental protection; and eliminating 
environmentally damaging subsidies such as agricultural export subsidies and fishery subsidies 
that contribute to overcapacity”200 Last but not least, just as in Singapore, the US stated the 
necessity of creating a Working Group to study the relation between trade and labour standards. 
These proposals, which acknowledged the answers given by the developing countries in the 
Singapore conferences, nevertheless reinstated the necessity of agreeing to the new issues, this 
time upon conditionality for developing countries (getting what they wanted, mainly reduction of 
subsidies in the agricultural sector, if they agreed to the proposals). The developing countries’ 
answers were the following: 
Every South American country complained about the agricultural issues.201  For example, 
Argentina, Bolivia and Ecuador made a strong complaint about the existing imbalance in the 
agriculture sector, due to developed countries.  
Argentina’s representative spoke of a “protectionist obsession discernible in the proposals of 
some of the most prominent members of the OECD.”202 Bolivia’s representative stated that 
“Bolivia is not prepared to accept greater liberalization commitments if their benefits are solely 
in the interests of other countries.”203 Ecuador and Brazil, on the other hand, spoke of 
discrimination204 and complained, as before, about the lack of reciprocity of developed countries. 
Ecuador’s representative claimed that: “…despite the substantial contribution to trade 
liberalization, the developing countries are still facing increasing marginalization and unequal 
redistribution of the benefits of increased world trade, since protectionist barriers and high tariffs 
persist, particularly in developed countries.”205 Uruguay expressly mentioned that the agriculture 
issue was a deal breaker for them. In a similar vein Paraguay, Colombia, Chile, Peru, Guyana 
and Venezuela joined in the complaint.  
The rejection of the multi-functionality concept was also expressly stated by half of the total of 
South American countries, the other half did not refer to it, none agreed with it. Argentina, 
Bolivia, Brazil and Uruguay viewed it as a protectionist measure, while Paraguay viewed it as 
against development. 
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In a similar vein, a majority was reflected in rejecting the treatment of the other issues such as 
labour (10 countries out of 12) and environment (8 countries against 3 with no reference to it). 
Interestingly, at this conference Ecuador seemed to be open for negotiation, including investment 
as long as the interests of developing countries were also taken into account.  
South American countries shared the opinion that environmental issues and labour standards 
should be treated by the appropriate and competent international organizations.206 Brazil’s 
representative stated that “Environment and labour standards…are two of such new issues being 
brought to the trade agenda in a way that leaves much room for suspicion. We are not convinced 
of the need to make changes in the WTO Agreements to that effect.”207 
Great importance is given by Brazil to the framework in which countries operate. Brazil in this 
meeting stated the following: “If free and fair trade is the name of the game – and most of us 
think it should be – we still have much to do to improve the rules by which we play. We all know 
that the world is no level-playing-field, but it is imperative that, at the very least, all players can 
trust that there are rules which apply to all alike, rules which are not written to protect the strong 
from their own weaknesses and to prevent the weak from taking advantage of their own 
strengths.”208 
The 1999 Seattle meeting has been regarded as a failure, or rather a collapse. Although the 
collapse was due to difference of opinions between developed and developing countries, Hertel, 
Hoekman and Martin (2002) have claimed that “the November 1999 ministerial meeting in 
Seattle turned out to be a fiasco, failing to launch a round. Domestic politics in the United States 
played a key role in the failure to attain consensus on a broad negotiating agenda, greatly 
reducing the willingness of the U.S. administration to agree to put items on the table that were 
opposed by domestic lobbies.”209  
 
However, from the developed countries’ perspective, it contained nothing more than the 
repetition of their proposal which they had made at the Singapore meeting. Both the US and the 
EU addressed the facts that developing countries were not happy about, namely the agriculture 
subsidies, but both the EU and the US made the statement to reduce the trade distortive measures 
in these areas ‘if’ all the other ‘new issues’ proposed by them would be agreed to. Rather than a 
negotiation, a condition for acceding to their terms was imposed. 
 
There was no room for propositions of developing countries. The South American countries 
complained about the status quo, this time with more emphasis than in Singapore. Furthermore, 
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the shared interests of South American countries on some points are also disclosed in this 
meeting.  
Firstly, the claims expressed by developing countries regarding the agricultural issues were 
unanimous. When in the previous meeting the statements contained just a point, indicating more 
awareness, after three years of no action by the WTO, nor actions from developed countries with 
regard to the developing countries’ claims on agriculture issues from the previous meeting, the 
developing countries statements took the form of accusations in this meeting.  
Most South American countries agreed that the maintenance of subsidies and barriers in the 
agricultural sector was discriminatory to developing countries, and that it was breaching the 
Uruguay Round commitments. Bolivia, Ecuador and Paraguay mentioned once again the costs 
that their countries had to incur to comply with the commitments of the Uruguay Round, for 
which they saw no reciprocity.  
Another shared interest was the claim by developing countries in regard to the ‘multi-
functionality’ in the agricultural sector by developed countries and especially by the EU policies. 
Even though there was no mention of this in the developed countries’ statement, since it was a 
domestic policy, most of the statements of South American countries used the WTO forum to 
complain about these policies, expressing that they were distortive to trade. Therefore, the South 
American countries rejected accepting the multi-functionality concept because according to them 
it was just another form of protectionism.  
Interestingly, Ecuador was in favour of treating the new issues of environment, investment and 
the others, as long as they were discussed in the light of interests and asymmetries between 
developed and developing countries; this is similar to Paraguay’s respective statement in 
Singapore. This was a change of view of Ecuador, since at the 1996 meeting they were against 
including environmental issues and at this meeting they were in favour of its treatment.  
Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Peru and Venezuela were against including environmental 
issues (contrary to the 1996 meeting in which Brazil was in favour of discussing environmental 
issues). Furthermore, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Guyana, Peru and Venezuela specifically 
mentioned being against including labour standards at this conference.  
Once again, when relating to the WTO framework, Brazil mentioned the comparison of power 
asymmetries that could be transported in the framework due to the negotiations between 
developed and developing countries. 
No agreement was reached in the Seattle meeting. The reason for the failure to come to an 
agreement was not only that the proposals of the developed countries were rejected. Developing 
countries perceived a lack of reciprocity and interpreted both the continuing agricultural 
subsidies of developed countries and their attempt to introduce the concept of multi-functionality 
as protectionist measures. 
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-2001 WTO Ministerial Conference, Doha. 
The Doha Ministerial Conference received the unresolved problems from the previous meetings. 
The investment issues were also pushed to this fourth 2001 Doha Ministerial Conference. This 
conference happened two months after the terrorist attack of September 11th and China was 
included as a new member of the WTO. 
 
The Doha Round was called the Development Round because development was the central issue. 
Furthermore, a social problem concerning developing countries arose in this meeting, regarding 
the necessity of having access to medicine to handle AIDS in African countries, which was 
challenged and prevented because of the intellectual property protection contained in the WTO 
TRIPS Agreement.210  
Considering these events, the results and considerations of developing countries from the last 
meetings, the developed countries proposed the following: 
The EU statement mentioned the failure of the last meeting in Seattle and further stated that 
“[w]e advanced neither classical trade liberalization, nor the so-called Singapore issues.”211  
However, the EU stated that they had been very flexible and that it was time for others to show 
flexibility too.212  The EU stated that this flexibility was on investment and competition and 
made a clarification on the rules on trade and environment. On agriculture however, they did not 
express such flexibility. 
The EU also stated the need to discuss the TRIPS and Access to Medicines, a point relevant for 
developing countries, especially in Africa. Furthermore, they restated their commitment to the 
environment: “And consider the need to integrate sustainability into the work of each and every 
negotiating group, so that we can take trade, support for the environment, and – of course – 
development forward together.”213 
The US made two important remarks in their statement. Firstly, they said that they are committed 
to opening their markets and secondly that they were open to liberalize agriculture. They further 
disclosed a fact of how much liberalizing the agriculture sector would benefit developing 
countries, when claiming: “Further liberalization of agriculture would provide a huge boost.  
And trade among developing nations offers untapped opportunities.  The potential is enormous.  
Just last week, the World Bank explained that the elimination of trade barriers would lift 300 
million people out of poverty.”214 
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Furthermore, an interesting aspect was that the US turned to group with the developing countries, 
as they stated that they shared the interest with developing countries on the agriculture issues: 
“The principal interest of the United States is to open markets for agriculture, industrial goods 
and services.  Our agenda is similar to that of most developing countries.  Nevertheless, we 
recognize that others are seeking a broader agenda.  We are committed to work cooperatively 
with all countries – developed and developing – to see if we can address these issues.”215   
On this meeting, the US complained about foreign subsidies and trade-distorting practices but 
just as the EU, they addressed the issue of medicine access and the TRIPS Agreement expressing 
that there was “confusion and misinformation about the flexibilities in the TRIPS Agreement.”216 
However, the US, as a promoter of the TRIPS, restated their position on pharmaceutical patent 
protection. They mentioned that the TRIPS can be flexible in that there are compulsory licenses, 
and that they are willing to give extra time to developing countries to comply with the TRIPs. 
Looking at the other side of the spectrum, the statement of South American developing countries 
were the following: 
The vast majority of South American countries complained about the agricultural issues once 
more.217 These countries claimed that subsidies were protectionist measures employed by 
developed countries against them.218 The Paraguayan representative said: “It suffices to cite the 
OECD study which states that in the year 2000, its Member States recorded a total of US$1 
billion per day in agricultural subsidies and that, on account of the denial of access for our 
products to the markets of developed countries and given the aforementioned support to their 
agriculture, we are being unfairly displaced from international agricultural trade.”219 
Paraguay stressed the “maintenance of special and differential treatment for developing 
countries.”220 The same was true for Ecuador and Brazil which pointed out that it was necessary 
to acknowledge the asymmetries among the members’ relationships. “If we are to have any hope 
of establishing meaningful special and differential treatment for developing countries, we must 
bring to an end all exceptions in favour of developed countries.”221 The lack of balance of the 
measures was also raised by Bolivia, Uruguay and the Brazilian representative stated: 
“Agriculture, of course, is the most glaring example of current imbalances and shortcomings.”222 
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Equally important was the shared interests on the health issues and TRIPS.223  The South 
American countries had an uncontested opinion that the TRIPS should be changed to do justice 
to developing countries.224 In these South American representative’s statements, the explicit 
mention of a coalition was not with regard to agricultural issues, as one might have thought, but 
with regard to intellectual property.225 Brazil, which promoted the TRIPS agreement, stated there 
should be some limits to it when health is involved.226 It was stated: “In the area of intellectual 
property, different readings of the TRIPS Agreement have given rise to tensions. To a certain 
extent, it is natural that conflicts of interest should reflect themselves in divergent interpretations 
of common rules. But the commercial exploitation of knowledge must not be valued more highly 
than human life. That is why we have been insisting, along with a broad coalition of likeminded 
countries, on the need to set out an authoritative statement on the TRIPS Agreement capable of 
clarifying its scope as far as public health is concerned.”227 
 
The topic on the environmental issues also continued to be rejected, specifically by Argentina 
which expressed that the proposals submitted by developed countries were seen to Argentina as 
restrictive to trade “rather than favouring it.”228 Bolivia stressed that they already have national 
laws protecting the environment and that the WTO is not the forum to discuss these issues. Once 
more, Bolivia’s representative stated in this regard that they are “opposed to any attempt to 
utilize this issue for the purposes of market protection.”229 
On the other hand, Uruguay showed its flexibility on topics proposed by developed countries 
such as investment, competition, public procurement, etc. but claimed nevertheless, that the 
framework should be beneficial for its members, but that it was not the case for developing 
countries which did not benefit from it.230 The representative from Uruguay stressed: “The time 
has come to correct these severe deficiencies and limitations; it is time to put the needs and 
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interests of developing countries at the core of our work and to allow them to improve 
significantly their effective participation in the multilateral trading system.” 231 
This meeting also showed some reflection on overall structures forming the framework. 
Paraguay made an interesting comment stating that multilateral agreements should work together 
with bilateral agreements, because the latter ‘pave the way for multilateralism.’232  
The 2001 Doha Development Round indeed treated issues of concern with development. One 
especially was the need of a statement with regard to the TRIPS and its limitation when public 
health is concerned, for example, as in the situation that was preventing developing countries in 
Africa to have access to medicine when fighting AIDS and other diseases.  
As one can see, the South American countries all shared the same interest on this matter with 
other developing countries, especially African countries. They all stated that ‘public health’ 
should be considered a priority to any provisions of the TRIPS (although this was not agreed to 
by the US).  
It is in this issue where the importance of coalitions comes to light. For the first time, in this 
Doha Ministerial Conference, a coalition among developing countries is expressly mentioned 
through Brazil’s statement.233 Developing countries stated that intellectual property issues and 
their connection to health should be analyzed considering the interests of developing countries. 
This coalition achieved a statement from the WTO regarding the TRIPS and public health, which 
hardly would have been possible if the coalition had not been formed.234 
The active participation of the developing countries also received attention. Hertel, Hoekman and 
Martin (2002) claimed in this regard: “…developing countries have demonstrated a willingness 
to participate actively and constructively in the WTO. This was reflected in the run-up to the 
Seattle ministerial and the role played in the process of defining a negotiating agenda. The 
inability (unwillingness) of the industrial countries to accept the necessary compromises helped 
scuttle the talks, but arguably helped set the stage for a more balanced agenda to be crafted at 
Doha.”235  
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On the other issues, not much in the South American statements changed since the Singapore and 
Seattle meetings. With regard to investment in the Doha round, Kumar (2003) has stated that 
although the Working Group on Trade and Investment did not conclude their work, the 
developed countries sought to include investment issues in the Doha round.236 As disclosed by 
the statements however, Uruguay showed its flexibility to investment, competition and public 
procurement while Ecuador was in favour of further working with the dispute settlement 
understanding, probably because of the great use that Ecuador had from it in the bananas case 
against the EU.237 
 
What is peculiar though, is that the US said they were open for market access, reducing tariffs 
and subsidies and that “the principal interest of the United States is to open markets for 
agriculture, industrial goods and services.”238 However, even after expressing the figures of how 
much this amendment would mean to reducing poverty, according to their statement, nothing 
concrete was promised: “We are committed to work cooperatively with all countries – developed 
and developing – to see if we can address these issues.”239   
According to Falke (2005) this was a strategy of the US to reject the approach of the EU. The US 
did not support the European agricultural objectives.240 In this strategy the US could stand 
against the EU with the other developing countries pursuing the objective of not including 
certain issues that the EU was proposing, and that did not benefit the US, in the framework. 
On the other hand, the EU statement also claimed that they have been very flexible in the past 
years. This flexibility, however, could be questioned since they stated that they were flexible on 
the proposed Singapore issues but not on the agricultural policies of the EU, about which 
developing countries were complaining.  
Developing countries had in this meeting once again mentioned the costs that their countries had 
to overcome to stay in the system. However, positive comments were also made; Uruguay 
favoured continuing with more liberalization and Ecuador said that their experience was good 
despite the costs. Argentina, on the other hand, stated that the rules should equitable if they were 
to continue with trade liberalization. This fact is a hint that the claims were not against the 
system per se but more against the members’ action.  
However, in Doha, South American countries strongly pointed out the problem regarding the 
agricultural issues, and again, there is evidence of a shared interest on this matter. Agreeing on 
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agriculture issues meant development for developing countries but although this was the 
development round, developed countries did not agree to eliminate agricultural subsidies which 
disfavour developing countries’ market access. However, Francois, van Mejil, van Tongeren and 
Evenett (2005) mentioned that if developing countries had liberalized their economy in the way 
it was expressed in this round, even with the unwillingness of developed countries to make 
reforms in their agricultural policies, developing countries could still have benefited.241  
 
Therefore, and because of the lack of agreement the Doha Round, this round has not been viewed 
as one with success. And again, blame was given to the lack of agreement between developed 
and developing countries. Kumar (2003) has pointed out that “…at Doha, the finalization for the 
draft Declaration was held up because of differences between the developed and developing 
countries on the investment issue, among others.”242 However, the work proposed in its agenda 
was meant to be continued in following meetings.  
 
- 2003 WTO Ministerial Conference, Cancun.  
The fifth 2003 Cancun Ministerial Conference was supposed to work further on the agenda 
developed in the Doha Round. The investment issues, among others, came to the negotiation 
once again due to the EU push.243  
 
The EU statement made a remark on the development agenda which was reflected in the active 
participation of developing countries. Regarding the access to medicine, the EU said that the 
WTO “can and will put people before markets.”244 The EU was aware of the power of the shared 
interests of developing countries and the strength that the coalitions were having, as they 
expressed: “we should avoid trying to re-create the confrontational north-south atmosphere of the 
1970s and 1980s.”245 In spite of this, the EU in this meeting pushed the treatment of what they 
had been trying to get agreed to since Singapore.  
The Cancun Round was also relevant for investment issues, because the Working Group on the 
Relationship between Trade and Investment had proposed in this conference the possibility of 
creating a Multilateral Investments Agreement (MIA) on the WTO context.  It was stated in the 
Cancun briefing notes that “…members have made it clear that the agreement they are proposing 
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to negotiate in the WTO bears no relationship to the OECD’s Multilateral Agreement on 
Investment (MAI)— in the WTO, negotiations would start from a blank sheet of paper.”246 
 
Blum (2008) states that this MIA proposal failed because of society’s concerns: “The efforts to 
devise a Multilateral Investment Agreement through the September 2003 Cancun round of WTO 
negotiations have been foiled due to civil society’s concerns about its effect on the environment, 
labor rights, and development.”247 According to Weiss (2008) the developing countries opposed 
to it due to the fact that the existing agreements were already a burden to them. Furthermore, he 
claimed that the investment policies is a matter of governments; that BITs already gave 
protections and that UNCTAD should be the forum and not WTO because of the development 
factor. Weiss reached this conclusion when analyzing that the obligations seemed to be only for 
developing countries while developing countries wanted to develop their own industries and that 
investment measures did not guarantee the increase of investments.248 
 
With regard to investment issues, the Cancun Ministerial meeting concluded the following: “We 
take note of the discussions that have taken place in the Working Group on the Relationship 
between Trade and Investment since the Fourth Ministerial Conference. The situation does not 
provide a basis for the commencement of negotiations in this area. Accordingly, we decide that 
further clarification of the issues be undertaken in the Working Group.”249 
 
On the agriculture issues, the EU just repeated that they were willing to look at the agreement 
(although it was an agreement that was concluded only with the US).250 Therefore, the main 
point, agriculture, was once again at the top of the claims that South American countries had.251  
 
South American countries pointed out the asymmetry in the system caused especially by 
developed countries not opening their markets in the agricultural sector. The point on 
liberalization costs providing no benefit followed. The representative of Bolivia stated that 
“…despite our on-going adjustment efforts, despite all the sacrifices we have made, the Bolivian 
people are not living any better than they did before embracing the trade liberalization 
model...”252 
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Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Paraguay, Peru, Uruguay and Venezuela expressly complained 
about agricultural issues and inter alias, protectionist measures and lack of compliance of the 
rules on behalf of developed countries.253  
Therefore, from what is disclosed in the statement of South American countries, the 2003 
Cancun conference did not have further issues to be negotiated than those described in previous 
conferences but the South American countries’ statements show that there is a lack of even 
mentioning issues other than the agricultural issues.254 
Awareness of a collapse for lack of understanding was stated by Bolivia and on the topic of 
poverty caused by barriers to agriculture, Brazil and Uruguay joined Bolivia on agreeing on the 
statement. Uruguay and Paraguay expressly stated the need for development and differential 
treatment in case of the latter. According to Uruguay, the statement to include development 
issues into the negotiation among countries did not mean that it has to be a unilateral concession 
from developed countries to developing countries. Paraguay, however, referred to the WTO as a 
means for raising the standard of living of its people, and seeking this purpose Paraguay stated 
that it is engaged in strengthening the WTO, as long as discriminatory measures will be 
abolished. 
Brazil’s statement in the Cancun conference was strong. Brazil’s representative stated: “None of 
the other issues in these negotiations remotely compares to the impact that the reform of 
agriculture can have on the alleviation of poverty and the promotion of development…. These 
nations, who account for more than half of humankind are united around the cause of agricultural 
reform.”255 
Furthermore, the representative of Brazil stated: “Yet, to call the Doha Work Programme a 
"development round" is not enough… Development goals and concerns must be effectively 
incorporated into the core of the WTO Agreements. They cannot be an afterthought in rules 
tailored to the needs of developed countries…”256 Not agreeing to these issues was, according to 
Brazil, a cause that could provoke the weakness of the system which, they said, they certainly 
did not want.  
The mention of a coalition on these issues was expressly stated, once again, by Brazil, referring 
to it as the G-21: “We, in the G-21, are organized for that purpose. We stand united, we will 
remain united. We sincerely hope that others will hear our message and, instead of confronting 
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us or trying to divide us, will join forces in our endeavour to inject new life into the multilateral 
trading system.”257 
From the developing countries’ perspective, this G-21 coalition of developing countries was the 
most important thing which characterized the conference. The coalition made sure to not accept 
the developed countries’ proposals until the developing countries interests were also taken into 
account. This coalition was formed by: Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, China, Cuba, Egypt, 
India, Indonesia, Mexico, Nigeria, Pakistan, Paraguay, Philippines, South Africa, Thailand, 
Tanzania, Venezuela and Zimbabwe.258 
However, because the differences between developed countries and developing countries that 
could not be solved, the Cancun Meeting was referred to, again as past meetings, as a collapse. 
Narlikar and Wilkinson (2004) blamed the whole structure of the agenda setting for the failure of 
the Cancun Round. They mentioned for example how the facilitators changed a 4 hour meeting 
into a 2 hour meeting and use the rest of its time “in bilateral consultations, in which developing 
countries felt even more vulnerable.”259 They described the Cancun Round as a ‘tug of war’: 
“…industrial states seeking to take the trade agenda forward by commencing negotiations on the 
Singapore issues and, on the other hand, developing members tenaciously pursuing market 
access into the notoriously protected agricultural markets of the North.”260 
 
What is directly disclosed from the statements, however, is that the developed countries made no 
concessions in regard to the developing countries claims, and neither did the developing 
countries believe in the promise of developed countries to address these issues if they would 
accept the proposed package. After the 2003 Cancun Ministerial Conference issues concerning 
investments were no longer treated. In 2004 the investment issues were removed from the 
agenda.261  
 
All the polemic of the aforementioned conferences can be summarized in the lack of a feeling of 
reciprocity by developing countries. While they had liberalized their economies, they saw 
developed countries as not doing the same, for they still did not eliminate their agricultural 
subsidies.   
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The new issues, although sometimes viewed positively by a country, which then changed its 
view in the next meeting, still were a proposal by developed countries which meant more costs to 
developing countries. With the lack of reciprocity experienced in the system, after a decade, as it 
has been seen, developing countries did not agree further and this meant not agreeing on a 
framework that does not comprehend developing countries interests. 
2.4. Relative Power of Developing Countries: Their Coalitions at the WTO. 
In the multilateral setting, when developing countries act in coalitions and alliances, they achieve 
a certain strength or power that makes them able to maintain their preferences under pressure 
from developed countries. Following Strange, I will call this their relative power: it enables 
developing countries to attempt and modify a proposed framework.  
Relative power has manifested itself when developing countries achieved to halt negotiations at 
the multilateral level if this meant that their interests would not be considered.  A contrario 
sensu, it is not a structural power because developing countries were not able to take negotiations 
further to establish new rules for the system in which actors would operate; instead, they were 
only able to slightly modify the existing rules, or keep them from being modified.  
Developing countries were able to gain this power due to the formal structures of international 
organizations.262 The fact that decisions are taken by consensus or majority at international 
organizations have given a great advantage to developing countries at the multilateral level in the 
sense that by having like-minded interests and by outnumbering developed countries, developing 
countries can include such interests in the framework in which actors would operate.  
 
It is in this sense that the framework to be defined at multilateral level has to include the 
developing countries’ interests. The like-minded interests shared by developing countries results 
in a form of power that they gain when acting in coalitions during the negotiations. It is a form of 
power because it counteracts the power of developed countries in the negotiations: it is the 
relative power which developing countries have gained when acting in coalitions in multilateral 
negotiations.263  
 
The WTO has become the most recent multilateral forum where the regulation of foreign 
investments has been attempted. Such as it has happened in the past, again, developing countries 
had united to fight for the inclusion of their interests in the framework of the WTO. However, 
Rolland (2007) expressed that is still an unbalanced position because developing countries have 
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to act in coalitions to face developed countries in negotiations at the WTO, when the fact is that 
developing countries are 75% of WTO membership.264 
At the WTO, Narlikar (2003) has claimed that an Informal Group of Developing Countries 
(IGDC) was present already since the Uruguay round but that its role changed after Singapore, in 
the sense that it has achieved important alterations in the WTO’s framework.265 Indeed, a 
framework with just developed countries’ interests was no longer agreed to.  
 
Developing countries sharing the same interests formed coalitions, for example, on agricultural 
issues, the WTO has categorized 4 developing countries coalitions: the Cairns group (wanting 
trade liberalization on agriculture); the G-10 (wanting to treat agriculture as a special matter 
because it has non-trade concerns); the G-20 (wanting to make more radical reforms) and the G-
33 (wanting flexibility for developing countries to open their markets in agriculture).266  
 
With regard to the trade related issues, or the new issues, this involved making an agreement on 
other areas apart from trade. Blum (2008) has stated that the aim to liberalize trade can conflict 
with the new issues whose connection to trade is intended: “regimes often conflict in their 
particular principles and institutions, their procedures and preferences, and their primary goals: 
trade liberalization versus environmental protection, development versus environmental 
protection, trade liberalization versus development, trade liberalization versus human rights, and 
liberal human rights versus communal human rights.”267  
 
South American countries had two problems with the ‘new issues’ proposed at the WTO. The 
first was that in spite of the concession that developing countries gave by opening and 
liberalizing their markets to accept a WTO framework, they did not get the same reciprocity 
from developed countries.268 Furthermore, that agreeing to these ‘trade related aspects’ issues 
would involve yet more commitments and costs to them. The second problem was that some 
developing countries were skeptical that the WTO was the right forum to deal with these ‘new 
issues’, and that furthermore, they already had sufficient international legislation with regard to 
these issues.  
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Developing countries claimed that the International Labour Organisation (ILO) was the 
competent body for labour issues and not the WTO and in that way managed the exclusion of 
labour standards from the WTO forum, which was proposed by developed countries since 
Singapore. This is a success on behalf of the developing countries’ coalition.  
 
Narlikar (2003) also mentioned the Like-Minded Group (LMG) coalition formed to reject the 
inclusion of the ‘new issues’. She claimed that this coalition achieved “some limited success in 
that the new issues were included only as part of a study program rather than actual 
negotiations.”269 During the Seattle and Doha rounds, Narlikar (2003) has categorized even more 
types of coalitions, namely, that of small and vulnerable economies; LCDs; the alliances with a 
developing country membership (the Development Box, G-24 on Services, and Friends of 
Geographical Indications); crossover and region based alliances. 
 
On the Doha round, the G-24 coalition also made an important achievement with regard to the 
TRIPs Agreement and the interests of developing countries. The draft that this group prepared 
was the basis for the Guidelines and Procedures for the Negotiations adopted in Doha. This 
coalition included: Brazil, India, Philippines, Thailand in a leading role, and also Argentina, 
Bolivia, Colombia, Cuba, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador, Honduras, India, 
Indonesia, Malaysia, Mexico, Nicaragua, Pakistan, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Sri Lanka, Uruguay 
and Venezuela.270  
 
Therefore, among South American countries, shared interests can already be seen since the 
beginning of the WTO rounds to later meetings, from Singapore to Cancun. The main shared 
interest has been the agricultural issues at the top of the list, followed by the non-reciprocity of 
commitments of the Uruguay Round, the rejection of the inclusion of the new issues or multi-
functionality concept for being disguised protectionist measures, and on the need of have a 
statement from the WTO with regard to the TRIPS and public health that would be drafted in the 
light of developing countries interests.  
 
The coalitions of developing countries were expressly mentioned in the South American 
statements given at the Doha and Cancun meetings, the latter mentioning the G-21 coalition.271 
And so, for the second time in the history, in the attempt to develop investment regulation at the 
multilateral level, there is another developing countries’ coalition. Before it was the Group of 77 
at UN multilateral level, now we have the G-21 at WTO multilateral level. In both cases, 
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developing countries interests halted building a framework considering only developed countries 
propositions.272 
 
The relevance of relative power should nevertheless not be underestimated, even if it is obtained 
through coalitions because it has shown effects in the WTO ministerial conferences; thus, it is 
producing an effect on international relations. 
With relative power and in this setting, it seems that it is no longer the case that developing 
countries have to stay in their role of “rule-takers” as Edward Kwakwa (2000) proposes when 
claiming that the developing countries’ task is to receive rules set by the more powerful states.273   
In conclusion, this chapter has disclosed two moments in the development of the international 
investment framework at the multilateral level that have put into evidence the relative power of 
developing countries.  
First, the multilateral setting was provided by the UN during the 1960s and 1970s. Developing 
countries, by acting in coalitions, supported each other’s acts and managed to get something out 
of the debates about foreign investment through UN resolutions. The coalition of developing 
countries (Group of 77) made the possibility of having foreign investment recommendations 
favourable for developing countries through the UN, in contrast to having rules which were 
solely on the interests of developed countries.  
Secondly, a multilateral setting for establishing rules on foreign investments was given by the 
WTO. Section 2.3. has revealed the evolution and development of the issues proposed in the 
WTO conferences with the direct statement of South American developing countries. It 
highlights important features arising of such meetings, for example, that developed countries 
were firm in their propositions hoping that at some point developing countries would accept 
them as this can be reflected from the fact that in every conference the Singapore issues were 
proposed. 
However, from the statement of the South American countries, it is also disclosed how 
developing countries shared the same interests. A peculiar fact results from this, namely that 
developing countries answered each of the developed countries’ proposals in the first meetings 
but ended up concentrating only on their interest regarding agriculture in the later meetings. The 
interests regarding agriculture were unanimous, and in spite of the fact that developing countries 
shared the same interests over many of the issues, it was the strong attachment to the interests of 
the unanimity that made them agree or jointly reject the other issues. 
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In this multilateral setting, developing countries again, by acting in coalitions, have been able to 
support their interests and decisions could not be adopted without considering their interests. 
This is the overall picture of developing countries’ relative power at the multilateral level.  
The following chapter describes the regulation of foreign investment at the bilateral level. It is of 
particular importance as it has tremendously affected the multilateral level. The awareness of the 
connection of the regulation of international investments in both settings reveals further 
consequences that will be detailed by the later chapters.   
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CHAPTER III: Investment at Bilateral Level. 
The current framework for international investments is given by Bilateral Investment Treaties 
(BITs) and their enforcement mechanism. However, the creation of such a framework, the 
established rules and who proposed the rules should be considered because it explains how the 
framework for international investment came about and what was intended with it.  
 
Although Bilateral Investment Treaties state as their objectives to increase investment and the 
welfare of the parties of such a treaty, the framework for international investment was created to 
provide protection for foreign investors in host countries. This protection consisted in a 
compensation for investors that had invested in foreign countries when these countries 
expropriated their investment.  
 
Since the work of this thesis refers to South American BITs, I limit the discussion of the 
examples in history to a South American context. The historical development is important 
because it can reveal what was lacking for certain parties involved in foreign investments. It can 
also reveal how the wording and concept of some elements that formed the BITs provisions 
derived from long historical dilemmas between developed and developing countries. 
 
On the one hand, foreign investors, when investing in a host country, had no direct way to 
protect themselves when a newly established government or country, in which their investment 
had been made, decided to expropriate such investment. Therefore, foreign investors had to bear 
all kinds of risks, including political and social risks. Foreign investors had to deal with a hostile 
environment for investments, rigid domestic laws, burdensome domestic bureaucracy, local 
justice, and the discretional power of the host state which could leave the foreign investor with 
no alternative, no recourse or hope of saving their investment when facing a unilateral 
amendment on investment policy coming from the host state. In case of disputes arising out of a 
foreign investment between an investor and a host country, before BITs existed, developed 
countries had to fight on behalf of their nationals. Diplomatic means were the mechanism used to 
resolve disputes. It was a state-to-state matter, and so the entire burden to resolve any kind of 
dispute was handed to the state of which the foreign investor was a national. 
 
On the other hand, there were developing countries, which in many cases were newly established 
by having acquired independence or a new form of government.  International law establishes 
the right of sovereignty and under this right they had the control over their natural resources and 
the right to regulate foreign investments pursuant to their laws and under their jurisdiction. 
 
Considering these two perspectives, the building of the framework for international investments 
presented a dilemma. The two main points of the dilemma can be summarized in the different 
views of countries for the inclusion of rules regarding expropriations and the determination of 
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how compensation should be given, on the one hand; and the mechanism of dispute settlement 
which would detach disputes from domestic jurisdiction, on the other. 
 
BITs have put a stop to this dilemma. The objective of the BITs is to provide foreign investors 
with a legal set of guarantees for their investments and to promote investments.  Home countries 
have achieved these guarantees that give protection to the investments performed in a host 
country, and so foreign investors could feel reassured and confident when taking their economic 
force into foreign territory. At the same time, developing countries, the other party to the 
agreement, ought to profit from the increase in prosperity that these BITs would give them, as 
that is what was stated as the purpose of BITs. 
 
Section 3.1. of this chapter highlights the historical developments that contributed to the 
framework for international investments. Section 3.2. will indicate what BITs are and Section 
3.3. will discuss whether all BITs are uniform. The intention is to bring to light the regulation of 
foreign investments at the bilateral level. 
 
3.1. The Historical Developments of International Investments. 
 
- Gunboat Diplomacy 
 
In the 19th century, the protection of international investments was given through a gunboat 
diplomacy. When a foreign investor had a dispute with the country hosting its investment, the 
investor used the diplomatic protection of its state to try and solve such a dispute.274 At this time, 
the management of disputes that arose from international investments was extraordinarily 
imbalanced and unfair because after using diplomatic means and if the dispute had not been 
solved, the more powerful countries threaten with the use of force or armed means. And in this 
setting, of course, a huge difference arose between the poor and less developed countries on the 
one hand, and developed and more powerful countries on the other. 
 
Three examples in South American history demonstrated how dangerous foreign protection of 
investments was for South American countries because in these situations the power 
asymmetries between developed and developing countries were accentuated.  
 
The first example is given by the blockage of Buenos Aires by the French Navy in 1840. The 
Argentinian government had extended the military service obligation to every foreigner with real 
estate in the country or to whoever had lived there for more than 2 years. France complained to 
Argentina about this law. France requested of Argentina the suspension of the military service 
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law for French nationals and further, France asked Argentina for their commitment to give them 
most favoured nation treatment guaranty275 and indemnifications for the French citizens, without 
signing any treaty. 
 
For this reason, and because Argentina refused to give France guarantees without a treaty, the 
French Navy blocked Buenos Aires. Although Grigera Naón (2005) claimed that this event 
marks one of the earliest use of arbitration in Latin America,276 the use of force by a more 
developed country was evident. The newspaper “La Gazeta Mercantil” published the answer of 
the Argentinean President which reflected the concern with the asymmetries of such behaviour: 
“To claim, with a canon pointed to us, privileges that can only be granted through a treaty is 
something that this government -as insignificant as it may be- will never be subjected to.”277 
 
The second example is the Triple Alliance War, a war in which Brazil, Argentina and Uruguay 
united to attack Paraguay in 1870. Although it might appear to have been a local conflict, some 
of the mediate causes were related to economic conflicts with a developed country, in this case, 
the British Empire.  
 
Rosa Luxemburg, for example, pointed out the influences of the British Empire as promoter of 
conflicts around this time in South America.278 In a similar vein, the historian John Cady gives a 
detailed account of the foreign intervention in the Rio de la Plata region around this time.279 
 
The illustration of one episode between Paraguay and the British Empire might describe the 
tension. Paraguay had been exporting mate tea, tobacco, cotton and exemplars of wood to 
Europe. The products were widely accepted in Europe and the international commerce grew. 
Nevertheless, because of Paraguay being a landlocked country, the Rio de la Plata280 navigation 
conditions were crucial for the good development of commerce.281 The UK, seeking further 
protection for its citizens commercializing in the region, wanted to sign a treaty of Friendship, 
Navigation and Commerce with Paraguay.  
 
The Paraguayan President, Marshal Francisco Solano Lopez, answered to Queen Victoria’s 
representative that the negotiation of a treaty would not be possible because a law providing the 
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guarantees of protection for international commerce to all foreigners was already in force.282 The 
answer by the letter dated December 29, 1852, attached the Decree that the Paraguayan President 
was referring to.  
 
From a second letter from President Solano Lopez, the UK’s answer to the aforementioned letter 
is revealed: It is disclosed that the UK disregarded the Paraguayan national law that President 
Solano Lopez was referring to and furthermore, the UK, in order to insist on its position of 
wanting a Friendship, Navigation and Commerce treaty with Paraguay, stated that they would 
only accept Paraguay’s independence if Paraguay would sign the treaty with the UK. This letter 
also discloses the Paraguayan President’s strong reaction to such conditionality expressing that 
there were and will not be any conditions to be fulfilled by Paraguay in order for the Queen to 
accept their independence. Solano Lopez, therefore, denied the ratification of the treaty simply 
because of the existence of a national law providing the same guarantees which had to be 
observed.283   
 
A few years later, the British Minister in Buenos Aires, Edgard Thornton, was present and 
promoted the signature of an alliance treaty for a war against Paraguay.284 The year following the 
signature of this treaty, the Triple Alliance War started. It was financed by the London Bank, the 
Baring Brothers House and the Rothschild Bank, all English financial institutions; until today 
regarded as the biggest war in South America. Some scholars have argued that the UK benefited 
the most from this war.285 
 
A third example is what happened at the beginning of the 20th century, from which the term 
‘gun-boat diplomacy’ originated. The government of Venezuela contracted some loans with 
Italian, German and British companies which at that time had investments in Venezuela.  When 
                                                 
282
 Decree related to the performance and industry incentive and improvement of the Republic, dated May 20, 1845. 
El Paraguayo Independiente. Vol. 20-22. 1845. Paraguay Portal Guarani, available at 
http://www.portalguarani.com/detalles_museos_exposiciones.php?id=94&id_exposicion=313 (last visited January 
28, 2013) 
283
 Letter dated January 14, 1853 from the National Library in Rio de Janeiro. In Livieres Argaña, J.  Con la Rubrica 
del Mariscal. Documentos de Francisco Solano López  Vol II. Talleres Graficos de la Escuela Tecnica Salesiana. 
1970. p 88 
284
 Treaty of Puntas del Rosario which formed the first alliance between Argentina and Brazil. In Pigna, F. “La 
Guerra de la Triple Alianza” Organización International (1862-1880) El Historiador. Available at 
http://www.elhistoriador.com.ar/articulos/organizacion_nacional/guerra_de_la_triple_alianza.php (last visited 
November 1, 2013) 
285
 For an account of the influence of the British Empire in South America at the time and the claim that the Triple 
Alliance war was financed by UK financial institutions, see Agüero Wagner. L. “Fuego y Cenizas de la Memoria” 
La Republica. 2000; Chiavenatto, J.  Genocidio Americano: A Guerra do Paraguai  Editora Brasiliense. San Pablo. 
Brasil. 1979; Galeano, E. "Open Veins of Latin America: Five Centuries of the Pillage of a Continent"  Monthly 
Review Press. 1997; Galeano, E. “La Guerra de la Triple Alianza contra el Paraguay aniquiló la única experiencia 
exitosa de desarrollo independiente” Congreso Bolivariano de los Pueblos. Dated March 3, 2005; available at 
www.congresobolivariano.com  (last visited March 20, 2013) 
74 
 
trying to collect these loans, disputes over the matter arose and not finding a solution, the 
governments of Italy, Great Britain and Germany organised a naval blockage of Venezuela.286 
 
These three examples show how at this time, the use of armed intervention was a common 
behaviour to demonstrate power in interstate relations. It was also a common practice 
experienced by South American countries. Not surprisingly, doctrines developed against these 
differences and the injustice resulting from them. These doctrines are known as the Calvo and 
the Drago doctrine which were based on protectionist policies towards foreign investors.  
 
- Calvo and Drago Doctrines 
 
Carlos Calvo was an Argentinean jurist who was sent on a special mission to Europe by the 
Paraguayan government, specifically to London and Paris in 1860.287 Calvo’s ideas are found in 
the book that he wrote while being in Europe in 1863, entitled “Derecho Internacional y 
Práctico de Europa y America”. This work contained the idea that a foreign party cannot have 
more rights than the nationals of the country where relief is sought.  Therefore, for settling the 
disputes between a foreign party and a national party, the foreign party should first recourse to 
the local jurisdiction and exhaust the remedies there, not use diplomatic protection for resolving 
the disputes in the first instance.   
 
Grigera Naon (2005) summarises Calvo’s main idea in the following way: “The general principle 
postulated by Carlos Calvo is that foreign aliens may not claim or enjoy rights, treatment or 
protection superior to or different from those afforded to nationals. A central and complementary 
part of the Calvo Doctrine is that, together with asserting the submission of foreign aliens to the 
laws and jurisdiction of the host country where they reside, it excludes the threat or use of force 
by their home country in support of their claims or grievances against the host country.”288 
 
It was naturally, however, for such a doctrine to arise given the gun boat diplomacy at the time. 
Referring to the Calvo clause, Grigera Naon expressed: “Its appearance as a reaction to 
imperialistic ambitions of the European powers in Latin America may be also considered part of 
the response of Latin American countries to so-called ‘gun boat diplomacy’, too often present in 
their relations with the USA. Clearly, the homeward trend incarnated in the clause, including its 
rejection of international arbitration as a means to resolving such claims, usually attributed to the 
Calvo Clause, goes hand in hand with political events affecting the evolution of international 
arbitration in the region.”289 
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In a similar spirit, Luis Maria Drago, an Argentinean Foreign Affair Minister in 1902, elaborated 
a doctrine. It originated right after the blockage of Venezuela by Italy, Great Britain and 
Germany for the purpose of collecting debts.  
 
Drago’s doctrine states that “for the common safety of the South American republics… the 
collection of pecuniary claims of citizens of any country against the government of any South 
American republic should not be effected by armed force.”290 Grigera Naón states: “According to 
Drago…a state decision not to pay public debt is an act of state, or act iure imperii, that is neither 
justiciable before nor subject to the jurisdiction of the local courts, nor may it give rise to a 
denial of justice or legitimise the diplomatic protection of the home state of the foreign 
claimant.”291  
 
While these two doctrines are considered as establishing the obligation of submitting the dispute 
to local courts, in Grigera Naón’s view, neither excludes international arbitration since both 
adhere to means of peaceful resolution of disputes. Their insistence of using local courts came 
about because private persons or companies did not have legal personality to claim their rights at 
an international court. Therefore, pursuant to Grigera Naón, it was natural for Calvo and Drago 
to think first of exhausting remedies at local courts, so that only upon denial of justice the dispute 
could be elevated to an international level for states to resolve it; “but without justifying 
resorting to armed intervention or other forms of coercion of the home state to seek or obtain 
redress for the private claims or impose its submission to international arbitration.” 292 (my 
highlights) 
 
Many countries in Latin American have indeed seen these doctrines as protecting their interests, 
and so it became state practice to include provisions obliging a foreign party to submit its dispute 
to local courts, referring to these types of clauses as Calvo clauses. 
 
- Friendship Commerce and Navigation (FCN) Treaties 
 
In the nineteenth century, Friendship, Commerce and Navigation Treaties (FCNs) between 
developed countries and South American countries were common. Although, as mentioned 
above, there is evidence of the British Empire trying to sign an FCN with Paraguay, the earliest 
FCN with South American countries were with the United States.293 Vandevelde (2005-2006), 
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when describing the history of BITs, has categorized a colonial and a post-colonial era in the 
history of BITs.294 He has described the colonial era as the one comprised by the existence of 
Friendship, Commerce and Navigation treaties (FCNs) which was categorized by just 
commercial provisions and no mechanism of enforcement, whereas the post-colonial era started 
after World War II but continued with new versions of FCNs which had provisions relating to 
property protection.295  
 
These treaties are said to be the ‘forerunners’ of BITs because they already contained provisions 
on the right of compensation in case of expropriations, but their purpose were to facilitate trade 
rather than to regulate investments.296 
 
When comparing an FCN to a BIT, Dolzer and Stevens (1995) write: “[D]eveloping countries 
were increasingly embarking on macro-economic policies… and rigid legal obligations allowing 
for unrestricted access of foreign investors to national markets were incompatible with such 
policies. As a result of these factors, the FNC was no longer viewed as the proper instrument of 
bilateral economic cooperation and the BIT emerged to become the preferred type of agreement 
for forging bilateral protection agreements on investments.”297 Therefore, and especially after the 
next historical developments, FCN treaties did not provide for full foreign investment protection. 
 
After the establishment of the United Nations, use of force was completely forbidden and was no 
longer an option for protecting investors’ investment in foreign countries. When states had 
disputes, they could use the International Court of Justice that was established for that purpose. 
In this regard, public international law states that there should be exhaustion of local remedies 
before submitting a dispute to the international plane.298 
 
However, it is through treaties that these international rules are going to change. Kaushal (2009) 
pointed out how BITs took developing countries out of the gunboat diplomacy.299 However, 
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Alvarez and Khamsi pointed out that the gunboat diplomacy was replaced by a stronger means of 
protection, namely given by BITs in which they describe the dispute settlement clause as 
gunboat arbitration.300 
 
- US Act of State Doctrine 
 
There were, however, some other events that would contribute to the framework for international 
investments. The countries’ independences also played a major role because countries wanted to 
be considered sovereign and signing treaties was a sign of their autonomy. The newly 
independent countries had macro-economic policies and wanted to exploit their markets, but that 
also meant having protectionist measures against unrestricted access of foreign investors. 
Therefore, their independence was also accompanied by nationalizations. 
 
US investors began to bring their claims to US courts because their investments had been 
expropriated and they did not get compensation nor relief from the country in which they had 
been investing. Through these claims, the US courts developed the Act of State Doctrine, which 
states: “Every sovereign state is bound to respect the independence of every other sovereign 
state, and the courts of one country will not sit in judgment of the acts of the government of 
another, done within its own territory.”301(my highlights) 
The Act of State doctrine developed in the US courts at this time was not far from the notion that 
domestic courts should rule on disputes occurring in their territory and the acts of a sovereign 
could not be reviewed by a foreign court, just as it had been proposed by the Calvo doctrine.302  
- International Rules on Expropriation. 
 
Customary international law is one of the sources of international law.303 The state has control 
over its territory, it is its sovereignty right; hence, the host country has exclusive sovereignty 
over foreign investments. International law also declares that states also have responsibility over 
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the injuries committed to aliens and if the act was a breach of international law, then there is a 
right to use diplomatic protection. However, the international rule is that diplomatic protection is 
allowed only after the alien has exhausted the local remedies.304  
 
The earliest jurisprudence from an international claim regarding foreign investment was 
submitted to the Permanent Court of International Justice. It was the Chorzow Factory case 
which concerned a dispute between Germany and Poland. In 1928, Poland had expropriated 
property of German investors in violation of a treaty between Germany and Poland.305  
 
The jurisprudence of this case shows the international law on expropriation and compensation 
thereof. One state is responsible when it commits an unlawful act to another state. The PCIJ 
stated: “It is a principle of international law that the reparation of a wrong may consist in an 
indemnity corresponding to the damage which the nationals of the injured State have suffered as 
a result of the act which is contrary to international law. This is even the most usual form of 
reparation; it is the form selected by Germany in this case and the admissibility of it has not been 
disputed. The reparation due by one State to another does not however change its character by 
reason of the fact that it takes the form of an indemnity for the calculation of which the damage 
suffered by a private person is taken as the measure. The rules of law governing the reparation 
are the rules of international law in force between the two States concerned, and not the law 
governing relations between the State which has committed a wrongful act and the individual 
who has suffered damage. Rights or interests of an individual the violation of which rights causes 
damage are always in a different plane to rights belonging to a State, which rights may also be 
infringed by the same act. The damage suffered by an individual is never therefore identical in 
kind with that which will be suffered by a State; it can only afford a convenient scale for the 
calculation of the reparation due to the State.”306 
 
With this, in the early 20th century, an international tribunal had acknowledged compensation for 
expropriation in disputes concerning a state’s improper takings of property belonging to a 
national of another state.  However, in terms of how the compensation should be made, it is 
worth mentioning that the international tribunal made the following important remarks.  
 
The international tribunal stated that the rules of international responsibility of a state applied 
when repairing the unlawful act: For the reparation of an unlawful act, the principle of restitutio 
in integrum should be applied, i.e., giving the damaged party restitution in kind, and only when 
this is not possible, then the party should give a pecuniary compensation. The PCIJ stated: 
“reparation must, as far as possible, wipe out all the consequences of the illegal act and re-
establish the situation which would, in all probability, have existed if that act had not been 
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committed. Restitution in kind, or, if this is not possible, payment of a sum corresponding to the 
value which a restitution in kind would bear.” 307 
 
For a ‘lawful’ expropriation, though, the tribunal stated that against the expropriation a “fair” 
compensation or a “just price” should be given.308 The PCIJ stated: “The action of Poland which 
the Court has judged to be contrary to the Geneva Convention is not an expropriation - to render 
which lawful only the payment of fair compensation would have been wanting…”309 
Furthermore, it expressed that “…if the Polish Government had had the right to expropriate, and 
if its wrongful act consisted merely in not having paid to the two Companies the just price of 
what was expropriated...”310 (my highlights) 
 
International law at the time had already built parameters with which disputes concerning 
international investment between an alien and a state could be settled. However, new 
developments arose. 
 
- The Hull Principle 
 
In 1938, due to a dispute between the governments of the US and Mexico, the Hull principle 
arose which states that compensation for expropriations should be prompt, adequate and 
effective. The Hull principle is contained in diplomatic notes of exchange between the US 
Secretary of State Hull and the Foreign Affairs Minister of Mexico, thus its name.  
 
Some authors have used some extracts of these notes to argue that Mexico did not want to 
compensate for an expropriation of US citizens.311 However, these extracts, which came from the 
letters of these two statesmen, were not analysed in chronological order. If one does so, then the 
notes reveal that what Mexico argued is that there is no international rule that says that 
compensation should be prompt, adequate and effective. Furthermore, there are parts that were 
omitted and are paramount to this part in history, since by them it is revealed that it was always 
Mexico’s intention to compensate.  
 
Herein below is a more complete abstract from these notes and reproduced in a chronological 
order. On July 21, 1938, Secretary of State Hull complained about the agrarian expropriations to 
US citizens, which had not been paid by the Mexican government. Secretary of State Hull said 
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that what the government of Mexico had done was confiscation and in his note Hull states the 
following: 
 
“If it were permissible for a government to take the private property of the citizens of other 
countries and pay for it as and when, in the judgment of that government, its economic 
circumstances and its local legislation may perhaps permit, the safeguards which the 
constitutions of most countries and established international law have sought to provide would 
be illusory. Governments would be free to take property far beyond their ability or willingness to 
pay, and the owners thereof would be without recourse. We cannot question the right of a foreign 
government to treat its own nationals in this fashion if it so desires. This is a matter of domestic 
concern. But we cannot admit that a foreign government may take the property of American 
nationals in disregard of the rule of compensation under international law. 
Nor can we admit that any government unilaterally and through its municipal legislation can, as 
in this instant case, nullify this universally accepted principle of international law, based as it is 
on reason, equity and justice….the single and hitherto solid foundation of respect on the part of 
governments and of peoples for each other's rights under international justice. The right of 
prompt and just compensation for expropriated property is a part of this structure. It is a 
principle to which the Government of the United States and most governments of the world have 
emphatically subscribed and which they have practiced and which must be maintained.” 312 
 
In this same note, Secretary of State Hull proposes to submit the issue to arbitration. The issues 
was "whether there has been compliance by the Government of Mexico with the rule of 
compensation as prescribed by international law”313 
 
The Mexican Minister replied on August 3, 1938: 
 
“My Government maintains . . . that there is in international law no rule universally accepted in 
theory nor carried out in practice, which makes obligatory the payment of immediate 
compensation nor even of deferred compensation, for expropriations of a general and 
impersonal character like those which Mexico has carried out for the purpose of redistribution 
of the land… The political, social, and economic stability and the peace of Mexico depend on the 
land being placed anew in the hands of the country people who work it; a transformation of the 
country, that is to say, the future of the nation, could not be halted by the impossibility of 
paying immediately the value of the properties belonging to a small number of foreigners who 
seek only a lucrative end… As has been stated above, there does not exist in international law 
any principle universally accepted by countries, nor by the writers of treatises on this subject, 
that would render obligatory the giving of adequate compensation for expropriations of a 
general and impersonal character. Nevertheless Mexico admits, in obedience to her own laws, 
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that she is indeed under obligation to indemnify in an adequate manner; but the doctrine 
which she maintains on the subject, which is based on the most authoritative opinions of writers 
of treatises on international law, is that the time and manner of such payment must be 
determined by her own laws.”314 
 
The Government of Mexico declined arbitration. On August 22, 1938, Secretary of State Hull 
said: 
 
“The fundamental issues raised by this communication from the Mexican Government are 
therefore, first, whether or not universally recognized principles of the law of nations require, in 
the exercise of the admitted right of all sovereign nations to expropriate private property, that 
such expropriation be accompanied by provision on the part of such government for adequate, 
effective, and prompt payment for the properties seized; second, whether any government may 
nullify principles of international law through contradictory municipal legislation of its own; or, 
third, whether such Government is relieved of its obligations under universally recognized 
principles of international law merely because its financial or economic situation makes 
compliance therewith difficult…The Government of the United States merely adverts to a 
selfevident fact when it notes that the applicable precedents and recognized authorities on 
international law support its declaration  that, under every rule of law and equity, no 
government is entitled to expropriate private property, for whatever purpose, without provision 
for prompt, adequate, and effective payment therefor. In addition, clauses appearing in the 
constitutions of almost all nations today, and in particular in the constitutions of the American 
republics, embody the principle of just compensation. These, in themselves, are declaratory of 
the like principle in the law of nations…The present Government of the United States has on 
repeated occasions made it clear that it would under no circumstances request special or 
privileged treatment for its nationals in the other American republics, nor support any claim of 
such nationals for treatment other than that which was just, reasonable, and strictly in harmony 
with the generally recognized principles of international law.”315 
 
On September 1, 1938, the government of Mexico replied: 
 
“This attitude of Mexico is not, as Your Excellency's Government affirms, either unusual or 
subversive. Numerous nations, in reorganizing their economy, have been under the necessity of 
modifying their legislation in such manner that the expropriation of individual interests 
nevertheless does not call for immediate compensation and, in many cases, not even subsequent 
compensation; because such acts were inspired by legitimate causes and the aspirations of 
social justice, they have not been considered unusual .or contrary to international law. As my 
Government stated to that of Your Excellency in my note of August 3, it is indispensable, in 
                                                 
314
 ibid 
315
 ibid 
82 
 
speaking of expropriations, to distinguish between those which are the result of a modification 
of the juridical organization and which affect equally all the inhabitants of the country, and 
those others decreed in specific cases and which affect interests known in advance and 
individually determined.”316 
 
The dispute concluded when the two parties reached an agreement. The agreement consisted in a 
determination of the value of the properties by a Commission in Washington (with one 
representative of each country). Mexico had to pay $ 1,000,000 for indemnities and $1,000,000 
annually thereafter for indemnities determined by the Commission.317 
 
With this analysis, two main issues can be disclosed. Firstly, Secretary of State Hull starts by 
demanding a prompt and just compensation under international law (in Note of July 31, 1938). 
This was partly in accordance with Chorzow Factory case which established the ‘just’ 
compensation for expropriations.318 Secondly, it was a disagreement about how and when to 
compensate. Although Mexico did try to claim that there are some expropriations which are 
legally effected without compensation, they did admit that they would indemnify (in Note of 
August 3, 1938).  
 
Only in August 22, 1938, the Secretary of State Hull makes reference to international law 
supporting prompt, adequate and effective compensation. However, he gives an additional 
argument which seems contradictory, since he claimed that the constitutions of American states 
embody the ‘just’ compensation. 
 
The Hull principle gave a new opinion on ‘how’ compensation should be paid because what 
international law ruled at the time was addressed by the Chorzow case, which referred only to a 
‘just’ compensation. The applicability, however, of a ‘prompt, adequate and effective’ 
compensation versus a ‘just’ compensation differs radically. The main difference is that a ‘just’ 
compensation involves the payment of the value of the expropriation at a fair market value 
whereas a ‘prompt, adequate and effective’ compensation extends beyond the payment of the 
value of the expropriation and can include expected profits.319  
 
Hull referred to ‘just’ compensations in his notes when claiming that just compensation was a 
principle embodied in the constitutions of states but he emphasized his opinion of ‘prompt, 
adequate and effective compensation’ in an exchange of diplomatic notes. However, diplomatic 
notes of exchange are not international law and so the debate remained between Latin American 
countries, which claimed that there was no international law rule for compensating promptly, 
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adequately and effectively, and developed countries, which wanted to elevate the Hull principle 
to international law.  
 
- Developed and Developing Countries’ Debate on Expropriation and Compensation 
Regulations 
 
During the 1960s and 1970s one could see that the US went through an internal conflict of power 
when wanting to incorporate the Hull principle as a standard in cases of expropriation. In 1964, 
in the Sabattino case, a case brought to the US Supreme Court by an US investor, the latter 
claimed that the Cuban Government had expropriated its investment. The US Supreme Court 
sustained the traditional act of state doctrine and claimed that such measure should be disputed at 
the local courts.320 The US Congress did not agree with this view and enacted the First 
Hickenlooper Amendment to the Foreign Assistance Act of 1962 that established economic 
sanctions on a state that expropriated property of a US citizen. It stated that in cases in which a 
US citizen is expropriated, there should be speedy compensation, in convertible foreign 
exchange, and equivalent to the full value thereof.321 When comparing with the Hull principle, 
this amendment included the Hull language.322 
 
At the international level, many of the already mentioned UN resolutions had passed, which gave 
right to the sovereignty of nations with respect to foreign investment.323 At a more regional level, 
in South America, the Andean Common Market between Bolivia, Chile, Colombia, Ecuador and 
Peru enacted the Decision No. 24 of the year 1970 which stated: “not to grant for investors more 
favourable treatment than that granted to national investors”324  and also “not to enact legislation 
that would enable foreign investors to seek dispute resolution outside the jurisdiction of the host 
state.”325  
 
Two distinct positions on international investments were evidenced between developed countries 
and developing countries and both positions carried on elements from the historical 
developments. For developed countries a breach of a ‘minimum standard of protection’ for 
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foreign investors was a breach of international law. Developing countries said as long as they 
treated foreign investors and nationals equally, there was no breach of international law.326   
 
Furthermore, on the one hand, there were developed countries who wanted to protect their 
investors by having regulations on compensations for foreign investments that follow the Hull 
principle, added by ideas of detaching the disputes regarding investment from the domestic 
courts, and on the other hand, there were developing countries who accentuated their sovereignty 
and demanded that all concerning foreign investments be regulated by their national laws. 
 
This debate, however, was settled with the agreement of a new kind of treaties relating to the 
treatment of foreign investments. These treaties are called: Bilateral Investment Treaties (BITs). 
 
3.2. What are Bilateral Investment Treaties (BITs)? 
European countries were the first promoters of BITs. Germany was the first country to sign a 
BIT with Pakistan to secure their investments abroad, especially after what they have lost in the 
war.327 As for the US, it was in the midst of the debates at the multilateral level that the US 
started the use of BITs, in 1977. While Germany sought the protection of their investments in a 
host country, the US was determined to customize the Hull principle through these treaties.328  
 
Bilateral Investment Treaties (BITs), as the name signifies, are treaties which are signed by two 
states or countries, also known as the ‘contracting parties’. Ergo, the parties of BITs, as in all 
other treaties which form part of international law, are two sovereign states. They are called the 
host state (state where the investment is made) and the home state (state of nationality of foreign 
investors) respectively. In practice, the home state is the developed country and the host state is 
the developing country. 
 
Although there is no rule about BITs having to be only between developed and developing 
countries, as developed countries or developing countries among themselves can sign such 
treaties as well,329 the practice shows that all OECD countries have BITs, but all of them are with 
a developing country.330  
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It is important to note that although the sole objective of BITs is to promote investments’ 
protection, they do affect other economic factors as well, for example the increase of capital in 
the host country because of the increase of foreign direct investments;331 at least it is an 
expression which can be found in the purpose of many treaties.332   
 
The relevance of BITs and how they can affect countries is given by their place in the legal 
hierarchy. Firstly, BITs form part of international law because the statute of the International 
Court of Justice (ICJ) establishes, inter alias, that the sources of international law are 
international conventions, i.e. treaties.333 For this reason, Dolzer and Stevens (1995) have stated: 
“BITs create international law obligations for each contracting party with respect to its treatment 
of investments from the other contracting party.”334 
 
Secondly, for most South American countries, BITs’ provisions are also an international 
obligation pursuant to the internal juridical order because norms’ hierarchy is an entrenched 
constitutional principle in many civil law countries and this principle establishes that the ranking 
of norms of each country starts with the constitution, then treaties and then the law.335 The 
regulation of foreign investments can, therefore, have a better hierarchical protection in 
comparison to laws and policies of developing countries, thanks to the fact that they have the 
rank of a treaty. For this reason, for South American countries the duties and obligations 
regarding the investments that are contained in BITs have a higher ranking than national law, 
because they have been agreed upon in the form of a treaty.  
 
BITs include substantive rights on the one hand, and formal or procedural rights on the other. 
Among the substantive obligations are:  
 
(a) The definition of investment. The application of the treaty will depend on what is understood 
by ‘investment’. BITs define “investment” very broadly so as to signify any form of capital 
introduced into the host state.  
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(b) The treatment given by the host country to a foreign investment. Dolzer and Stevens call 
these treatments the common standards of BITs. The obligations regarding the treatment that the 
BITs of the case studies herein and the majority of BITs have are: 
 
- National Treatment: One benefit that foreign investors can have is that BITs put them in an 
equal position to any national investor, eliminating any form of discrimination between a 
national and a foreign investor. 
- Most Favoured Nation treatment: The treatment given to the contracting party should be no 
less favourable than any treatment given to other countries.  
- Fair and Equitable treatment: This is a treatment that obliges host countries to restrict their 
domestic legislation if they are different from the standards provided under international law.336  
 
The obligations stated in BITs provide favourable conditions and guarantees of fair and equitable 
treatment by the host states even in times of revolution, war or crisis, in which case the host state 
would have to compensate the investors for any kind of loss of their investments.337 
 
(c) Expropriation and compensation rules. BITs state under which circumstances a host country 
would be able to expropriate and if it does so, BITs state the obligation to compensate prompt, 
adequately and effectively.338  
 
(d) The right to submit disputes to international arbitration instead of to domestic jurisdiction.  
 
The formal or procedural right is the mechanism provided to exercise and enforce the rights of 
the treaty. Therefore, the dispute settlement clauses of BITs are the most important provision in 
BITs that foreign investors have for enforcing the rights given to them and also enforcing the 
compliance of the obligations that host countries have in regard to their investments. 
As any other clause in the treaty, the parties can freely choose the wording of the rights and 
obligations to be included in a dispute settlement clause of a BIT, as well as defining the 
mechanism to be used to resolve the dispute. The contracting parties in a BIT, foreseeing the 
possibility that disputes may arise and completely aware of it, include the relevant clauses which 
explain how the parties shall proceed in the event that a dispute arises.  
 
The common mechanism provided in BITs for settlement of investment disputes is international 
arbitration, which parties freely agree upon. On the one hand, the advantage of international 
arbitration is the delocalisation of the disputes. In other words, the dispute is resolved on neutral 
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grounds. This means that the dispute is taken out of the local courts and instead submitted to a 
completely neutral and unbiased international arbitration tribunal with normally three 
independent arbitrators deciding on the case. Considering that in a BIT the parties are of different 
countries, this is what seems fairest.   
 
From the perspective of foreign investors, international arbitration is an advantage because it 
eliminates the fear that their claims could have little success against a host state in its own 
territory and whose own authority decides who the judges of these domestic courts are going to 
be. Then, the parties of an investment dispute should have more confidence with the fact that the 
resolution of the dispute by arbitrators, who are specialized on the subject matter, provides 
impartiality.   
 
Another advantage of international arbitration that can be pointed out is the degree of expertise 
of the arbitrators on the subject matter of the dispute, i.e., foreign investment. In contrast to 
judges of domestic courts, who have the mandate to know the law - no matter how extensive-, 
international arbitrators can be people specialized on international investment law.339  While 
domestic judges have jurisdiction to solve disputes of any nature, civil, commercial, family law, 
etc., which in developing countries normally causes a backlog for the amount of cases they have, 
arbitrators at international arbitration institutions can be jurists, academics or people specialized 
in international investment law.340  
 
There is a differentiation however, in regard to the preference of international arbitration or 
domestic courts for settling the dispute. This is why the dispute settlement mechanism also can 
contemplate more than one stage; it can contain other requirements which parties have to comply 
before reaching the arbitration stage. This depends on the actors’ perspective. The investors and 
the home countries prefer international arbitration whereas host countries prefer domestic 
courts.341 
 
The mechanism for solving disputes in BITs is also different depending on the type of disputes. 
Most BITs contain two different articles which address the two types of disputes, and they do so 
because the mechanisms chosen to resolve one or the other type of disputes are quite different.  
Therefore, one has to point out that in most BITs, rules regarding dispute settlement are provided 
depending on whether the disputes are concerned with the interpretation and application of the 
treaty or with the investment. 
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The first one, interpretation and application of the treaty, is a matter which only sovereign states 
can handle and therefore the disputes are normally solved by governments, which are the two 
parties of the treaty.  On the other hand, the investment disputes are between one party of the 
treaty (the host state) and a foreign investor which can be a national or company of the home 
state.   
 
Depending on the wording of the BIT, the disputes that are related to the investment per se, can 
be settled in local courts but there is also the possibility that if the dispute is not settled at the 
local courts, the case can be brought to international arbitration. 
 
In BITs, the investment dispute settlement clause also contains another important feature. They 
establish a choice of international arbitration institutions for the parties. The parties decide which 
institution they wish to be the neutral actor to resolve a dispute arising from a BIT. In case of 
disputes, the investors can use the international arbitration bodies like the International Centre 
for Settlement of International Disputes (ICSID) or ad hoc arbitration that follows the rules of 
the United Nations Commission for International Trade Law (UNCITRAL).342 
 
As part of any arbitration process, consent is required. As such, to have access to for example the 
ICSID, the parties must have ratified the 1965 Washington Convention which created the 
ICSID.343 International arbitration bodies or institutions like ICSID, through these mechanisms, 
are the ones responsible for settling investment disputes. Likewise, the arbitral awards issued by 
these institutions need to be binding. This was also agreed in the New York Convention of 1958 
that most countries have ratified.344  
 
3.3. Are all BITs uniform? 
 
Due to the fact that the structure of BITs resembles similarities among one another, the substance 
of BITs has caused some debate with regard to their uniformity. According to Dolzer and 
Stevens, BITs have four substantive areas, namely: admission, treatment, expropriation of 
foreign investments and settlement of disputes. They have also found that there are standard 
elements and features that can be found in the preamble, in the definition of investment and in 
the criteria used to determine which nationals are covered under the treaty.345 
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Regarding the common standards that the majority of BITs have, Dolzer and Stevens made the 
following remark: “The survey shows that the majority of BITs subscribe to common standards 
such as fair and equitable treatment, full protection and security, non-discrimination as well as 
national and most favoured nation (MFN) treatment.”346 
 
The reason for finding standard terms could be that most capital-exporting countries had a model 
agreement with which they started the negotiations, but there are also cases in which the model 
treaty had some modifications that were desirable for the capital-importing countries. In spite of 
this, one can still find standard terms in BITs.347 
 
Developing countries start their foreign investment negotiation with a BIT model drafted by a 
developed country. A BIT model is a BIT template prepared by the developed country which 
contemplates all the substantial clauses used when entering into negotiations for the signature of 
BITs. The parties can modify such a template according to their needs but practice shows that the 
main clauses have remained the same as in the model.348 
 
Ibrahim Shihata, the 1995 Secretary General of the ICSID stated that BITs were uniform.349 
Guzman (1998), considering Dolzer’s and Stevens’ work, has stated the following: “Although 
the US treaty is, in principle, open to negotiation, BITs signed by the United State are usually 
very similar to the model treaty. (In fact, looking beyond United States treaties, BITs in place 
around the world are quite similar to one another)”350 
 
However, there are some scholars, who have heavily criticized the claim that BITs were uniform 
and stated that on the contrary they were very different from one another. Allee and Peinhardt 
(2010) claimed the importance of considering that BITs are negotiated on a “treaty-by-treaty 
basis.” They disclosed a survey of BITs from the UNCTAD in 1998 which states that “…despite 
the apparent uniformity among many BIT provisions, there are many significant differences in 
the formulation of individual provisions.”351 
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Allee and Peinhardt use these arguments to build up their theory of a variation, but they 
specifically refer to dispute settlement clauses. They claim that there is a bargaining on the 
dispute settlement clauses of BITs which entails a legal delegation of investor-state dispute to 
ICSID.  Sornarajah (2000) also stated: “There is a fallacy promoted that these treaties are 
uniform”352; he too was referring to the dispute settlement clauses and the variations contained 
therein in different BITs.353  
 
Therefore, the different opinions found in the literature regarding the BITs’ uniformity might be 
a problem of interpretation.  Note that Dolzer and Stevens never said that BITs are uniform in the 
sense that they are identical to each other. On the contrary, in their book they have never stopped 
pointing out the variations and modifications that contracting parties do to the standard terms 
contained in BITs. 
 
Standard terms are the essential substance of BITs. The provisions could be completely different 
from one BIT to the next but these essential substances will always remain.  This essential 
substance is what forms the substantive areas of a BIT and accordingly they form the structure of 
BITs. The substantive areas of a BIT are the essential parts that form what is called and we know 
as a BIT. BITs may not be uniform, but they have a common core.354  
 
The common core is the set of substantive topics that give BITs their structure. This is confirmed 
by the treaties herein analysed and in all of them we find the essential components, namely: 
preamble, investment definition, admission, treatment, expropriation, dispute settlement clauses. 
 
Hallward-Dreimeier also state: “BITs vary across countries, but they generally share similar 
features of defining foreign investment and laying out various principles regarding treatment, 
transfer of funds, expropriation and mechanisms for dispute settlements.”355 
 
This does not mean, however, that all is safe and sound. Dolzer and Stevens, when giving a 
statement on the similarity of certain provisions, in this case of the definitions of investment in 
different BITs, claimed: “This similarity does not, however, mean that there exists a universally 
binding concept of investment for all purposes. Rather accepting that the concept has no absolute 
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meaning and may change in the future, most treaties, as noted above, have adopted a broad, 
open-ended definition that ensures a certain amount of flexibility in treaty’s application.”356 
 
This is one of the reasons why BITs rules are not considered customary international law but 
have been regarded as lex specialis.357 However, the flexibility given to the treaty’s application is 
what in practice causes problems because arbitrators interpret treaties so differently and this 
provokes an uncertainty regarding what the rule on a particular matter is. 
 
In conclusion, this chapter has shown that the current framework for international investments 
was the result of bilateral negotiations. The historical events, however, have shown that the 
formation of the rules for foreign investment until they were entrenched in BITs did not run 
smoothly.  
 
The chapter also explained what BITs are and together with the examination of its structure 
supports the argument that BITs are not identical to one another but have a common core which 
refers to the main clauses that together give birth to BITs.  
 
This analysis has been important because the next chapter makes a comparative analysis of South 
American BITs. The analysis of the differences, if any, can put the aim of BIT clauses to a test, 
which will ultimately serve as a contribution to the assessment of whether the relative power of 
developing countries gets weakened through BITs. 
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CHAPTER IV: BITs in Practice: An Empirical and Comparative Analysis of BITs 
 
The countries’ different opinions manifested during the intellectual debates on foreign 
investment at multilateral level were materialized through BITs. By focusing on an empirical 
analysis of BITs, this chapter analyses which rules, among the debated rules of foreign 
investment, became entrenched in these BITs. Furthermore, the effects that these provisions may 
have are also discussed. 
 
As case studies I analyze BITs that South American countries have signed and entered into force 
with the United States, Germany, France, Spain and the United Kingdom. I specifically compare 
and contrast the clauses of these BITs in the following respects: the definition which refers to the 
scope of application, the objectives, the expropriation clauses and the dispute settlement clauses.  
 
4.1. Scope of Application 
 
The connection between the treaty’s provisions, the enforcement right and the submission of a 
dispute using the dispute settlement mechanism is very tight. The glue that allows all of them 
being connected is the existence of a foreign investment.   
The definition of investment is one of the common standards that BITs share. These investments 
are the subject matter of the treaty to which a commitment of protection is given by developing 
countries in order for foreign investors of developed countries to be reassured of the security of 
investing in those countries. 
Therefore, how BITs define investment will determine which activities could and will be 
governed by the BITs provisions. The definition of a foreign investment can limit the scope of 
application of BITs. Among the provisions of a BIT, there is a right to enforce all the obligations 
stated in the treaty and the relevant clause for it provides a mechanism which includes 
international arbitration. If a foreign investment does not exist then a BIT is not applicable and 
the international tribunal would have no jurisdiction to solve a dispute. 
Pursuant to Article 25 of the ICSID Convention, ICSID has only jurisdiction to settle the dispute 
if it is considered “an investment” dispute. In ICSID, the tribunal is conducted by arbitrators 
through international arbitration and so the classic principles of arbitration apply. One in 
particular should be noted, that is, the principle of kompetenz-kompetenz. According to this 
principle the arbitrators can rule on their own jurisdiction, they are empowered to decide whether 
they have competence to decide on the case. Thus, when a dispute arises, arbitrators have to rule 
on the issue of jurisdiction, or in other words, to assess whether the subject matter of the dispute 
does indeed constitute an ‘investment’.  
Mortenson (2010) is of the opinion that the drafters of BITs, developed countries, negotiated a 
broad definition of investment from the start, while developing countries “pushed to strictly limit 
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ICSID review to narrow categories of economic activity.”358 The intention was that by keeping 
such a broad definition and allowing any kind of foreign activity to be considered an investment, 
the right to submit the matter to be solved by ICSID’s tribunal gets also broader.359 However, 
Mortenson also argued that an opt-out option remained available so that each country could, 
upon their choice, take out some elements from the definition of investment, and further claimed 
that even though arbitrators have taken a broad interpretation of what could constitute an 
investment, more recent cases have shown that they have had a very restrictive approach which 
could damage the international investment regime.360  
Appendix III shows that in BITs, “investments” are normally defined very generally and broadly, 
for example, meaning every kind of asset in accordance with the law of the country where the 
investment is being made. In the South American countries BITs with the EU countries the 
wording is extremely similar. How they define investment can be summarized in that they 
include all kinds of movable and immovable assets of a foreign investor in the host country. The 
common list also extends to shares, stocks and any right connected to the property or that has 
economic value, like intellectual property rights and business concessions.361 
It should be noted that in all South American countries BITs with the referred European 
countries it is also stated that the list of what is described as an investment is not exclusive to 
what it is expressly stated in the BIT. The phrase ‘not exclusively’ allows the parties to 
encompass all other kind of features as investment and escape the limitation to have a definite or 
express provision. The only exception which expressly excludes some types of activities is 
provided in the Spain-Colombia BIT.362 
 
In regard to the US BITs with these South American countries, the provisions that relate to what 
is understood by investment are similar to the European countries. In the US BITs with South 
American countries, the common investment provision also includes any kind of assets, like 
tangible or intangible property (which will include movable and immovable assets), and their list 
to expands to rights related to the property like economic or intellectual property rights and 
concessions. 
 
The difference in the US BITs compared to those BITs with the EU countries is that there are 
some variations in some of them. For example, only in the Argentina-US BIT it states that the 
list is without limitation of any other activities. This, however, can be compared to the wording 
of the Uruguay-US BIT, which states that the definition of investments extends to any type of 
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activities that would have the characteristics of an investment. Furthermore, although the 
wording is different in two other BITs (with Bolivia and Ecuador), the effect of having a broad 
definition remains the same. The Bolivia-US BIT states that the list of contractual rights that are 
protected by the BIT is only illustrative, and the Ecuador-US BIT state that all types, “such as 
social capital, debts and service and investment contracts” are included in the protections granted 
by the BIT.363 
 
As can be seen, the comparative study of the definition of investment in these BITs shows how 
the definition of investment remains a very broad one. While the EU BITs, on the scope of 
application, state that they will include inter alias, property rights that allow any right connected 
to the property to be claimed as an investment, the US BITs extend their scope of application 
much more by stating that ‘any’ kind of investment controlled directly or ‘indirectly’ shall be 
considered an investment for the treaty. 
 
This means that the scope of application is very extensive and not restrictive as Mortenson 
(2010) had claimed. Furthermore, the comparison of the BITs does not provide evidence that 
developing countries limit the definition of investment in accordance to their convenience. The 
effect can be related to the fact that there is a strong relation between broadening the concept of 
investment in BITs and the countries’ constitutionalism. In constitutions, property is protected, 
and if property is needed for public reasons, it can be expropriated with a due compensation.364 
Schneiderman (2000), when comparing the property regime of the constitution of South Africa 
and the Canada-South Africa BIT says that: “the prohibition against takings in the BIT is broader 
than that found in the South African Constitution. The BIT prohibits nationalization or 
expropriation or “measures having an effect equivalent to” nationalization or expropriation. The 
constitutional provision is narrower to the extent that is does not make reference to equivalent 
effects…”365  
 
What comprehends investment expands in the treaty so that the investment will also include 
other aspects that may not be covered by the law of the country where the investment is being 
made. The more BITs extend the concept of investment as to include “any kind of assets” the 
higher the chance that foreign investors will have at the moment of trying to demand 
compensation for their investments.366 
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There are many examples of cases of submitted to ICSID in which the defendants (normally 
developing countries) have contested ICSID’s jurisdiction but in the majority of cases, ICSID’s 
tribunal has ruled in favour of their jurisdiction,367 judging that the scope of application of the 
treaty entitles this jurisdiction.368 
 
This is the reason why the broad definition of investment in BITs becomes extremely relevant. 
By having a broad definition, the protection given to their investors gets extended to a higher 
variety of activities. Furthermore, it gives leeway to the arbitral institutions to decide whether 
they have jurisdiction over the investment dispute that arises out of the BITs.  
 
4.2. Objective of BITs 
 
In a treaty, its purpose expresses the intention or spirit of the parties and it is normally contained 
in the preamble of the agreement. The Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties expressly 
states that any treaty should be interpreted “in accordance with the ordinary meaning to be given 
to the terms of the treaty in their context and in the light of its object and purpose”369 (my 
highlights) 
 
Therefore, pursuant to international law, if there is something not clear in the treaty, after which 
a dispute has been submitted to an arbitration tribunal, the arbitrators have the obligation to look 
at the purpose of the treaty to interpret it.   
 
Appendix IV compares the purposes of the South American countries’ BITs. The resulting 
comparative analysis presents some remarks, which are the following. 
 
The purposes contained in US BITs with South American countries can be summarized as: (i) To 
promote greater economic cooperation (ii) stimulate flow of capital and the economic 
development of the parties (iii) encouragement of reciprocal protection of investment (iv) 
improvement of living standards (v) fair and equitable treatment of investment. 
 
In regard to the US BITs with Argentina, Bolivia, Ecuador and Uruguay the purposes are 
identical in some points and only a few differences are found in the BITs signed with Uruguay 
and Bolivia. The explanation could be that the US uses a model BIT to start negotiations. Thanks 
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to the US Letter of Submittal to the Senate for the ratification of the BITs we know for example 
that in the US-Bolivia BIT, the 1994 US model BIT was used and in the US-Uruguay BIT, the 
2004 US model BIT was used.370  
 
It is worth noticing that some US BITs express in their purposes issues that go beyond the mere 
promotion of investments. For example, in Argentina, Bolivia and Ecuador’s BITs the well-
being of workers is mentioned.371 The US-Uruguay BIT goes even further as the treaty includes 
not only the recognition of international labour rights but also that the treaty shall be consistent 
with health, safety, environment, and consumer protection.372  
 
The US-Uruguay BIT also mentions among the purposes something that the other countries do 
not have, which is on the point of enforcement of BITs: it mentions international arbitration as a 
mechanism of solving disputes, but stating that this mechanism has to be treated respecting the 
domestic or national law.  
 
In regard to the US-Bolivia BIT, it is also interesting to notice that provisions regarding health, 
safety and the environment are mentioned but with the peculiarity that there is a positive 
constraint of how the objectives are allowed to be pursued, namely, ‘without’ relaxing health, 
safety and environmental measures.373  
 
On the other hand, among the statements regarding the purposes made in the BITs between the 
EU countries (France, UK, Spain and Germany) and the mentioned South American countries,374 
we can find the following. 
 
In the South American countries BITs that were signed with France, the purposes that are stated 
are: (i) reinforce economic cooperation (ii) create favorable conditions for investments (iii) 
encouragement of investment and stimulation of capital and technology transfer in order to 
increase economic development.  
                                                 
370
 Stated in the respective US Letters of Submittal to the Senate for ratification of the BITs. 
371
 Note that the US ratified 2 out of 8 Fundamental International Labour Conventions, while Argentina, Bolivia, 
Ecuador and Uruguay have ratified 8 out of 8 of the Fundamental International Labour Conventions. See 
International Labour Organization. Ratification of ILO Conventions available at www.ilo.org (Last visited July 25, 
2013) 
372
 The US-Uruguay BIT has also specific clauses regarding the respect of the environment (Article 12) and labour 
(Article 13) in the text of the treaty. The explanation for the difference might reside in the fact that the US-Uruguay 
BIT was based on a 2004 model BIT and so a version which was later than the others US BITs with these countries. 
373
 The freedom of citizens to act is regulated by two law principles which distinguish themselves depending on 
whether they are in the public or private sphere.  In public-administrative law, the principle states that it is only 
permitted what is expressly established in the law; in contrary to the private law principle which states that all that is 
not forbidden is permitted. It is interesting to see how in this treaty, which is an international public law between the 
parties because it is handled by states, also private behavior is presupposed and therefore an express prohibition is 
included. This peculiarity though on the last point, is only found in the US-Bolivia BIT. The other countries do not 
have it.  
374
 Appendix IV, emphasis added. 
97 
 
 
Peculiarly, Uruguay does not state a preamble in its BIT with France but in the text of the treaty 
it has commitments as to promote investments, to provide fair and equitable treatment, to give no 
less favourable treatment (MFN) and to provide protection and security to investments.  
 
In the South American countries BITs with the United Kingdom, the purposes contained in the 
preamble of the South American countries BITs with the UK are identical. The purposes stated 
are: (i) create favourable conditions for greater investments (ii) encouragement and reciprocal 
protection of investments conducive to stimulation of individual business initiative and (iii) 
increase the prosperity of both states. 
 
In the South American countries BITs with Spain, the purposes contained in these treaties of 
South American countries with Spain do not change among one another, i.e. that the BITs are 
signed to: (i) intensify the economic cooperation for the mutual benefit of both countries (ii) 
create favourable conditions for investments (iii) to stimulate initiatives in the field of 
investments.  The only exception is that the Ecuador-Spain BIT does not state to have mutual 
benefit as a purpose in their BIT.375 
 
The South American countries BITs signed with Germany also contain the exact identical 
purposes among one another, i.e. (i) to intensify economic cooperation between the two States 
(ii) to create favourable conditions for investments (iii) stimulate private business initiative, and 
(iv) increase the prosperity of the two nations. Only the Germany-Paraguay BIT does not 
expressly state as a purpose that both states intend to intensify their economic cooperation. 
 
The common feature in the comparative analysis of the purposes contained in South American 
countries BITs with France, UK, Spain and Germany is that all these BITs expressly state that 
they are signed, inter alias, to increase economic development, prosperity or that it is done for 
the “mutual benefit” of the parties. 
 
Therefore, what results from the comparative analysis of the purposes contained in South 
American countries’ BITs is that both the US and the European countries’ BITs state that BITs 
are signed to have a fair and equitable treatment of investment and also increase prosperity, the 
FDI, living standards or formulations alike. 
 
Although all the South American countries’ BITs with the US recognize as their objectives, inter 
alias, to promote improve living standards, economic development and stimulate FDI, it is 
interesting to note that even before their ratification the US Congress was informed that “the 
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existence of a BIT alone will not guarantee increased investment.”376 Therefore, Alvarez and 
Khamsi have concluded that the “US BIT would not guarantee an increase in incoming FDI 
flows… US negotiators were quite clear that the US BIT was not designed to promote economic 
development or employment as such but was intended to achieve one clear purpose: to protect 
foreign investment.”377 
 
Furthermore, another feature that can be extracted of this analysis of the South American BITs 
signed with the US and European countries is that while both the US and European BITs intend 
to protect investment declaring that these would increase the economic development of the 
parties, the European BITs concentrate on improving the investment climate, whereas the US 
BITs intend to protect investors further aiming to cover obligations that go beyond investment 
protection.378 These are standards like health, labour according to international standards and 
environmental protection, which must be observed by the parties and can be held as mandatory 
by virtue of the treaty. Also, they have to be taken into account by arbitrators when deciding on 
investment disputes. The European countries BITs with South American countries do not include 
these labour, health and environmental standards. 
 
These standards, however, have only been found in more recent BITs.  The US-Bolivia BIT, 
which has entered into force in 2001 (with the 1994 US BIT model), already made reference to 
labour, health and environmental standards, but only in a restricted manner. It was only in the 
2004 US BIT model that these standards were further elaborated and made permanent. 
 
The above mentioned is mainly relevant to us in two regards: Firstly, the test of whether BITs 
fulfill their objective and secondly, the connection of these aspects to the halt of negotiations at 
the multilateral level. It can be seen that through BITs, it is possible to introduce standards that 
go beyond investment (environmental and labour issues), standards that were so difficult to agree 
to at the multilateral level.  
 
4.3. Expropriation provisions. 
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Remembering the dilemma of introducing the Hull principle as the rule for the compensation of 
expropriation at the multilateral level, rejected by developing countries, this section analyses the 
express wording for the expropriation provisions stated in the South American countries’ studied 
herein.  
 
The comparative analysis of South American countries’ BITs, detailed in Appendix V, show that 
in all South American countries’ BITs that were signed with the US, the expropriation provisions 
include without exception that the payment for expropriations shall be upon payment of ‘prompt, 
adequate and effective compensation’. Therefore, the BITs that South American countries signed 
with the US contain the Hull principle in full as the way to compensate for expropriations. 
 
In what relates to the EU BITs with South American countries, the considerations are as follows:  
 
In the BITs that France signed with South American countries, all except one contain the 
American Hull principle. While all the BITs with South American countries state that in case of 
expropriation there should be “payment of a prompt and adequate compensation…such 
compensation should be effectively realizable”, the France-Paraguay BIT refers to a “just” 
compensation which was in accordance to international law and did not follow the Hull 
language.  The reason lies in the fact that the France-Paraguay BIT was signed in the 1980, much 
earlier than when the US started the BIT program with South American countries after 1990. 
This fact also explains why all other BITs that were signed with France after the 1990s do 
contain the Hull principle.379  
 
In regard to German BITs with these South American countries, the language does not follow the 
Hull principle but the effect of the provision is similar to the effect of the principle of 
compensating “prompt, adequate and effectively”. The South American countries BITs signed 
with Germany state that “…compensation should be paid without delay…it shall be effectively 
realizable and freely transmitted…”380 To do the payment of a compensation ‘without delay’ is 
to do it promptly; to make it ‘effectively realizable and freely transferable’ also means that in 
practice the payment should be adequate and effectively performed. 
 
The UK BITs with South American countries also follow the US Hull principle of a prompt, 
adequate and effective compensation. The normal and common clause among the UK BITs 
states: “Investments  of investors of either Contracting  Party  shall  not  be nationalised, 
expropriated  or  subjected to measures having  effect equivalent  to nationalisation or 
expropriation  (hereinafter referred to as "expropriation") in the territory of the other Contracting  
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Party  except for a public purpose  related  to  the internal needs of that Contracting  Party  on  a 
non-discriminatory basis and  against  prompt, adequate and effective compensation”381 
 
However, only the UK BIT with Bolivia has a language more similar to the German BITs, it 
states “Compensation… shall be made without delay, be effectively realizable, and be freely 
transferable.”382 In the end, however, the provision has the same effect as that of the Hull 
principle. The different wording and language in the Bolivia-UK BIT might be explained by the 
fact that the first BIT that the UK signed with a South American country was with Bolivia, 
though it has also been entered into force in 1990.383  
 
The Spain BITs with South American countries are more diverse. While the Spain BITs with 
Bolivia, Colombia, Uruguay and Venezuela use the Hull language, the BITs with Argentina, 
Chile, Ecuador, Paraguay and Peru state that the obligation to compensate is without delay but 
that it should be adequate (similar effect). However, apart from the Venezuela-Spain BIT, all the 
Spain BITs omit the requirement of the manner to compensate alleged by the Hull principle, i.e. 
that the payment having to be ‘effectively’. 
 
All the South American countries’ BITs with the US and the European countries were entered 
into force after 1990 except that of France-Paraguay BIT. It is not a coincidence that the sole 
South American BIT that was signed before any liberal and reform processes on South American 
countries is the one that goes in accordance to international law and not the Hull principle. 
 
The results of the comparative analysis of the expropriation provisions contained in these BITs, 
however, show that almost all of them include the Hull principle as the way of compensation in 
case of expropriations, a principle that was contrary to what these South American developing 
countries were arguing for at the multilateral level on this issue. 
 
4.4. Dispute Settlement Mechanism in BITs. 
 
All BITs have a clause determining the procedure to follow when a dispute arises. The dispute 
settlement clauses of BITs, in general determine the following stages: 
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Stages 
a) Amicably  
NON-JUDICIARY b) Consultation and Negotiation 
 
c) Local Courts 
 
d) International Arbitration 
 
JUDICIARY/LEGAL 
 
 
 
It is important to note that the first step is normally to solve the dispute using a non-juridical 
method (like resolving the dispute amicably, through consultation or negotiation). Only when 
that does not work, the legal method is used comprehending the stages of submitting the dispute 
to local courts and/or international arbitration. Thus, submitting the dispute to an international 
arbitration institution is not necessarily the first recourse in BITs. 
 
However, depending on the type of dispute, the dispute settlement clauses will vary. This is why 
the settlement of disputes in BITs can be separated into two main categories. The first category 
comprehends disputes regarding the interpretation and application of the treaty in which the 
parties of the disputes are the parties of the treaty, i.e. only states. The second category 
comprehends disputes regarding the investment per se which involve one of the parties (the host 
state) and the foreign investor or company. Thus, this second category is what allows companies 
to directly sue the host state.  
 
When the dispute reaches the stage of international arbitration, the international arbitration 
institution will analyse the dispute using elements of international law: the provisions of the 
treaty, customary international law, general principles of law, etc.384 Thus, the international 
arbitration tribunal is very important as the main enforcer of BITs.  
 
Although some BITs’ dispute settlement clauses directly indicate the submission of the dispute 
to a specific international arbitration institution, others BITs allow the parties to have a choice 
among arbitration institutions. The most common are the International Centre for Settlement of 
Investment Disputes (ICSID) or ad hoc arbitration in accordance with the Arbitration Rules of 
the United Nations Commission on International Trade Law (UNICTRAL).  
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The differences among the two institutions, ICSID and UNCITRAL, are extensive and they can 
influence the party’s choice. The UNICTRAL has just a guidance of the rules that should be 
observed by the parties during the arbitration. The whole mechanism lies within the parties’ 
discretion, and they can even modify these rules when they agree.   
 
The UNCITRAL rules allow the parties to constitute an ad hoc arbitration for “any” kind of 
dispute, including investment disputes, and to choose the arbitrators freely upon their 
convenience; therefore the costs of the arbitration can be reduced. However, the awards are not 
public as it is a commercial arbitration. UNCITRAL just provides the rules, the UNCITRAL as 
an organization is not involved in any counselling, neither legal advice nor interpretation of their 
rules, even upon the parties’ request. 
 
ICSID, on the other hand, has been created as a specialized institution for solving only “foreign 
investment” disputes. ICSID was created by a multilateral treaty and thus, its arbitration is treaty-
based arbitration and its awards are public. Sornarajah (2012), when referring to the comparison 
among international arbitration institutions, states: “These are not specialist institutions like 
ICSID, which is dedicated to the arbitration of foreign investment disputes.”385  
 
ICSID has a much higher level of expertise, the whole body of the institution is already in place 
for the parties to use it: for example, ICSID provides with a list of experts that can be chosen to 
act as arbitrators. All of them are very qualified and prominent figures in law, commerce, 
industry or finance, and there is also the secretariat which facilitates all the administrative 
work.386 
 
ICSID’s disputes concern disputes that are between the investors and the contracting host 
country where the investment is made.  For this reason Mortenson (2010) said that the ICSID 
was intended as “an adaptable vehicle with maximal flexibility for individual states to change 
their investment policies over time and maximum capacity to satisfy many states’ preferences at 
any single point in time.”387 The caveat that should be given to Mortenson’s claim, however, is 
to point out that the provisions of a BIT allow only the investor to bring an arbitration claim 
against the host state, and not vice versa.  
 
                                                 
385
 Sornarajah, M. “The International Law on Foreign Investment” Cambridge University Press. 3rd Edition. 2012. p 
286 
386
 ICSID Convention,  Article 14. 
387
 Mortenson,  J. “The meaning of investment: ICSID´s travaux and the domain of international investment law” 
Harvard International Law Journal. Vol 51. No.1. 2010. p. 261 
103 
 
The arbitration institutions need jurisdiction to solve the dispute (the parties’ consent). This 
consent is mainly expressed through BITs which have permitted all this mechanism for solving 
disputes.388  
 
I will now provide an overview and a comparative analysis of the dispute settlement clauses of 
South American countries BITs that refer to the aforementioned two categories. 
 
a) Disputes regarding the Interpretation and Application of BITs. 
 
Regarding the dispute settlement mechanism for the interpretation and application of the treaty, 
the US BITs with South American countries differ in their mechanism as compared to EU BITs 
with the same countries.  In most US BITs, the mechanism chosen for resolving these kinds of 
disputes is consultation, with a direct involvement of the sovereign parties. If the dispute persists, 
the US BITs establish arbitration as a possibility. The US BITs establish UNCITRAL as the 
arbitral institution to solve these disputes.389 
 
The US-Uruguay BIT is different from the other South American BITs in the sense that it does 
not have such a distinct separation of disputes.390 There are some provisions that establish that in 
case of interpretation both parties have to agree on what they think of as the right interpretation, 
and that agreement shall be binding for them. Then, there is one whole section and not just a 
couple of articles that determine the mechanism and procedure for solving the investment 
disputes.391  
 
In EU BITs the position is quite different. When disputes are regarding the interpretation and 
application of the treaty, it is also stated that only governments shall handle the dispute through 
diplomatic means and if the dispute is not resolved then there is the obligation of using 
arbitration. However, no arbitration institution is chosen, instead the parties themselves establish 
the rules for their arbitration. The clause establishes that the arbitration shall be ad hoc and for 
appointment of the arbitrators even the President of the International Court of Justice can be 
summoned to do the appointment, if no agreement is reached. 
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These dispositions can be found in Germany’s BITs, Spain’s BITs and UK’s BITs.392  France’s 
BITs also state that disputes concerning interpretation and application of the treaty shall be 
solved through diplomatic means but if six months elapse and the dispute subsists, arbitration is 
the mechanism chosen for solving the disputes. The arbitration rules are established in the clause 
and in case of not having an agreement on the appointment on the arbitrators the Secretary 
General of the United Nations shall be summoned to make the appointment.393 
 
In the France-Ecuador BIT, as well as in the UK-Ecuador BIT, negotiation and not diplomatic 
means is provided to solve the dispute, but it still ends up being only the states which have to 
solve the dispute. As the other EU BITs on this matter, the clause nevertheless remains similar to 
the others in the sense that arbitration shall be used if the dispute is not solved through 
negotiation.394 
 
This type of mechanism is more in the direction of a typical dispute settlement using arbitration 
between two countries with the rules of international public law because it is derived from an 
international public law principle by which only states can handle treaties. No private parties are 
allowed and only states can solve their differences through a third impartial which is the 
arbitrator or arbitrators chosen by those same states.  
 
b) Investment disputes of BITs.  
 
Since the investment disputes are the type of disputes that allow a foreign investor to sue the 
state, these are the ones detailed in Appendix VI. The following reveals the comparative analysis 
of both US and European countries’ BITs with South American countries. 
 
In regard to the investment dispute settlement clauses in US BITs, the only US BITs with a 
South American country that lists all the stages, namely solving the dispute amicably; by 
consultation or negotiation; local courts and international arbitration accordingly, is the US-
Argentina BIT. However, at the stage when the dispute reaches the local courts, the deadline 
given to solve the dispute is only 6 months, which in practice, is rather a short time for solving a 
dispute. This is why the dispute is very likely to end up in arbitration. 
 
In the US BITs with Bolivia and Ecuador, the chance to resolve the dispute amicably is 
mentioned. In the Bolivian case, if the dispute is not resolved amicably, the parties can choose to 
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submit the dispute at a local court “or” international arbitration. In the same event, for the 
Ecuadorian case, the dispute has to be first submitted to the local courts and if in 6 months it is 
not resolved, only then it can go to international arbitration.  
 
The US-Uruguay BIT is different from the other South American BITs in the sense that it does 
not have such a distinct separation of disputes.395 There are some provisions that establish that 
both parties have to agree on what they think of as the right interpretation, and that agreement 
shall be binding for them. Then, there is one whole section and not just a couple of articles that 
determine the mechanism and procedure for solving the investment disputes.396  
 
For all the South American BITs with the US, once the dispute has reached the stage of 
international arbitration, the parties are given the choice of submitting the dispute either to 
ICSID or UNCITRAL.397   
 
On the other hand, in regard to the investment dispute settlement in EU countries’ BITs, in the 
UK BITs with South American countries, the stage of submitting the dispute to local courts is 
completely excluded in the UK BITs with Bolivia, Chile, Ecuador and Venezuela. For Ecuador, 
Guyana, Paraguay, Peru and Venezuela the only mechanism is international arbitration and the 
institution determined to solve the dispute is ICSID. However, in the UK BITs with Argentina, 
Bolivia and Uruguay there is a choice between ICSID or UNCITRAL for the international 
arbitration institution. 
 
Interestingly, in spite of such provisions, the UK BITs with Argentina, Uruguay and Venezuela 
state that when there is no agreement in regard to the arbitral institutions, the choice by default is 
UNCITRAL. The UK-Paraguay BIT has the provision that there can be an international claim if 
the award if not complied with.  
 
Another peculiar fact is in regard to the UK-Uruguay BIT. It expressly states in its dispute 
settlement clause that even if there is a final decision by a local court on the matter, which 
manages to comply with the deadline, the foreign investor can nevertheless submit the dispute to 
international arbitration, if the investor thinks that the decision is unjust.  
 
In regard to Spain BITs with South American countries, they establish that the parties have to 
comply with the stages of amicable settlement and local courts before reaching international 
arbitration. When the stage of international arbitration is reached, then there is a choice for 
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submitting the dispute to either ICSID or UNCITRAL. For the Spain-Venezuela BIT the choice 
of UNCITRAL is only given if ICSID is not available or there is an express choice of the parties. 
 
With the Spain-Uruguay BIT, again, an unjust decision from the local court allows the parties to 
submit the dispute to international arbitration. Likewise, it is interesting to note that in the Spain-
Uruguay BIT the dispute settlement clause states that an international claim can be submitted 
when the award from the arbitral tribunal is not complied with. 
 
In the South American countries BITs with France, the BITs with Paraguay and Ecuador only 
provide for one mechanism which is international arbitration at ICSID, no other choice or stage 
is provided. France’s BITs with Bolivia and Venezuela also lacks the possibility of submitting 
the dispute to local courts. The mechanism provided if the dispute is not resolved amicably, is 
that then automatically it has to be submitted to international arbitration where the choice of 
submitting either to ICSID or UNCITRAL is given to Bolivia but no choice but that of ICSID is 
given to Venezuela. Again, as before, the France-Uruguay BIT allows the possibility of 
submitting an international claim when the arbitral award is not complied with.   
 
In the South American countries BITs with Germany, the stages of resolving the dispute 
amicably, through local courts and international arbitration are provided in Germany’s BITs with 
Argentina, Chile, Ecuador and Uruguay.  
 
The Germany BITs with Argentina, Chile, Ecuador and Uruguay state, however, the 
conditionality of time to submit the dispute, which after the elapse of 18 months and if the 
dispute subsists it can be taken to international arbitration. Furthermore, the Germany-Uruguay 
BIT, as the other Uruguayan BITs, states that when the final decision of the local court is unjust, 
the parties can submit the dispute to international arbitration. Only in this BIT, neither the ICSID 
nor UNCITRAL are the arbitral institutions of choice, but instead the International Chamber of 
Commerce (ICC) with headquarters in Paris. 
 
Germany completely excludes the possibility to submit the dispute to local courts in the BITs 
with Bolivia, Guyana, Paraguay and Venezuela. However, the majority of the South American 
countries BITs with Germany reflect ICSID as the choice of the arbitral institution to solve the 
dispute.  The exception is given in the BIT with Argentina which has the choice of also using 
UNCITRAL. However, the default option if no agreement is reached among the parties, still 
remains ICSID. 
  
- The Difference in Dispute Settlement Clauses between US and EU BITs. 
 
In regard to the international arbitration institution, the typical investment dispute settlement 
clause between the US and South American BITs is similar to those of countries in Europe, 
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insofar as there is an option to submit the dispute to international arbitration institutions. 
Although in some cases an alternative is given for choosing other arbitration institutions, like for 
example the International Chamber of commerce (ICC),398 we see that in the case studies herein, 
and upon the results of the comparative study the most common arbitration institutions in BITs 
of South American countries are: the International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes 
(ICSID) or to an ad hoc arbitration in accordance to the rules of the United Nations Commission 
on International Trade Law (UNCITRAL). 
 
There could be cases were no agreement is reached in regard to the arbitration institution. In 
these cases, the provisions for choosing an institution in case of non-agreement vary 
considerably. In the UK BITs with Argentina and Uruguay, when there is no agreement, there is 
a preferred institution stated by the parties: UNCITRAL. It is expressly mentioned that the 
parties may agree in writing to modify the rules, a peculiarity that the UNCITRAL rules allows 
the parties to do. On the other hand, in the Spain BITs with Argentina and Uruguay, as well as in 
the Germany-Argentina BIT, when there is no agreement on which institution to use, the 
preferred institution is ICSID.  
 
Regarding disputes concerning interpretation or application of the treaty, the EU countries’ BITs 
establish their own arbitration mechanism but the US BITs establish a preference for 
UNCITRAL.399 
 
The reason why parties may as default choose the UNCITRAL as the preferred institution, or in 
the case of the US when concerning the “interpretation and application” of the treaty, could be 
seen as self-interest of the state for the following reason: When the dispute involves the 
interpretation and application of the treaty, normally it is only sovereign states who handle the 
interpretation or application of a treaty. At this stage, private parties, like individual investors, 
companies, or other legal persons other than the States per se, are not involved in such a dispute.   
 
The fact that states choose UNCITRAL for dealing with the treaty’s structure, interpretation and 
execution, can be understood because the UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules have basic and standard 
rules for international arbitration and are therefore more general. They even provide the parties 
with the right to change the rules upon agreement. On the other hand when UNCITRAL rules are 
chosen to solve disputes concerning the “investment” by private parties, i.e. investors, the reason 
might be an economic interest. Commercial private parties such as transnational companies may 
prefer to remain anonymous in disputes to protect their commercial image in the public.  Their 
stock value, reputation and clientele could be affected if they did not have a favourable decision. 
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However, the point lies in a grey area, as the publicity of ICSID may also work to a company’s 
advantage. In cases submitted to ICSID, in which a favourable decision was awarded to the 
company, companies can use this fact to their benefit since they can achieve a better 
reputation.400 Allee and Peinhardt (2010) have claimed that in practice companies prefer to have 
ICSID because they have less transaction costs when dealing with a dispute that arises from a 
foreign environment with different language, culture, etc.401 Indeed, the centre and its facilities in 
regard to these difficulties do provide an advantage. The investor’s decision to use ICSID can be 
based upon the institution’s experience with the foreign disputes and their jurisprudence over 
time.402 
 
In regard to the difference among the investment dispute settlement clauses between US and EU 
BITs, one of the differences can be found in the fact that some European countries’ BITs express 
that when an arbitral award is not complied with, an international claim can be brought against 
that home country. The US BITs do not mention this possibility. 
 
Another difference is that US BITs also have something that European countries’ BITs do not 
have for solving investment disputes. The US BITs has an extra non-judiciary stage, that of 
“Consultations or Negotiations”. This extra step, however, can be an advantage or disadvantage 
depending on the parties’ perspective. From the claimant’s perspective (the investor), having to 
deal with consultation and negotiations with the host state, when the relations with the host 
country are already not good, could be a burden. However, depending on the influence and 
power of the investor in the country, it might also work to the investor’s benefit.  
 
In the same vein, from the host country’s perspective the advantage might be that the dispute can 
be settled before entering a costly arbitration procedure. However, the host country can also be 
vulnerable in the negotiation depending on the investor’s influence in the country and its relation 
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to the home country. Although the developing country might not depend on the foreign investor, 
it might very well depend on the country of which the investor is a national. 
 
In conclusion, this empirical and comparative analysis of South American BITs with the US and 
European countries reveal what the parties really agreed to. It shows the preferences and interests 
that were put into ink in BITs. However, the analysis of the BITs’ structure and the literal 
meaning also sheds some light on their purpose and effect of the provisions on the parties. 
 
What was agreed to be the scope of application of BITs shows how a broad definition of 
investment was taken. By including under the umbrella of investment all kinds of investment-
related disputes it takes away sovereignty of developing countries because once the disputes are 
given the label of investment disputes, they are solved by an international arbitration institution 
and not the judiciary of the host country where the investment had been made. Mortenson argued 
that there was an option for developing countries to opt out of such a scheme. Then the question 
remains: why did they not do it? 
 
The BITs preambles mention, as BITs purposes, that these treaties are signed to promote and 
increase the FDI and economic development. This could be said to be the parties’ belief when 
taking such an action. However, although the treaty stated this objective, the US when 
submitting the US-Argentina BIT for its ratification knew the problematic that BITs alone will 
not increase FDI, they signed it under those terms anyhow. Furthermore, the purposes of BITs 
show that there are issues that go beyond investment like environmental and labour issues. Once 
in the BIT preamble, and due to international law, these standards become enforceable if an 
interpretation of the treaty is needed. These are the very same standards that were not agreed 
upon by developing countries at the multilateral level.  
 
In the same vein, the expropriation provisions in the studied South American BITs have shown 
how developing countries have accepted the Hull principle, which was also so forcefully 
opposed at the multilateral level.  
 
The comparative analysis of the dispute settlement clauses, especially those regarding to 
investment disputes in which the investors can directly sue the state, show that the agreement in 
many BITs is firstly to exhaust local remedies before submitting the dispute to international 
arbitration. However, the clauses also express some conditionalities by which the dispute is very 
likely to end up before an international arbitration institution. Furthermore, the dispute settlement 
clauses show that there are cases where there are safety measures for the claimant (investor) 
through the home state, for example, by adding the ‘consultation and negotiation’ stage in the 
case of the US and by allowing an international claim in certain cases by some European 
countries. Both scenarios accentuate the asymmetries between the parties. 
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Therefore, the utility of the results contained in this chapter relates to the assessment of theories 
regarding why developing countries have signed BITs. The results are evidence that in spite of 
the intellectual debates on foreign investment at multilateral level, through the bilateral way, it 
has been possible to create a framework that did not reflect the developing counties interests. 
Instead, what became the rules for the framework were the preferences of developed countries on 
the central issues that were debated. Again, the main question remains why? The next chapter 
illustrates the different theories that intended to answer this question but I also remark what is 
lacking in them.   
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CHAPTER V: Why have South American countries signed BITs? 
 
South American countries fought at multilateral level to make foreign investments be governed 
by their local laws and to make their local courts the ones with jurisdiction when disputes 
concerning foreign investment arose. However, South American countries signed BITs which 
contain provisions contrary to this. BITs contain clauses establishing that for compensations for 
expropriation, the Hull principle applies and that in case of disputes, the disputes pertaining to 
foreign investment will be detached from domestic courts. And so it is that under these 
assumptions the framework for international investments resulted from the signature of BITs 
which contained the developed countries preferred provisions in the debate about the rules of 
foreign investment. 
 
These BITs, as treaties and the provisions contained in them, are part of international law which 
countries have to comply with. With the existence of bilateral investment treaties, governments 
of home countries have provided security and gave the necessary juridical protection to their 
investors when investing in a host country. For developing countries however, these BITs and 
the changes they had to implement to fit the framework, can be doubted to have contributed to 
their development: the reforms have not resulted an increase in foreign direct investments in 
developing countries, and indeed, BITs have created further costs for developing countries. Thus, 
the current framework is arguably extremely onerous for developing countries but they have 
agreed to it anyhow. The greatest question is: Why?  
 
5.1. Governments’ intention and reasons for entering BITs into force. 
 
Scholars who have paid attention to the history of foreign investments have discovered 
something they consider an immense paradox.403 The alleged paradox consists in the fact that 
when international investments were being regulated at the multilateral level, developing 
countries fought to have provisions according to what was beneficial for them. While even 
international law was favoring their positions in the area of international investments,404 when 
signing BITs, developing countries agreed to provisions which surpassed or contradicted what 
they had previously achieved at multilateral level.  
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Kaushal (2009) said that it was a paradoxical behavior of developing countries to have a UN 
resolution -referring to the 1974 Charter- that gave developing countries full control over foreign 
investment in their territories, and in spite of this, give away this sovereignty through BITs.405 
Sornarajah (1986), Salacuse and Sullivan (2005), Kaushal (2009) and Kononov (2011) have 
argued that possibly because of all the confusion of international laws and dispersed regulation 
of international investment, the contracting parties of BITs, through them, wanted to clarify these 
rules.406  
 
However, those trying to explain the alleged paradox, on the one hand, leaned towards the 
argument that they were signed because of the expected mutual benefits and increase in FDI.407 
Another argument has been that this seemingly contradictory behavior is explained by the 
increased competition among developing countries for FDI from developed countries.408 Herein 
below some considerations on both arguments. 
 
- Benefits? 
 
The main answer given in the scholarship as for why countries sign BITs is that BITs entail a 
benefit for the contracting parties. It has been argued that because of the desire of developing 
countries to attract foreign investors, they have liberalized their markets in order to increase their 
FDI.409 Ergo, that is expressly established as one of the purposes in all BITs.410 Other purposes 
stated in South American BITs are: to have mutual benefit,411 to increase cooperation and 
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economic development,412 to increase prosperity in both countries,413 and even to improve the 
living standards of both parties.414 
 
Before the establishment of BITs, it was thought that developing countries would immensely 
benefit from BITs.  Dolzer (1981) in particular has claimed that developing countries enjoy 
special benefits with BITs.415 This might arise from seeing developing countries as countries of a 
weak economic standing point, struggling with their democratic institutions, political and 
financial instability, social crisis, corruption and poverty, issues that would amount to consider 
them the places least likely to be chosen for a foreign investment.   
 
Kaushal (2009) argues that the grand bargain of BITs is “the promise of protection in exchange 
for the prospect of more investment.”416 As we have seen the purposes of BITs are in accordance 
with this belief. Schneiderman (2000) has mentioned that developed countries considered 
important to secure FDIs in agreements because FDIs were a reason not only to overcome trade 
restrictions to have access to natural resources but that it was also a way for firms to get into the 
markets and benefit from them.417  
 
Vandevelde (2000) also addressed the theoretical debate on the issue. In his work, he analyzed 
the issue from a micro and macro-economic perspective.  In the micro-economic perspective, he 
claims that under the liberal model, the investor keeps the control of their foreign investment, so 
FDI does not involve movement of capital but only a shift in control. Under the interventionist 
model, the state keeps control by having, for example, trade restrictions, so that companies 
would establish themselves locally or by giving investment incentives.418  
In the macro-economic perspective, the liberal model establishes that when capital flows freely, 
the productivity would be at its maximum. The interventionist model requires state intervention 
to allocate the distribution of wealth of foreign investments, and this affects developing 
countries. “For developing countries, the real goal is often development, not merely increased 
productivity, and liberalism promises only the latter.”419 
However, departing from the theoretical debate and arguably, more importantly for the subject, 
there have been empirical studies focusing on proving an answer to whether BITs increase the 
FDI of developing countries or not. I will discuss them in a chronological order. 
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The 1988 UNCTAD Report stated that there was no “direct linkage between the adoption of 
those treaties and the flow of investment to developing countries.”420 The 1998 UNCTAD Report 
concluded that it is “unreasonable to expect that any individual factor, let alone a BIT, could be 
isolated and “credited” with a decisive impact on the size or increase of FDI flows.”421 
 
The 1998 UNCTAD Report used an empirical study of 200 BITs between developed countries 
and developing countries and countries in transition, the report indicated that there is “a very 
weak association between the signing of BITs and absolute or relative changes in FDI 
flows….When the other independent variables are added to the analysis they become important 
as FDI determinants (market size is especially important), and BITs lose almost all significance. 
The overall conclusion is that BITs appear to play, at best, a minor and secondary role in 
influencing increases in FDI flows…Thus, it would be misleading to suggest that the greater the 
number of BITs a host country concludes, the higher FDI flows it can expect.”422(my highlights) 
 
In 2003, the World Bank also made a study on this issue and concluded that FDIs are not 
increased by BITs. The World Bank report refers to Hallward-Driemeier’s (2003) empirical 
study.  Hallward-Driemeier’s study focused on the FDI outflows from 20 OECD countries into 
31 developing countries during the years 1980 until 2000 also because “the vast majority of FDI 
inflows into developing countries originate from OECD countries.”423 
 
Her variables included the World Bank’s World Development Indicators: size of the host 
country, GDP per capita, host country macro-economic stability, among others. In her study she 
added to the latter, what she calls two dummy variables. The first “to capture the effects of the 
enormous political and economic changes in Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union in the 
1990s relative to the 1980s”424 and the other dummy used was to include NAFTA. Although the 
latter was not a BIT, it made Mexico an investment destination.  
The findings showed that BITs do not attract FDI. Furthermore, she also made the same point 
that the UNCTAD report had made, namely that the FDI flows went only into developed 
countries: “It should be noted that the rights secured in a BIT are reciprocal; investors from 
country A investing in B are the same as those given to investors form country B investing in 
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country A. However, in practice there is usually tremendous asymmetry as almost all the FDI 
flows covered by BITs are in fact in one direction.”425  
 
Hallward-Driemeier concluded that BITs did not increase developing countries’ FDIs, and 
therefore, developing countries have had no benefits with BITs. She concluded: “Analyzing 
twenty years of bilateral FDI flows from the OECD to developing countries finds little evidence 
that Bits have stimulated additional investment. Those countries with weak domestic institutions, 
including protection of property, have not gotten significant additional benefits.”426 
 
In 2004, Egger and Pfaffermayr, using the outward FDI of OECD countries into both OECD and 
non OECD economies, concluded that ratified BITs had an impact on FDIs.427 In 2005 there 
were three more empirical studies on FDIs and BITs. Tobin and Rose-Ackermann (2005) in their 
study concluded that they found very weak positive relationship between BITs and FDI.428  
Salacuse and Sullivan (2005) found positive results but only for US BITs429 and Neumayer and 
Spess (2005) also arrived at a contrary opinion and claimed a positive influence on FDI for 
developing countries, claiming that the reason why developing countries sign BITs is to attract 
foreign direct investment.430  
 
Neumayer and Spess’ conclusion states that signing BITs sends out a signal to investors. The 
signal is that the developing country takes the protection of foreign investment seriously.431 
Furthermore, they state: “Countries with a higher cumulative number of BITs, richer countries 
with fast-growing economies and larger populations receive more FDI. So do countries that are 
more intensive in natural resource extraction, that are members of the WTO and have a higher 
number of trade agreements with developed countries.”432 
 
Neumayer and Spess praised the fact that in 2003 the FDI level rose to 31% in the countries that 
they have analyzed. The problem lies in considering whether such increase was indeed caused by 
BITs. Their research design treats absolute FDI, outflows and inflows of FDIs. They consider the 
elements of institutional quality such as political constraints, socio-economic conditions (ethnic 
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tensions, military and religious influence in politics); and they used an International Country 
Risk Guide and an Investment Profile Index that discloses the levels of risk in the country.  
 
In contrast to the study of Hallward-Dreimeyer (2003) which analysed 31 developing countries 
and 537 country pairs, Neumayer and Spess (2005) have used a specification model which 
includes the analysis of BITs between the period of 1970 and 2001, which included 119 
countries, and therefore claimed that it is a sample much broader than those used in the other 
studies. 
Swenson (2005) commented on these empirical studies: "While Salacuse and Sullivan, and 
Neumayer and Spess find evidence that BITs appeared to facilitate subsequent foreign 
investment flows, work based on a smaller set of host countries conducted by Hallward-
Diremeier and Tobin and Rose-Ackerman comes to the opposite conclusion.”433 
Swenson then embarked on the task of using more developing countries, and found that when a 
country signs a BIT the FDI flows rises immediately. She claimed that it is likely that this is a 
reassurance for investors who are more likely to invest in countries with BITs. She herself, 
however, mentions two problems in her analysis, one of which is the timing and the other is the 
partner identification.  
In her argument she claims that investors may invest after signing BITs but others may not, 
considering the lack of provisions needed for the protection of their investment. Referring to the 
study of Tobin and Rose Ackerman, she says that the FDI flow would also depend on the 
partner, a BIT with the US would have more FDI than one with Belgium for example because 
the US has a bigger part of overall foreign investments.434 
In 2006 there was another empirical study. Sokchea (2006) made a study considering BITs from 
1984 to 2002. She found positive results in stating that BITs did increase the FDI of developing 
countries. This study, however, only analyzed 10 Asian countries.435 In the same year, Elkin, 
Guzman and Simmons, referring to Neumayer and Spess’ study, stated that it cannot be predicted 
that BITs increase FDI.436 
Desbordes and Vicard (2007) made an empirical study to determine the FDI return for the 
investor. Seeking to achieve an empirical study comprehending interstate political relations, 
bilateral investment treaties and FDI they analyzed the impact of FDI with 30 OECD countries 
and 62 OECD and non-OECD countries during 1991-2000. 
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They concluded that BIT is a signal for institutional credibility and that it raises FDI but that 
nevertheless the quality of the institutions and relations are important factors that can alter it. 
Desbordes and Vicard state: “…the entry into force of a BIT increases bilateral FDI stocks by 
16%, on average, a lower impact than the one found in previous studies. The magnitude of this 
effect nevertheless significantly differs according to the quality of both host country domestic 
institutions and interstate political relations.”437 
Büthe and Milner (2008) started their study with the premise that indeed FDI have increased 
thanks to transnational companies (TNC) investments, but that it varies. They try to explain this 
variation, analysing the political factors and the FDI flows into 122 developing countries. They 
consider not just BITs but also Preferential Trade Agreements and the inclusion of a country in 
the WTO. They conclude that these agreements may indeed increase FDIs because they have 
also political effects showing the commitment of a country to a liberal market and in that way the 
international political institutions have an effect on FDIs.  
Yackee (2008), on the other hand, also includes in his model other agreements apart from BITs. 
Yackee included the NAFTA and Friendship, Navigation and Commerce treaties because they 
contained similar investor-disputes clauses such as BITs. He made a model including weak and 
strong treaties which depended on the investor dispute clause. Yackee points out that the former 
study of Neumayer and Spess did not use the lagged dependent variable (LDV)438 and “its 
omission would bias model results.”439 He concluded that “the baseline results provide little 
support for the notion that BITs promote investments…”440  
Yackee’s study also showed the result of a statistic made to find out whether investors know 
about BITs and whether they are a determinant factor for them to invest in a country. The 
statistics showed negative results, and furthermore that most investors are unaware of the 
international legal protection they have.441 This is important because it conflicts for example with 
the findings of Swenson (2005). 
In 2010 Tobin and Rose-Ackerman made another study and they reached a different conclusion 
from that of their previous study. Tobin and Rose-Ackerman (2010) arrive at the position that 
BITs do increase FDI but that the FDI of some countries may naturally fall because of the 
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competition that exist among developing countries who have BITs. Their analysis covered the 
period of 1984-2007 and included 97 countries. 
They further claimed, taking into consideration the institutions of developing countries, that BITs 
are not the problem, it is developing countries’ institutions which do not provide a good 
investment environment and BITs cannot be a substitute for weak investment environments.442  
On the other hand, Haftel (2010) in his empirical studies concludes that “BITs have the expected 
positive effect on FDI inflows, but only to the extent that they are in force.”443 However, his 
analysis only comprehended the FDI coming from American investments into developing 
countries.  
Finally, the 2011 UNCTAD Report, regarding international investment agreements (IIA) in 
general, concluded: “These findings began a number of questions with regard to the effectiveness 
of IIAs in terms of generating investment flows and promoting development gains (UNCTAD, 
2009B). For example, the existence of considerable FDI stocks in the absence of post-
establishment treaty coverage suggests that for some investment relationships, IIAs fall short of 
being a determining factor for investment.”444 
 
As one can see, at an empirical level, the results are inconclusive.445 The studies are divided 
between those who found a positive influence of FDI because of BITs and those who did not. All 
of the international organizations studies, however, showed a negative result or showed no 
connection between increase in FDI and BITs.  
 
The UN studies provided the information that in all its analysis the result is negative, i.e. that 
BITs do not increase FDI of developing countries or that there is no direct linkage between BITs 
and FDI. The World Bank report (Hallward-Driemeier study) established the information that 
BITs have not increased FDI to signatory developing countries. BITs do not increase flows of 
investment to developing countries and even more, although rights and duties should be 
reciprocal in BITs, in practice there is a huge asymmetry because FDI are only in one 
direction.446 
 
The different results of Tobin and Rose-Ackerman could be explained because in their later 
study they considered two new factors for justifying that there was a positive influence between 
BITs and FDI. The first one is the effectiveness of domestic institutions; this however, would 
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only work where there is “an interaction with features of the political and economic environment 
of host countries.”447 The second one is the coverage of BITs; the latter being affected by the 
competition among countries. They considered many variables (for eg. from market size, trade 
openness to political stability, inter alias)  
Although Tobin and Rose-Ackerman found positive results in their latest study regarding the 
effects of BITs with FDI flows, contrary to their previous study, the UN and Hallward-Driemeier 
studies, in the findings also show that the FDI inflows fall, so in other words, the fact remains 
that there is not so much FDI, the difference lies in that the reason for them is the competition 
among countries.   
However, the most recent UNCTAD Report of 2011 again sustained the affirmations of the 
original UN studies performed in the 1990s, which did not find that BITs had an influence on 
FDI. 
For this reason Supnik (2009) writes: “Signing BITs “may help legitimize a developing country 
in the international arena and, thus, attract increased levels of foreign direct investment. There is 
no definite proof, however, that the existence of a BIT increases investment flows.”448 
 
The most significant argument for a direct proportionality between BITs and FDI, however, is 
what in practice is happening in South America. The latest UNCTAD Chart on FDI flows, 
direction inward, shows Brazil at the top of the list with the highest FDI in Latin America. They 
received 4.8506 US$ billion dollars in 2010 in the form of FDIs and yet it has not signed one 
single BIT with developed countries.449 
 
In this same line of thought, it is worth mentioning that Yackee (2010) performed an empirical 
analysis on companies’ legal counsels to assess the awareness of a BIT protection. His results 
showed that BITs are neither taken into account by companies for their decisions to invest in a 
developing country nor by political risk insurers.450  
 
The results of analysis like the aforementioned are important because they suggest rather 
strongly that in the end developing countries do not get the claimed benefits from a BIT. These 
issues are worth noticing because there could be a misrepresentation to developing companies 
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when signing BITs because of false beliefs induced by one of the parties so that the other signs 
the treaty. And indeed, these studies already have consequences: One of the justifications of 
Ecuador when denouncing and terminating some of their BITs was that FDI increase was not 
significant and said that these treaties are an evident failure with regard to their purpose to attract 
investments.451  
 
- Competition? 
Guzman (1998) argues that the explanation of the alleged paradox of developing countries 
signing less beneficial rules through BITs than those they had at the multilateral level, can be 
found in a theory of competition. Developing countries accepted certain actions (like the 
provisions of BITs) at bilateral level, when acting alone and in competition with their peers, but 
when in a group, developing countries contested the issues that were in a BIT. Guzman (1998), 
in his article entitled “Why LDCs (least developed countries) sign treaties which hurt them: 
Explaining the Popularity of BITs” says that developing countries are in the prisoner’s dilemma.   
 
The logic to reach his conclusion is that facing the nationalization of many foreign investments, 
the application of the Hull principle (prompt, adequate and effective compensation for 
expropriations) was mainly opposed by developing countries who believed in their domestic 
adjudicative to solve any problem arising from foreign investments according to their laws, and 
their judiciary to be the ones to decide how compensation for expropriations should be made. 
The contradiction comes when facing this situation, developing countries nevertheless signed 
BITs, which not only extended the protection to foreign investors beyond of what international 
law had provided until then but also included the Hull principle. 
According to Guzman developing countries were in a prisoner’s dilemma because while it is 
good for developing countries to reject the Hull principle as a group, individually they are better 
off if they leave the group by signing BITs because then they would be ahead in the competition 
among themselves.452 
In the same vein, Elkins, Guzman and Simmons (2006) argue that BITs are signed because 
developing countries compete with each other for foreign direct investment. They claim that 
BITs are nothing more than a phenomenon that emerged from the international competition 
among developing countries. 
Furthermore, they argue that BITs are an initiative from developing countries in the sense that 
they sign BITs because for them is a “take it or leave it” deal: They choose to do it because of 
                                                 
451
 Minutes of the Ecuadorian Parliament. No. 179 regarding the termination of the Ecuador -Germany BIT and the 
UK-Ecuador BIT. 
452
 Guzman, A.T. “Why LDCs sign treaties which hurt them: Explaining the Popularity of BITs” VA.J. INT’L L. 
1998 p. 667 
121 
 
the fear of being left behind in the competition race with other host countries (developing 
countries), and so they accept the terms of the BITs as they are.453 
To prove their theory, the authors made an empirical study which showed that there were clusters 
which are the high peak when countries signed BITs. Elkins, Guzman and Simmons write that if 
theories of power were right, according to which developed countries determine the agenda, then 
the empirical results should show only developed countries clusters. In their findings however, 
developed countries signed BITs in stretched periods of time and the clusters were found among 
developing countries.  
However, this empirical analysis can be criticized in the following ways: Firstly, by trying to 
explain their empirical evidence using mathematics, they attempt to make the issue be explained 
under a natural science rationale whereas political science is a social science, dynamic and 
constantly changing through time. Susan Strange when commenting on how difficult is to 
achieve a real theory in social science, writes: “Natural science aspires to predict…Social science 
can never confidently predict because the irrational factors involved in human relations are too 
numerous, and the permutations and combinations of them are even more numerous.”454 
Secondly, when Elkins, Guzman and Simmons analyze the empirical data, they consider two 
alternative diffusion mechanisms (policy diffusion towards BITs considering learning and 
coercion). The learning diffusion mechanism is that host countries sign BITs because of the 
benefits, and they refer specifically to the increase of FDI. On this point they write: “Our model 
does not assume that policymakers have Herculean powers of observation or analysis; nor does it 
treat them as remedial statisticians. We assume simply that policy makers assess the success of 
countries in attracting investment over recent years given the countries’ level of development 
and their number of treaties in force during this time.”455 
As has been pointed out above, the empirical analysis on the increase of FDI is inconclusive and 
therefore the connection between BITs and increase in FDI cannot be taken as an assumption. 
Elkins, Guzman and Simmons are just taking an assumption that investments come to the 
country based on the level of development of the developing country and the number of treaties 
in force. They say if their theory is correct then these treaties are going to be prevalent in 
developing countries which are most competitive.456  
Thirdly, Elkins, Guzman and Simmons used for their analysis a US prototype BIT model and not 
real BITs with developing countries. A model is just a template, a standardized BIT which has 
not been signed and the variations contained in each signed BIT are very important. One has to 
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look at them to make the assessment of which provisions were developing countries agreeing to. 
Furthermore, for the events in time, they used only the signature dates of BITs and not their 
ratifications and it is only the latter which makes them enter into force.457 
Furthermore, these scholars completely omitted the development of the framework for 
international investments, from which is revealed, for example in the case of the US, the start of 
a particular BIT program in South America.458 
With regard to the role of coercion diffusion mechanism that Elkins, Guzman and Simmons use 
in their argument, it refers to the International Monetary Fund (IMF) credits, which made them 
state that:  “It may be that potential hosts are coerced or at least strongly encouraged to enter into 
BITs.”459 Even though, coercion seems to be only a remote possibility for Elkins, Guzman and 
Simmons; they do not discuss these thoughts in the context of theories of power.  
This might be the reason why by following Guzman’s prisoner’s dilemma theory, Elkins, 
Guzman and Simmons could only reach the conclusion that developing countries can collectively 
resist to BITs but when acting alone they accept their propositions because they think they are 
going to be better off: “Collectively, they might be better off resisting the demands of investors 
(avoiding the sovereignty costs described above) but individually it is rational to sign in hopes of 
stimulating capital inflows.”460 
However, this leaves a loophole for explaining the BIT regime as they themselves say that their 
competition theory cannot explain the current events in the international investment framework, 
such as the fact of developing countries signing BITs among themselves.461 
5.2. The loopholes  
In conclusion, neither of these theories provides sufficient explanation for the developments and 
challenges of the BIT regime for the following reasons.  
BITs promised benefits, to increase FDI and with it to increase the economic prosperity of 
developing countries.462 The results of empirical studies on the increase of FDI in developing 
countries through BITs have been inconclusive, so the fact that there is actually increase of FDI 
is contested.  
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The praxis, however, with Brazil’s example, suggests that there is no direct connection between 
BITs and FDI increase. Let us compare two other South American neighboring countries of 
Brazil. Paraguay has 26 BITs in force and is at the bottom of the FDI ranking, their FDI in 2009 
was established as 108 Million dollars. Bolivia has only 15 BITs, half the BITs compared to 
Paraguay and had FDIs in 2009 of 2244 Million dollars, 20 times more FDI than Paraguay.463  
 
Likewise, the competition theory, which says that BITs are going to be prevalent in the most 
competitive countries and that with the treaties in force the level of development will raise, is 
also ruled out by the case of Brazil.  In South America, Brazil is at the top of the scale in terms of 
FDIs in comparison to other countries in the region, and yet Brazil has no bilateral investment 
treaties in force with developed countries.464  
 
Furthermore, these theories are insufficient to answer not only the seemingly paradoxical 
behavior of developing countries, but these theories can neither explain some of the challenges 
that the BIT regime is going through, like: why have the attempts of regulating foreign 
investment at the multilateral level failed, why are developing countries reacting against the 
regime, and why is the international investment framework once again changing?  
 
Therefore, what is lacking in the literature on international investment is an explanation for the 
alleged paradox that would include the particularities of Brazil, for example, but furthermore, 
there is also the need for explaining the other challenging questions surrounding the international 
investment framework. In particular: why are developing countries reacting against the regime, 
why is the framework evolving and why have the multilateral attempts to regulate investment at 
the multilateral level failed? 
 
In the next chapter I will argue that the way to answer these questions is by appeal to a specific 
theory of power, namely, understanding power as a holistic phenomenon in the context of 
Strange’s theory of structural and relative power. 
 
The next chapter unveils the indicators of structural power in the framework for international 
investment, from its establishment to the events provoking the current challenges that the 
framework faces. 
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CHAPTER VI: Indicators of Structural Power in the BIT regime  
 
The South American region is particularly relevant as a case study for finding structural power in 
the framework of international investments for two reasons: Firstly, because what has been 
thought of as a paradox, i.e. developing countries achieving favourable international investment 
rules at the multilateral level and then signing BITs that contained less favourable international 
investment rules, can easily be spotted in South American countries’ seemingly contradictory 
behaviour: the adoption of the Hull principle and international arbitration while rejecting the 
Calvo doctrine which was born in this region. Secondly, because South American countries have 
been the first ones to start reacting against the BIT regime. 
 
This chapter points out the indicators that support the claim that the framework for international 
investments was defined by structural power. The first indicator is given when analysing how the 
framework for international investment developed and under which rules it was established. The 
second indicator lies in how the control of the financial dimension played a role in defining the 
rules for international investments. The third indicator arises from the ex post costs that 
developing countries have pursuant to the institutions established in such a framework. The 
fourth indicator pertains to a greater sovereignty cost that has affected only developing countries 
so far. Finally, the fifth indicator is revealed from the reasons behind the new changes of the 
framework for international investments. 
 
These indicators should not be referred to in isolation. All indicators are connected to one 
another, and that is why they result in a holistic phenomenon of power that can suffice for 
explanations of what happens in the BIT regime. 
 
6.1. The Formation of a Framework for International Investments.  
 
Dolzer and Stevens claim that after World War II developing countries relied on private foreign 
capital and through BITs foreign investments could be protected.465 However, during the period 
after the World War II and before BITs existed, there were international investment rules. There 
was customary international law in favour of developing countries and there was a period where 
UN resolutions were in favour of sovereignty, where regional pacts still conserved the Calvo 
clause.466 All this benefited developing countries.  
 
However, there were efforts by developed countries to define a framework with different rules. 
The Bretton Woods agreement after World War II created the International Monetary Fund and 
the World Bank. These institutions, together with other financial institutions, played a role in the 
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development of an international investment framework.467 On this, Simmons, Dobbin and Garrett 
(2006) write: “[T]the hegemonic United States—often acting through the Bretton Woods 
international economic institutions it helped create after World War II—has used a combination 
of carrots (political and military support, as well as preferential access to US markets) and sticks 
(from strings attached to financial assistance to threats of military coercion) to impose its vision 
for political and economic liberalism on the rest of the world.”468   
 
While rules at the multilateral level were benefiting developing countries, it was pointed out in 
the GATT Ministerial Declaration of 1986 that: “Following an examination of the operation of 
GATT Articles related to the trade restrictive and distorting effects of investment measures, 
negotiations should elaborate, as appropriate, further provisions that may be necessary to avoid 
such adverse effects on trade.”469 It was said that the rules on foreign investment were 
‘restrictive and distortive’, but for whom? Since the rules were in favour of developing countries, 
the reference of them being restrictive and distortive, had to be from a developed countries’ 
perspective as it will become evident in the following. 
 
Therefore, among the purposes established in the Uruguay Round, one consisted in: to “halt and 
reverse protectionism and to remove distortions to trade.”470 Developed countries, from whose 
perspective the investment measures were distorting and restrictive, took indeed further 
measures. In the same round, the 1986 Uruguay Round of the then GATT, the elaboration of an 
Agreement on trade related to investment measures (TRIMS) was proposed.471   
 
The 1980s were characterized by the Latin American debt crisis.472 Latin American countries 
needed capital and foreign investments were supposed to facilitate capital for them. Two years 
after the Uruguay Round, in 1988, the Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agency (MIGA), 
member of the World Bank, was founded to promote foreign direct investment in developing 
countries with a mandate to procure agreements on the promotion of foreign investments. Article 
23 (b) (iii) of the MIGA Convention establishes that “The Agency also shall: …promote and 
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facilitate the conclusion of agreements, among its members, on the promotion and protection of 
investments.”473  
 
In 1989, with the Washington consensus a wave of neoliberalism came about. The Washington 
Consensus starts by stating: “No statement about how to deal with the debt crisis in Latin 
America would be complete without a call for the debtors to fulfill their part of the proposed 
bargain by "setting their houses in order," "undertaking policy reforms," or "submitting to 
strong conditionality."474  
 
The Washington Consensus proposed liberalization of trade policies and openness to foreign 
investment. Criticizing Latin American countries, it was said in regard to foreign investments: 
“liberalization of foreign financial flows is not regarded as a high priority. In contrast, a 
restrictive attitude limiting the entry of foreign direct investment (FDI) is regarded as foolish. 
…The main motivation for restricting FDI is economic nationalism, which Washington 
disapproves of, at least when practiced by countries other than the United States.”475 
 
In 1990, President George Bush senior initiated what was called “Enterprise for the Americas 
Initiative”, which created ‘Framework Agreements’ that required openness and liberalization of 
the developing countries’ markets to create, among other things, an investor-friendly 
environment.  
 
Baldwin (1993) states: “…President Bush’s Enterprise for the Americas Initiative boomed in 
1991 with 26 countries signing so called Framework Agreements (these require the countries to 
make unilateral concessions on trade and investment to the US in exchange for the promise of 
closer US relations leading eventually to an FTA).”476 
 
These agreements resulted in developing countries having to make structural changes to fit to the 
trade and investment scheme of developed countries. In South America, the Framework 
Agreement was signed in 1991 by the United States and Argentina, Brazil, Paraguay, and 
Uruguay (the founding countries of the MERCOSUR).  
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The Framework Agreement created a Council to monitor trade and investment: “The objectives 
of this council, established by this framework agreement, are to monitor trade and investment 
relations, identify opportunities for expanding trade and investment through liberalization and 
other appropriate means, and negotiate implementing agreements.  It will also seek to consult on 
specific trade and investment matters of interest to both parties and identify and work to remove 
impediments to trade and investment flows.”477 
 
The US, in particular, had the objective to establish a framework in which developing countries 
had to liberalize their markets. This became clear in the 1991 Dispatch of the US Department of 
State: “Completion of a framework agreement with a country or group of countries establishes a 
channel to explore various trade liberalization options and promotes the EAI [Enterprise for the 
Americas Initiative] vision.”478   
 
Suddenly, in the 1990s, Bilateral Investment Treaties (BITs) started to boom in South 
America.479 Policies in those developing countries started to change; they liberalized their 
markets and provided an investment climate favourable for foreign investors. The UNCTAD 
World Investment Report 2000 stated that “[o]ver the period 1991-1999, 94 per cent of the 1,035 
policy changes favoured investors.”480  
 
Simmons, Dobbin and Garrett (2006) worked on documenting the diffusion of liberal policies. 
The following graphic shows when Latin America started to open for liberalization:  
 
 
 
FIGURE 4.  Regional variations in financial openness481 
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For Latin America, the graphic shows the increase of liberal policies around the 1990s, exactly 
the time when the BITs started to boom in South America and with it, all the regime which 
supported it. 
 
The UNCTAD report of 2005 stated that there was a huge amount of changes, especially towards 
liberal investment regimes.482 Developing countries agreed to liberalize their market because 
they had the promise that by doing it, they would attract foreign investments and increase their 
prosperity.483 Facing their financial crisis, this was something appealing.  
 
Dolzer and Stevens claim that “the confidence and interest of foreign investors in developing 
countries in the 1990s may principally be attributed to an improvement in the investment climate 
brought about by a range of economic policy reforms which in many cases have led to better 
economic performances.”484 However, as the empirical studies have shown in Chapter V, there is 
no link between the increase of foreign investment and BITs, which were arguably signed in 
order to improve the investment climate.  
 
In 1992, the World Bank issued the “Guidelines on the treatment of Foreign Direct Investment”. 
In regard to this guideline Dolzer and Schreuer (2012) write that: “It recognizes ‘that a greater 
flow of foreign direct investment brings substantial benefits to bear on the world economy and 
on the economies of developing countries in particular, in terms of improving the long term 
efficiency of the host country through greater competition, transfer of capital, technology and 
managerial skills and enhancement of market access and in terms of the expansion of 
international trade.”485  
 
Signing BITs was part of the liberalization process. However, the BITs by themselves could not 
have worked; they needed an enforcement system. Thus, further to embracing the liberalization 
concept, there were further requirements, in particular agreement to the framework that would 
support the BITs regime, which included many more treaties giving strength to the international 
arbitration system.   
 
Hence, parallel to BITs booming, South American countries ratified international arbitration 
conventions and treaties that were key to the BIT regime. The 1965 Convention,486 which created 
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the ICSID, was only ratified by South American countries around the 1990s.487 The ICSID 
Convention created a body, an international arbitration center that would conduct the arbitral 
proceedings of such disputes: ICSID. This institution is dependent of the World Bank. The 
decision, however, to have ICSID in the investment dispute settlement clauses of BITs, as the 
chosen arbitration institution to solve investment disputes, has been theoretically analyzed by 
scholars as a bargain,488 although there are elements that also point towards structural power in 
which the aims of the powerful party prevailed. 
 
The same is true for the 1958 New York Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of 
Foreign Arbitral Awards. Developed countries signed this convention much earlier than South 
American developing countries.489 
 
All these developments lead to the framework that has been legitimized through BITs, and BITs 
changed the multilateral rules on foreign investments in what pertains to the main areas of it: 
compensation for expropriations and dispute settlement. 
 
On the rules for determining the compensation that should be given to foreign investors in case 
of expropriations, BITs established the Hull principle, that expropriations should be prompt, 
effective and adequate. This gives more to the investor than if the rule of international law of fair 
compensation applied by which the expropriatory state should pay the fair market price of the 
expropriation and not the full prompt, effective and adequate that includes for example, the loss 
of expected profit and rights.490 
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Regarding the rules determining the dispute settlement mechanism for foreign investment 
disputes, BITs established that such disputes were neither subject to local courts nor using the 
host state’s laws, as the multilateral level rules had established,491 but to submit such disputes to 
an international arbitration institution. 
 
For this reason, it was pointed out by Shan (2007) referring to Calvo clauses: “In the mid 1990s, 
the "imminent death" of this doctrine was again declared due to changing attitudes in Latin 
American states towards foreign investments…Calvo has converged with investment treaties on 
the national treatment standard requirement, and has been greatly eroded and largely discarded 
on the exclusive national jurisdiction and national law requirements.”492 
 
Developed countries were keen on these modifications in the legislation of developing countries. 
For example, the US Assistant Secretary of State for Economic and Business Affairs stated, 
when submitting the US-Argentina BIT493 to the US Senate: “One item of particular interest in 
the Argentina BIT is that, like many Latin American countries, Argentina has long subscribed to 
the so-called Calvo Doctrine which requires that foreign investors submit disputes arising in a 
country to that country´s local courts. This treaty contains an absolute right to international 
arbitration of investment disputes and thereby removes U.S. investors from the restrictive 
operation of the Calvo Doctrine. Such a precedent with Argentina has already helped pave the 
way for similar agreements with other Latin American countries.”494 
 
Referring to this statement, Alvarez and Khamsi (2009) have drawn attention to how the US 
praised the inclusion of international arbitration in the US-Argentina BIT, because for the US, 
the agreement to this BIT “marked the repudiation of the Calvo Doctrine by the country that had 
given birth to it.”495  
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However, we have seen that in the BITs that were herein analyzed, some BITs have as a step the 
submission of the dispute to domestic courts before reaching the stage of international 
arbitration. This indicates that South American states are keen to maintain the investment 
disputes in their jurisdiction if possible, and therefore, rightfully agree with such a provision that 
had the submission of the dispute to local courts as a pre-stage.  However, in most BITs, these 
same clauses allowing for the submission of the dispute to local courts have a condition of time 
(deadline) or an event which upon fulfilment, directs the dispute to international arbitration: If 
eighteen months have elapsed or if after the decision of the court the disputes subsist, or even if 
the party seeking relief has an unjust court decision, then such a party can submit the dispute to 
international arbitration.496  
 
Therefore, the deadlines and conditions included in the clauses limit considerably the 
circumstances under which the disputes can be handled by domestic courts. Developing 
countries’ judges are likely to be overloaded with work, due to an inadequate system, and the 
lack of specialized courts to address foreign investment claims may be factors which delay the 
process in developing countries.497 With regard to the condition of submitting the dispute to 
international arbitration when there is an unjust court decision, this is there to protect investors 
and it is founded in the prevention of arbitrary and discriminatory treatment of the local 
judiciary. However, the assessment of an allegedly unjust court decision will be done by the 
party that the court decision disfavours, and this might encourage the possibility of misusing the 
system, when the party which lost, in bad faith, uses the next stage (arbitration) as another 
attempt to try better luck.  
 
Some other South American BITs have dispute settlement clauses that state that the dispute has 
to be submitted to local courts “or” international arbitration.498 This alternative is crucial because 
by introducing the word “or”, choice is given to the claimant for submitting the dispute “either” 
to local courts “or” international arbitration.  In this case, and considering that foreign investors 
are likely to be the ones submitting the complaints, a direct path is given to them for 
circumventing local courts completely and submit the dispute to international arbitration, with 
which they can obtain a binding award from a tribunal of arbitrators (one of which being 
appointed by them).  
 
And so, even in those South American BITs, which indicate as a pre-stage that the dispute will 
be resolved in domestic courts and those with the choice “or” in them, will in all likelihood end 
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up in international arbitration.499 This is a strong reason for developed countries to comfortably 
sign BITs with developing South American countries, even if submission of the dispute to local 
courts is determined as a pre-stage.500 
 
The developments described in this section are the reasons why the formation of the framework 
for international investment is an indicator of structural power. The institutions created to 
promote liberalization touched on the topic of investment and there are clear targeted plans, like 
with Bush’s program of the ‘Framework Agreements’ that included the fact that developing 
countries ought to give concessions on investment issues, after which BITs started to boom in 
South America.  Following this, there were the ratification of international arbitration 
conventions and the establishment of ICSID, which cannot be referred to as being a bargain 
because one of the parties is heavily constrained or dependant on the other party, allowing for the 
outcome to be determined by the powerful party.  
 
Structural power confers the party holding it the power to ‘shape frameworks’. The analysis of 
this particular framework as well as the developments in it showed us that no matter what the 
substantial rules are, those of convenience for a party with structural power are more likely to be 
determined by this party as the rules of the game. For example, the US wanted and tried to 
influence structures, on more than one occasion, U.S. Department of State made the following 
statement regarding BITs: “The BITs help advance U.S. values and ideas. They do so by 
promoting U.S. investments, spreading U.S. legal concepts, and lending support to economic 
reforms and reformers in newly emerging democracies.”501 Furthermore, it was stated: “…how 
these treaties can advance certain U.S. interests and encourage reform-minded countries to adopt 
and maintain market-oriented policies.”502 The way it could be achieved is through structural 
power.503  
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A political scientist would not analyze the institutions or the bodies per se but he/she would 
focus on other less formal but more substantial questions like determining whose authority these 
institutions are reflecting.  If international regimes are the reflection of national interests, then 
also from a political science perspective, it is the powerful players who are able to determine the 
rules.  As Susan Strange said: “[M]any international regimes have not so much been the result of 
a coming-together of equals, but the end-result of a strategy developed by a dominant state, or 
sometimes by a small group or dominant states.”504 And so it is that the framework for 
international investments that we have today did not evolve from a multilateral consensus among 
all members of the international community nor taking into account the interests of developing 
countries, but rather from the strategies and preferences of the developed countries, achievable 
through structural power in the framework.  
6.2. The Control in the Financial Dimension. 
Analyzing the connection between international financial institutions and the repercussion on 
developing countries is not a novelty in the literature. What is a novelty is the lens of structural 
power used to view this phenomenon. 
The factor of coercion is often mentioned to explain why developing countries agree to rules that 
do not benefit them. Simmons, Dobbin and Garret said that “One prominent explanation for the 
spread of economic and political liberalism involves a distinctly antiliberal mechanism: coercion. 
Powerful countries can explicitly or implicitly influence the probability that weaker nations 
adopt the policy they prefer by manipulating the opportunities and constraints encountered by 
target countries…”505 By the same token, Alvarez (1992), speaking directly about BITs and 
referring to the attitude of developing countries towards BITs, pointed out that they had “…a 
IMF gun pointed at their heads…”506 
There is no denial of the strong connection of international financial institutions in the 
establishment of the BIT regime, but coercion might not be the right word for it as there was 
always a choice for developing countries and so developing countries have willingly accepted 
the terms. Rather, a better explanation might be provided if we consider the financial element as 
a structural factor of the framework. 
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Strange’s concept of structural power has a financial dimension to it: the control over credits. 
The structural power characterized in this dimension limits the choice of the financially weaker 
party in such a way that what is proposed will be agreed to.  This situation explains why the 
developing countries had proceeded in the way proposed by developed countries. 
Is this what happened in the signing of BITs by South American countries? We will see that the 
international financial institutions like the International Monetary Fund (IMF), the Inter-
American Development Bank and the World Bank (WB) and its agencies like the International 
Bank for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD) and the Multilateral Investment Guarantee 
Agency (MIGA), all played a role in the decision of developing countries to agreeing to the BIT 
framework.  
The international financial institutions, created by the US through the Bretton Woods system, 
helped developing countries financially.507 However, the loans provided had conditions with 
which developing countries had to comply in order to receive such loans.508 This is a strong tool 
for developed countries, and specially the US, to persuade developing countries to change their 
policies to stop the adverse effects that -from the perspective of the US- investments were having 
on trade.509   
The International Monetary Fund (IMF), a lending institution for developing countries, had 
stabilization programs in which “greater hospitality for foreign private investment”510 was 
required.511 
In an analysis of the conditions imposed by the IMF, Kalderimis (2003) established a correlation 
between these conditions and investments. He claimed that the IMF wants liberalization of 
foreign investments, and that meant measures were needed to be accepted by developing 
countries, inter alias, not to restrict investments, to give them national treatment and to be willing 
to privatize.512 
Kalderimis concentrated on giving reasons for why the IMF has no jurisdiction to prescribe 
investment terms as conditions for receiving funds and he further claimed that, by doing this, the 
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IMF is acting illegitimately.513 He stated, however, that the conditionality that the IMF can 
impose is not mandatory; it is just an influence on its debtors, indicating  that it is an indirect way 
in which funding is given in exchange of a certain conduct.514  
However, Kalderimis himself clarifies that the need might be crucial for these actors: “The word 
“needed” should be emphasized. IMF funding is much more crucial to debtor countries than 
federal funding is to U.S. states. States can tax their citizens to make-up budget shortfalls. Not so 
indigent debtor countries – this is precisely why they need IMF assistance.”515  
In regard to the Inter-American Development Bank, when the Framework Agreements were 
created, they administered a US$ 1.5 billion multilateral investment fund. This was offered to 
developing countries in exchange of being part of the Framework Agreements (which intended 
to liberalize investments, i.e. signing BITs), becoming in that way the bait for the Enterprise of 
the Americas program.516 
The World Bank can play a similar role. As Kaushal (2003) points out: “There are important 
intersections between the IMF and World Bank on the one hand and foreign investment on the 
other.  The forceful and far-reaching nature of conditionality is such that the loan becomes a 
policy tool.”517  
The World Bank consists of five institutions, three of which relate to the promotion of foreign 
investments. The Articles of Agreement of the IBRD518 states that the purposes of the Bank is, 
inter alias, “To promote private foreign investment by means of guarantees or participations in 
loans and other investments made by private investors; and when private capital is not available 
on reasonable terms, to supplement private investment by providing, on suitable conditions, 
finance.”519 
The MIGA, offers insurance for foreign investments but as described before, it was created to 
promote foreign investments agreements.520 ICSID is also an agency of the World Bank and the 
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main international arbitration institution to solve investment disputes. This dependency has also 
been criticized, as ICSID has to sometimes solved disputes that are directly in connection to the 
loans of the World Bank.521  
South American countries, desiring and ‘in need’ of continuing obtaining loans from 
international financial institutions, and relying on the promises made, changed national policies 
to attract  foreign direct investment that would lead to an increase in prosperity. Kaushal (2009) 
pointed out that “…a financially troubled developing country without other recourse is not strong 
enough to refuse the terms of the loan.”522  
The multilateral scheme of investments, and its failure, also proves the relevance of the 
conditionality factor as an indicator of structural power. There was more than one attempt to 
create a complete multilateral investment agreement.523  For example, the Multilateral 
Agreement on Investments (MAI) from the OECD countries was proposed in 1995,524 and then 
the Multilateral Investment Agreement (MIA) was proposed at the 2003 WTO Ministerial 
Conference. All such attempts have failed so far. 
The reasons for this, apart from the lack of agreement among members, might lie in the fact that 
developing countries were not conditioned to receiving credits upon the acceptance of these 
agreements, in the way they were in the case of BITs. Kalderimis (2003), referring to the MIA, 
has pointed out: “It is more conceivable that a struggling developing country would not sign a 
new investment treaty than it is that such a country would refuse IMF funding.”525  
These conditionalities affected the behavior of developing countries with regards to agreeing to 
the rules of developed countries, but it is thanks to the structural setting because the strong 
conditional factor and the dependency on credit reduce the choice of developing countries to the 
point that they accept the terms of a loan.  Allee and Peinhardt (2010), although analyzing the 
acceptance of ICSID, have conducted an empirical study on the effects on conditionalities for 
accepting terms and found out that “host regimes that are highly dependent upon the global 
economy are almost certain to include ICSID in their BITs.”526  
Furthermore, viewing conditionality under these terms is another argument for the lack of 
developing countries’ bargaining position. Factors like hardship in the relationship, especially 
when one of the parties knows that the other party’s only means to alleviate such hardship is 
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their reliance in said party, predicts the outcome: the acceptance of such conditions. This, 
however, does not amount to the bargaining of said issue but to an acceptance based on a 
relationship that contains structural power.  
Developing countries agreed to the BIT regime because with the conditions to get loans from 
international financial institutions, their choice gets limited by the structural setting and power in 
the framework.  
As Susan Strange said, structural power limits the range of choices so much that the outcome can 
be determined.  With the loans conditionality and the requirement to have an investor friendly 
environment in order to get loans, the South American countries’ possibility of choice was so 
reduced and limited that they could not choose anything else but to accept the requirements and 
conditions that were contained in a framework with structural power. 
 
6.3. The Costs of ICSID for Developing Countries. 
 
Developing countries always wanted to have the disputes concerning investments that were 
performed in their territory to be resolved locally. From a practical perspective, this would 
involve no costs and it could enforce the trust on the local judiciary system. To have a setting 
under such circumstances was, however, a disadvantage for developed countries and their 
investors which were asked to trust in a foreign judicial system.527  
However, as the liberalization process has shown, developing countries accepted and contributed 
to creating the BIT regime, which involved the constitution of an international arbitration 
institution: ICSID.528  
ICSID, as part of the BIT regime, was created as a specialized international arbitration tribunal 
for resolving investor-state disputes. Mortenson (2010) stated “the underlying purpose of the 
ICSID Convention: to promote economic development by increasing the flow of foreign 
investment into interested host countries.”529  
However, the focus of the analysis should not be directed to the creation or purpose of ICSID. 
The focus should be directed to its practice.  This ex post facto analysis reveals which were the 
costs that this choice has had for developing countries and whether it was really something that 
was intended by developing countries.  
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ICSID’s practice has been criticized in numerous ways. The theoretical discussions of problems 
that have been identified with ICSID include its high financial costs, the unpredictability of its 
decisions, their partiality and conditionality, and the bad reputation it gives to countries. 
Interestingly, it is developing countries that are primarily affected by all these problems. 
As with most international arbitration tribunals, the first criticism of ICSID regards its financial 
costs. In comparison to the submission of disputes to the courts of host countries, whose costs are 
going to be based on their national currency, the submission of disputes to ICSID are expensive. 
When submitting a dispute to ICSID, the administrative fee for requesting arbitration is 
US$25.000; for any complementary decision, US$10.000; annual fee for constituting the 
Tribunal, US$32.000; Appointment of arbitrators, US$10.000, and the Arbitrator´s fee is US$ 
3000 per day. These costs do not include the arbitrator’s travel costs, translations, etc.530  
It is also important to consider which parties will be paying such costs and under which 
circumstances. When submitting a dispute, pursuant to a BIT, the parties are foreign investor-
which are normally transnational companies (TNCs) on the one hand, and developing countries, 
which are always the respondents in such disputes. From a developing country’s perspective, the 
problem is that they not only have to take money from their treasury to defend themselves, 
money that might well be useful for other needs of the country, but even more money has to be 
added to have a good representation. Supnik (2009) has said in this regard: “[D]eveloping host 
states facing ICSID claims often lack sufficient resources to adequately represent themselves in 
proceedings.  Developing states must pay expensive legal fees to elite Western law firms to 
obtain representation comparable in calibre to that of private investors.”531 
Indirectly, this gives companies a better position than developing countries, because the mere 
idea of having to defend a costly dispute might limit the possible actions of developing countries. 
Picciotto (2011) has pointed out: “The effect is to destabilize the legitimacy of national 
laws…The threat of such a claim, which could lead to an award which may run to hundreds of 
millions of dollars as well as the cost of defending it, gives foreign investors a powerful weapon 
especially against poor states.”532 Furthermore, Hallward-Driemeier (2003) stated in her 
conclusion that there is a speculation regarding firms, “to look for ways to exploit the terms of 
the treaty as a lucrative way of doing business, seeking compensation for risks that they had not 
previously expected to be protected from.”533 
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Parties to a BIT and its system have to bear in mind that the ultimate purpose of such treaties is 
allegedly to encourage development and economic growth in developing countries.534 There is a 
dilemma though because having an international arbitration tribunal such as ICSID brings more 
balance to solving disputes between a foreign investor and a state, when the legal institutions of 
such a state are full of corruption and exercising discretionary powers. However, this might not 
always be the case, and if the purpose is development, more aid, and not only financial aid 
should be provided to these areas for developing countries to develop. An easy and formal 
contribution to the host country would be if foreign investors paid the corresponding judicial 
taxes when submitting their disputes. This would help the judiciary as a whole, something that 
does not happen when submitting a dispute to ICSID.  
 
The second criticism of ICSID concerns its operation as a deciding tribunal.  Kaushal (2009) has 
stated that ICSID’s awards are “unpredictable, contradictory, intrusive on the national regulatory 
sphere and extremely generous to foreign corporations.”535 
These comments derive from some substantial matters in ICSID’s decisions.  In the cases 
submitted to ICSID, if we just consider the treatment that for example the most favoured nation 
(MFN) clauses536 were given, it is clear that there was some controversy in its application and 
interpretation.537   
 
The cases Siemens (2004) and Wintershall (2008) are good examples that reflect the problem. 
Both cases concerned German investors against the Argentine Republic.  Both tried to get over 
submitting the dispute to local courts by invoking the MFN clause.  In both cases, the Argentine 
Republic objected to the jurisdiction of the ICSID Tribunal, claiming that the submission to local 
courts was imperative.538 The ICSID, however, ruled in favour of the German party in one case 
and not in favour of the German party in the other case. 
 
In Siemens vs Argentina539 it was ruled by ICSID that the MFN clause of the Chile-Argentina 
BIT can be applied by Siemens540 and they accepted the jurisdiction of ICSID for the case.541 
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The reasoning of this decision lied in the tribunal considering the Vienna Treaty, whose 
respective article states that treaties are to be interpreted in good faith in accordance with the 
ordinary meaning to be given to the terms of the treaty in their context and in the light of its 
object and purpose.542 
  
In this case the tribunal stated that its guidance will be by the “purpose” of the Treaty, and as it 
was expressed in the German-Argentinean BIT’s title and preamble, that it is a treaty “to protect” 
and “to promote” investments.  
 
A contrario sensu, in the case Wintershall vs Argentina543 the ICSID Tribunal ruled that the 
MFN cannot be applied because in the German-Argentina BIT, arbitration to ICSID was 
conditioned to first submitting the dispute to local courts.  
 
While in Siemens the reasoning of the tribunal for the decision was based on the provision of the 
Vienna Convention on interpretation of treaties, of which the tribunal interpreted the “purpose” 
approach, in the Wintershall case the Tribunal read the same provision but they interpreted it 
using the “textual” approach.  
 
Therefore, the tribunal stated in Wintershall that the acceptance by a State of the jurisdiction of 
an international tribunal always requires to be expressed by positive conduct and that the right to 
access to arbitration was conditioned by the German-Argentina BIT “simply because it was the 
will of the contracting states” and therefore another BIT (in this case the Argentina-US BIT) 
could not be used to invoke the MFN for this matter.  
 
What is strikingly different is that while in Siemens the tribunal stated that the purpose of the 
treaty was important and the application of MFN of other treaties was available as to give more 
favourable treatment to Siemens, and so it was stated that Siemens could have direct access to 
international arbitration, in Wintershall the tribunal’s arbitrators said: “That an investor could 
choose at will to omit the second step is simply not provided for nor even envisaged by the 
Argentina-Germany BIT – because (Argentina’s) the Host State’s “consent” (standing offer) is 
premised on there being first submitted to the courts of competent jurisdiction in the Host State 
the entire dispute for resolution in local courts...Besides, it is a general principle of international 
law that international courts and tribunals can exercise jurisdiction over a State only with its 
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consent. The principle is often described as a corollary to the sovereignty and independence of 
the State”544 
 
The tribunal stated that because Wintershall did not comply with the dispute settlement clause in 
the German-Argentina Treaty insofar as to submitting the dispute to local courts and then to the 
international tribunal, “they had no competence to entertain the claim and proceed with the 
merits.”545 
 
If we put ourselves in Wintershall’s position, it is evidently an unequal treatment in comparison 
to what was awarded to Siemens who got a more favourable treatment by the international 
tribunal when they allowed Siemens to use the MFN principle.546 These two cases are really a 
big contradiction for the application of the MFN and both could happen under the same treaty, 
which in these cases was the Germany-Argentina BIT. 
 
The effect of these MFN interpretations is quite remarkable. Firstly, claiming the MFN clauses in 
the cases allows the claimant, an investor, to do treaty shopping in the sense that the investor 
does not need to rely on the BIT that was signed with its home country as the investor can 
choose a provision that is established in another treaty. Secondly, because the MFN principle can 
be applied to any provision of the treaty, there is a possibility of ending up with what has been 
called ‘a Frankenstein treaty’ because the rulings of the tribunal hint at the possibility of using 
different clauses from all the BITs of the country that better suits the claimant.    
 
However, it was not only the interpretation of the MFN clauses that was contradictory in some of 
the ICSID’s decisions. Some other examples of how ICSID retained jurisdiction happened under 
the interpretation given to fork in the road clauses. Fork in the road clauses are the clauses by 
which the submission of the dispute to local courts is said to waive the right to access 
international arbitration.   
 
In CMS vs Argentina,547 derived from an US-Argentina BIT in 2004, in respect of the 
jurisdiction of the Tribunal, there was in addition to the BIT a specific contract (a License of 
CMS and subject matter of the investment), which stated that they had to settle disputes before 
the local courts. The tribunal said this is not a waiver to the Tribunal’s jurisdiction because a 
breach of a contract is not equal to a breach of a treaty.548  
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Furthermore, in Azurix vs. Argentina,549 derived from a US-Argentina BIT, the respondent 
challenged the jurisdiction of the ICSID because the contract of Azurix specifically provided that 
the disputes should be submitted to the local courts, waiver of other fora. However, the Tribunal 
ruled in this case that the party’s submission to local courts was no waiver because an obligation 
under the BIT towards the investment was breached and that gave them jurisdiction.  
 
And again, a decision of the ICSID Tribunal, which is opposite to the aforementioned, was given 
in the case Compañía de Aguas del Aconquija and Vivendi vs Argentina,550 which derived 
from a France-Argentina BIT. In a way similar to the Wintershall case, the French-Argentina 
BIT had the same provision as the US-Argentina BIT, which states the option of submitting the 
dispute to either ICSID international arbitration or UNICTRAL.  
 
The Tribunal stated in Wintershall that the MFN of the US-Argentina BIT could not be applied 
because it was a different arbitration system, though they allowed the international jurisdiction in 
Siemens, but in this case, Compañía de Aguas and Vivendi, the reasoning of the Tribunal was 
different. They said that the dispute must be submitted to local courts because the treaty 
expressly stated that there was a fork in the road clause in the treaty. 
 
The tribunal in the Compañía de Aguas and Vivendi case stated that any claim against the 
Argentine Republic could only arise if claimants were denied access to courts, if they were 
treated unfairly or if the judgment of those courts were unfair or denied rights guaranteed to 
French investors under the BIT.551 This decision was, however, later annulled and as in the 
previous cases the Tribunal sustained that a breach of a contract can amount to the breach of a 
treaty.552 
 
As it can be seen, in the cases submitted to ICSID, the arbitrators, using their kompetenz-
kompetenz have resolved in favour of their jurisdiction, either using the MFN principle553  or in 
spite of fork in the road clauses.554 However, all this happened in spite of the dispute settlement 
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wording of South American countries’ BITs and especially Argentinean ones which contain a 
special provision requiring that disputes first go to local courts.555  
Thirdly, there is the criticism that ICSID is partial. Although ICSID is supposed to be an 
autonomous institution that was established through an international convention, it was formed 
by the World Bank, and it is one of the five agencies that forms the World Bank group. 
ICSID’s authority has been criticized because the president of the World Bank appoints the 
Secretary General of the ICSID, and the World Bank’s president in turn is elected by the US 
president.556 Van Harten (2008) has in this context stated: “At ICSID, the role of the US 
Administration is one or two steps removed from this quasi-colonial set-up in that the US 
Administration nominates the World Bank President – subject to appointment by a process in 
which 11 major capital-exporters hold a majority of the votes- who will then either exercise 
appointing authority or in turn select the ICSID Secretary General to do so.”557  
The ICSID Tribunal decides on cases that are connected to loans of the very institution to which 
they belong. In CMS vs Argentina,558 the investor submitting the dispute to ICSID received the 
main investing loan from the International Finance Corporation, a member of the World Bank 
group. The one benefiting from the investor´s compensation in such a case was the World Bank´s 
agency that lent the investor the money. The Argentine government complained about this, but 
the arbitrators disregarded it just by denying any interference among the institutions.559 
The fourth criticism derives from conditionalities. If developing countries are constrained by 
receiving loans from the World Bank, and the ICSID is an agency of the World Bank, the choice 
to accept the ICSID Convention is not really a choice at all. 
Allee and Peinhardt (2010) have used the theory of relative bargaining power to explain how in 
the dispute settlement clauses a delegation to the ICSID takes place. Both parties, home and host 
countries, could equally use and have this relative bargaining power. They made an empirical 
study considering the conditionality factor and came to the result that “power matters as an 
explanation for international arbitration….Those developing countries that are at the mercy of 
international economic actors who supply them with export markets and much-needed capital are 
most likely to succumb to international dispute resolution clauses in their BITs. Coupled with the 
finding about the importance of relative bargaining power, we conclude that for many of the 
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world’s weakest and most dependent countries, the inclusion of ICSID clauses within BITs is not 
so much a choice as it is a requirement.”560 
The connection of the ICSID to the World Bank, the principal institution to provide credit to 
developing countries, is an issue that both developed and developing countries take into account. 
It can be security for the first and a risk for future credits for the latter.561 
The reason for establishing ICSID was supposed to be that it was going to be a neutral body, in 
contrast to the judiciary of the host country. However, as we have seen, its neutrality is 
questioned, and that affects the view of this institution as an impartial one.  
Fifthly, it was argued that ICSID could give bad reputation to developing countries through 
ICSID’s cases. Allee and Peinhardt (2011) stated that ICSID can even produce FDI losses for the 
country because of the bad reputation that countries breaching a BIT have and when they lose the 
cases submitted to ICSID, i.e. when it is affirmed that indeed the country acted in violation of the 
investor’s right. They stated: “[G]overnments suffer notable losses of FDI when they are taken 
before ICSID, and suffer even greater losses when they lose an ICSID dispute.”562 Allee and 
Peinhardt reached this conclusion after empirically examining the loss of inward FDI for 
governments that were challenged at ICSID. 
This bad reputation that host countries being sued at ICSID can obtain is possibly due to the lack 
of confidentiality of ICSID’s disputes, which in turn can operate in two ways. One is that it can 
provoke a hesitation for future investors and also for the global community in regard to the 
country being sued.563 And the other is that ICSID can be used by foreign investors who want to 
disclose the country’s problem: “When investors attempt to discern a state’s reputation for 
upholding its BIT commitments, ICSID is the venue to which they will look.”564 
All these criticisms of ICSID can be summarized in ICSID’s practice, through the investment 
disputes. It mainly affects developing countries which are the main respondents in investment 
disputes brought to ICSID.  This outline just contributes to show what ICSID’s practice has 
meant for developing countries, leading to the questioning of their lack of intention for these 
consequences to come about. However, this also suggests that it has been part of the structural 
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power which helped built the framework for international investment and in which the developed 
countries’ preference of including ICSID as institution had prevailed.565 
 6.4. Developing Countries’ Sovereignty Costs. 
Early conceptions of sovereignty defined it as a state having control over a territory and can do 
its will. It was complemented by the idea that sovereignty had limitations not only of divine or 
natural character, as it was initially conceptualized, but that there was a limitation in the people. 
However, the people willingly could delegate the power to its government.566   
Therefore, it is not new that with every international treaty that is being signed, states have 
sovereignty costs. This is because states through treaties assume obligations that they have to 
comply with. This, however, is performed through an intended action of the state towards the 
welfare of its people. 
The BIT regime also presents sovereignty costs. Kaushal (2009) concluded that BITs were a 
bargain which consisted in developing countries giving their sovereignty for the promise of 
foreign investment.567 In a similar vein, Elkins, Guzman and Simmons (2006) stated that 
developing countries are trading sovereignty for credibility.568  
What differs, however, is that with the BIT regime the sovereignty costs of developing countries 
were not intended. Furthermore, the costs go beyond the normal sovereignty costs associated 
with signing a treaty: the restriction to legislate.569 The right to legislate is an inalienable right of 
the state in order to pursue the welfare of its people.  
 
The BITs set obligations that the host country must observe with a foreign investor in relation to 
the investment in its territory. If something in the territory of the host is done even for reasons of 
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public interest or emergency national actions are taken which nevertheless affect the investment, 
the host country will be breaching the obligations of the treaty. This also means that it will be 
breaching international law, for which the investor could demand to be compensated. 
 
The problem arises when there is a dispute that concerns public interests.570 The arbitration 
tribunal would analyze and review (approving or denying) these interests in the scope of a BIT 
and many BITs do not have the obligation towards the community, ecological, or health 
interests, which are a matter of priority for states.  Supnik (2009) already pointed out that the 
ICSID convention should be amended so as to include these matters.571 
 
Although South American BITs do not include in their text these obligations, some of them do 
express them in their preambles and as pointed out in section 4.2., according to the Vienna 
Convention of the Law of Treaties, the preamble has to be taking into account when interpreting 
the treaty. However, the enforcement of BITs and the awards given by international arbitration 
institutions, like ICSID, have not always followed this approach. 
 
Some of the cases submitted to ICSID have shown that ICSID examines the countries’ policies 
and decides upon the matter. The arbitration tribunal can judge the actions of a sovereign 
country, even if the latter is acting legitimately through its constitutional powers.  
 
I will discuss the Tecmed vs Mexico case,572 the cases during the Argentinean crisis, and, as a 
more recent example, the still pending case of Philips Morris vs Uruguay.573 In these examples, 
there was no recognition of the public interest over the interests of the foreign investor and it 
remains to be seen if the case with Uruguay, which is still pending, will have the same fate. 
A Spanish company, Tecmed, had a waste plant in a Mexican city called Hermosillo. It operated 
with a license granted by the government of Mexico. Around 1997 a citizenship movement 
worked against this waste disposal plant because it was worried about the health and 
environmental consequences of having a waste plant in the middle of its community. 
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Consequently, in 1998, the renewal of the license was denied and the closure of the plant was 
ordered. 
The Spanish company said this was an act of expropriation by the Mexican government, which 
supported a social movement that wanted the closure of the plant. The Spanish company, 
Tecmed, sued the government of Mexico for breaching the investment treaty between Mexico 
and Spain. 
The case was submitted to arbitration at ICSID. In its defense, Mexico adopted the position of its 
citizens toward the waste plant. They were concerned about the waste plant because of its 
location and because of general health issues, since the waste plant had to transport and store 
highly toxic waste. 
Mexico, a sovereign state, had to justify itself to a foreign investor and to the tribunal for actions 
that it pursued in the public interest and for having prioritized the health of its citizens. The 
Arbitral Award stated: “The respondent highlights the adverse attitude of the society towards the 
waste plant because of its location and of the negative and critic opinion that the society has 
manifested in relation to the compliance of the tasks of transport and storage of dangerous toxic 
waste by Cytrar, originated in what was the recycling and recuperation plant of Alto Pacífico de 
Mexico SA, located in Tijuana, Low California, what accentuated the importance to require 
strict compliance of the conditions of the new authorization from INE to Cytrar dated November 
19th 1997.”574 (my emphasis) 
The respondent, Mexico, stated that the denegation of such authorization, i.e. to continue with 
the license, was a measure of control in a sector highly regulated that involved the public interest 
very closely.575 The arbitral tribunal of ICSID decided that the fair and equitable treatment owed 
by the government of Mexico to the Spanish investor was breached; that the “non-renewal” of 
the license was indeed an expropriation of the Spanish investment committed by the government 
of Mexico. Mexico was judged to have breached the investment treaty with Spain, and as a 
consequence, Mexico had to pay damages which amounted to US$ 5.533.017. The economic 
interest of the foreign investor had prevailed over those of the community. 
The second example concerns the disputes submitted by investors due to Argentina’s crisis in 
2001. Argentina, as part of its privatization program, had privatized gas companies. A regulator 
created for this purpose by law, was supposed to control the business fairly and reasonably. The 
investors or licensees could calculate their tariffs in US dollars and charge in pesos. Already in 
1990, Argentina was having economic problems and the calculation in dollars of the tariff 
became immensely onerous for the consumers. In the year 2000, the government met with the 
investors and asked for a postponement of the tariff based on the dollar calculation. In 2001 
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Argentina had an economic crisis, the citizens started to withdraw their savings from the bank. In 
2002, Argentina then enacted the Emergency Law, together with the Corralito decree, which 
restricted bank withdrawals. The Emergency Law stated the pesification policy by which all 
assets (even those in dollars) were converted into peso at a non-market exchange rate. It also 
terminated the right of investors in the public utilities sector to calculate their tariffs in dollars.  
From the foreign investors’ perspective, these laws had a negative impact on their investments in 
the country. Many companies sued Argentina for these actions; I will refer as an exemplary case 
only to four companies of the gas sector which sued Argentina at ICSID pursuant to the US-
Argentina BIT.576 In all these cases, as a defense, Argentina claimed a ‘state of necessity’, which 
is a right of sovereign states to act in a certain way in circumstances calling for emergency 
actions, by which said sovereign state can be excluded from liability. Thus, ICSID’s ruling was 
relevant because if a state of necessity was legitimate then it will have the consequence of 
exempting the host country’s liability for its action. 
The necessity exemption is used when a country fails to comply with an international obligation 
because of going through a stage in which its acts cannot be otherwise than those taken because 
they are determined by special circumstances.   
 
The International Law Commission “Articles on State Responsibility”, in its Article 25 states 
regarding the State of Necessity: “Necessity may not be invoked by a State as a ground for 
precluding the wrongfulness of an act not in conformity with an international obligation of that 
State unless that act: a) is the only way for the State to safeguard an essential interest against a 
grave and imminent peril; and b) does not seriously impair an essential interest of the State or 
States towards which the obligation exists or of the international community as a whole…”.577 
 
Although the situation was the same in all cases, and the same treaty was used to present a claim 
(the US-Argentina BIT), ICSID reasoned very differently regarding allowing necessity to be a 
factor that could exempt liability to Argentina. Therefore, the cases had very different outcomes. 
 
In CMS vs Argentina578 the ICSID had jurisdiction through the US-Argentina BIT.  The 
tribunal in 2005 ruled that Argentina was not completely exempted from liability but the 
compensation which Argentina had to pay was decided based on the fact that there was a crisis. 
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The tribunal viewed the crisis as a “changing reality” and it was stated in the award “Justice, 
however, is not as blind as it is often thought and this Tribunal acknowledges that changing 
realities had an impact on the operation of the industry, and the governing legal and contractual 
arrangements.579” 
 
The tribunal reasoning was that the measures adopted by Argentina breached the standard of 
“fair and equitable treatment” stated in the Treaty and although Argentina had not acted wrongly, 
they had to compensate the claimant for it.580 
 
However, the ICSID tribunal had a different outcome in the case LG&E vs Argentina.581 In an 
award rendered in 2006 it was judged that because of the crisis during the period 2001-2003, 
Argentina was completely excluded from liability. Argentina was in a state of necessity, because 
of which it was exempted from the payment of compensation for damages incurred during that 
period.   
 
Although here too, the tribunal’s reasoning stated that Argentina violated the fair and equitable 
treatment, it excluded its liability, arguing that “the Tribunal nevertheless recognizes the 
economic hardships that occurred during this period, and certain political and social realities 
that at the time may have influenced the Government’s response to the growing economic 
difficulties.”582 
 
The tribunal ruled that liability should be excluded for breaches of the Treaty because the crisis 
affected the public order and Argentina’s security interests. However, the tribunal did consider 
the crisis period but ruled that after the crisis the relations should be restored or Argentina should 
compensate for not doing so. If that were to be the case, the tribunal stated that there should be a 
different arbitration. 
 
In Enron vs Argentina, Argentina also claimed state of necessity but the tribunal said that the 
crisis did not amount to it. “The Tribunal has no doubt that there was a severe crisis and that in 
such context it was unlikely that business could have continued as usual. Yet, the argument that 
such a situation compromised the very existence of the State and its independence so as to 
qualify as involving an essential interest of the State is not convincing.”583 
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In Sempra vs Argentina584 (just as in the CMS and Enron case) and again with the same 
Argentina crisis which excluded liability of the Argentine Republic in the LG&E case 
aforementioned, the ICSID arbitrators concluded that the crisis was not sufficient to exclude 
Argentina’s liability. Indeed, the tribunal ruled that there was no state of necessity and that 
Argentina -as in the other cases- had breached the equitable and fair treatment clause and, 
therefore, had to pay compensation. One of the reasons for the decision in Sempra vs Argentina 
was that the measures adopted did not affect the independence of the country and that the 
government allegedly had control to not make things worse. 
 
These different outcomes in cases against Argentina resulting from its economic crisis provide us 
with interesting issues: On the one hand, changing realities and how these can affect the 
governmental actions, and on the other hand, again the uncertainty and lack of uniformity in the 
ruling over state of necessity and its exclusion of liability.585  
 
In three of the four cases the ICSID Tribunal did not observe the principle of international law of 
an exclusion of liability in case of necessity. Furthermore, they judged on matters that are 
exclusively matters of sovereigns, such as the decision of what can or cannot affect the 
independence of the country. The crisis had an erga omnes effect, i.e. it affected all the citizens 
and not only foreign investors. The tribunal, however, decided that Argentina should pay 
damages to the foreign investors, a situation that could be seen as intrusive, as Kaushal (2009) 
stated, on the national regulatory sphere of the state.586 
The decisions of the awards materialized in the duty of Argentina to compensate foreign 
investors millions of dollars because of Argentina’s crisis and because of the reaction of the 
government to the crisis did not favour the foreign investors.  Alvarez and Khamsi (2009) make 
an important point about the arbitrators’ powers when deciding these disputes, when they write: 
“Many are astounded by the idea that three individuals, two of whom are party-appointed, in a 
case brought by a single foreign investor, who is not entitled even to be considered part of the 
greater democratic polity of a host state such as Argentina, can question how that government 
chooses to respond to a serious crisis…”587   
                                                 
584
 Sempra Energy International vs Argentine Republic (ICSID Case No. ARB/02/16) (2007) 
585
 Necessity was also raised as a defence by Argentina in two other cases: In Continental Casualty Company v. 
Argentine Republic (ICSID Case No. ARB/03/9) and in National Grid v Argentina. The tribunal upheld the 
necessity claim in the first case and not in the second which was performed under UNCITRAL rules. available at 
http://italaw.com/documents/NGvArgentina.pdf ). Sornarajah  pointed out that “It is difficult to reconcile these 
awards.” in Sornarajah, M. The International Law on Foreign Investment 3rd Edition. Cambridge University Press. 
2010.  p 464 
586
 Kaushal, A. “Revisiting History: How the Past Matters” Harvard International Law Journal. Vol 50 Issue 2. 2009. 
587
 Alvarez, J. and Khamsi, K. “The Argentine Crisis and Foreign Investors: A Glimpse into the Heart of the 
Investment Regime” Yearbook of International Investment Law & Policy 379. Karl P. Sauvant, ed., 2009. p.383 
151 
 
For Kaushal (2009) ICSID is empowering foreign investors that are only pursuing their own 
economic interests and are not sensitive to other concerns. He also mentions that this would not 
have been the case under state-to-state procedures.588 
The fact remains that Argentina’s BIT contributed to the financial catastrophe they had after 
these cases. This is peculiar, given that its BITs were supposed to do the opposite. The US-
Argentina BIT was signed with the purpose of: “[d]esiring to promote greater economic 
cooperation between them…. Recognizing that agreement… will stimulate the flow of private 
capital and the economic development of the Parties.”589 Alvarez and Khamsi commented: 
“Some deride those rulings as callous, one-sided failures to recognize the dire needs of the 
Argentine people during a financial collapse of catastrophic proportions.”590 Having international 
arbitration awards that oblige a host country to pay millions when its own country is in crisis 
does not contribute to one of the main objectives of BITs, i.e, increase the wealth, development 
or prosperity of the signatory countries. On this point Sornarajah (2010) stated that “the issue 
arises as to why the foreign investor should not suffer the circumstances of necessity in the same 
way as the citizens of the state.  The risk in the situation was voluntarily assumed by the foreign 
investor. Necessity in customary international law was designed to apply to an entirely different 
situation of an obligation directly owed to another sovereign state.”591 
The claims against Argentina for its financial crisis and the measures it took have not stopped. 
Some cases are still pending. Overall, however, the costs for Argentina are of the order of 
magnitude of billions of dollars plus interests.592 
The third example, a more recent one, is a pending claim against Uruguay. Uruguay’s 
government enacted laws, decrees and regulations regarding public health, aimed at reducing 
smoking. This was done pursuant to a multilateral effort of the World Health Organization 
(WHO), and because of this, Uruguay has now a claim pending at ICSID.  
In 2010, a foreign investor, a tobacco company with headquarters in Switzerland (Phillips 
Morris), sued Uruguay and submitted a claim to ICSID.593 Uruguay had enacted national laws 
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which applied the provisions of the Framework Convention for Tobacco Control (FCTC) of the 
World Health Organization, an international convention that Uruguay had ratified together with 
many countries in the world.594 Pursuant to this convention, it was an obligation of the signatory 
countries to implement the provisions contained therein.  
Article 11 of the FTCT provides rules for cigarette packaging which the parties to the 
Convention must comply with within a period of three years. The rules provided restrictions for 
cigarette packaging regarding  terms such as “low tar,” “light,” “ultra-light,” or “mild”, for being 
misleading and deceptive, and also regarding the health warnings which should cover 50% or 
more of the package.595 
Uruguay and many countries in South America adopted these regulations through their national 
laws.596 Uruguay, by Law No. 18256 of 2008, Decree Nº 287/09, and Ministerial Order Nº 
466/09 and the Resolution of the Public Health Ministry Nº 514/09, took measures regarding 
tobacco control in accordance to the FCTC. 
Philip Morris main strategy in suing Uruguay was to invoke the constitutional right of 
intellectual property. A trademark is an intellectual property asset and, therefore, subject to legal 
protection. Since the protection of property is in the constitution, it is a protection that is above 
national laws and regulations.597 While they submitted an unconstitutional claim which is 
currently pending in the Supreme Court of Uruguay, Philip Morris also claimed that these 
measures damaged its trademark, and as its intellectual property, it was therefore claimed to be 
subject to protection in the Swiss-Uruguay BIT.598   
As a consequence, Philip Morris also made use of the right conferred to investors in the BIT to 
submit a claim before ICSID, claiming that the Uruguayan government had expropriated their 
investment. 
The claim stated that because of the Uruguayan regulations that determined certain conditions 
for single cigarette packaging, which had to contain pictograms and health warning covering 
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80% of the package, Philip Morris incur losses because it had to take some of their products off 
the market.599 
Philip Morris claimed that this was an expropriation of its trademark. Philip Morris stated that its 
investments in the country had been expropriated because, they claimed, the single packaging 
presentation requirement is a breach of the prohibition of unreasonable measures under the 
treaty.600  
The decision of the tribunal is still pending. It will have to face a challenge; ultimately, the 
decision between the economic interests of the foreign investor and those of the public interest. 
The growing social concern about these issues might also account for greater expectations 
regarding the decision.601  
All these cases concerning public interests have shown that the sovereignty costs could not have 
been intended by developing countries. Further evidence of this claim is given by the reaction 
that South American developing countries are adopting against the framework for international 
investments, as I will outline now. 
Brazil, for example, has not ratified any BITs with developed countries602 because 
parliamentarians oppose them due to their implications.603 The Investment Arbitration Reporter 
of 2008 stated the reason or worries for Brazil which prevent them to ratify BITs: “The 
development is notable in that Brazil has long refrained from entering into meaningful 
international treaty commitments in relation to foreign investment protection, due to concerns 
expressed by parliamentarians as to the constitutional and domestic legal implications of such 
agreements.”604 The main problem for Brazil with BITs was in regard to their sovereignty costs. 
 
More South American countries have also taken radical actions against ICSID. Bolivia, with the 
government of Evo Morales, denounced the ICSID Convention on April 29, 2007, and the 
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country was officially excluded from the affiliation to ICSID on November 3, 2007.605 More 
recently, Bolivia terminated its BIT with the United States, on June 10, 2012.606  
 
Ecuador denounced ICSID in July 2009.607 In the same year, the President of the country asked 
for the termination of 13 BITs.608 On September 14, 2010, Ecuador terminated the BITs with the 
UK and Germany and on March 2011, the BIT with France.609 A request for termination of the 
BITs with the US and Spain is pending at the Ecuadorian Congress.610 
 
The speaker of the Ecuadorian Government on this matter, Pedro Páez, stated that the decisions 
of the arbitral ICSID tribunal have an element of bribery for their country, and made the 
comparison to the gun-boat diplomacy of hundreds of years ago and the pressures upon public 
debt. He also stated that foreign investments are a myth because of which the country gave away 
sovereignty to receive investments, and that has proven to be false. He further said: “ICSID 
works as a tool for exploitation, pressure and destabilization of our countries.”611 
 
Linda Machuca, the Vice-President of the International Relations Commission of the Assembly, 
when asked in an interview by the BBC about the reason of Ecuador’s decision towards 
terminating BITs, stated: “we are defending the sovereignty of our jurisdiction.  We want to 
acknowledge the possibility that our State has to settle dispute at an instance in which it has 
confidence. In the case of ICSID our data reveal that its awards have been mainly favourable to 
the foreign companies”. 612 Furthermore, in the same interview, the former Foreign Affairs 
Minister, Manuel Chiriboga, stated that foreign investment will be in danger if Ecuador does not 
find instances and mechanism for dispute settlement. 
 
The justification for the termination of these treaties was that they were against the Ecuadorian 
Constitution. The National Constitution of Ecuador states that the government cannot give away 
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sovereignty when signing international treaties and based on that article Ecuador denounced the 
treaties.613  
 
In 2012, Venezuela also denounced the ICSID Convention.614 The Energy and Oil Minister, 
Rafael Ramirez, reportedly stated: "We will pull out of ICSID. It is not a mechanism to settle 
differences and for that reason we will get out of it."615 Shortly after the statement was published, 
Venezuela finally denounced the ICSID Convention and left it on January 24, 2012. 
 
Argentina has not paid any of the awards that were ruled by ICSID,616and since March 2012, 
Argentina has a draft of law in Congress which states the termination of the ICSID 
Convention.617  
 
As one can see, two forms of reactions are emerging from the South American countries against 
the BIT regime. One is the rejection of an international arbitration institution, which is ICSID, 
and the other is the rejection of the BITs in general. In some cases, both the BITs and ICSID are 
rejected at the same time. 
 
While this could prima facie show that there is now more awareness by South American 
countries that the disputes settlement clauses of BITs have ‘teeth’,618 especially through the BITs 
enforcement, the reactions of developing South American countries against the regime shows 
that it was never their intention to incur these sovereignty costs. Vandevelde (2005-2006) already 
predicted that “developing countries may come to see the agreements as poor bargains in which 
states surrender portions of their sovereignty and subject themselves to costly arbitration with 
investors, without having gained appreciable new investment as a result.”619 
 
To summarize, all the decisions of the cases described in this section, which concerned 
environmental issues, economic crisis and health issues, have been decided by the ICSID 
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tribunal in the light of a BIT. The BIT’s enforcement affects developing countries because BITs 
allow foreign investors to sue developing countries for enacting any kind of public laws, 
regulation or policies, even if these regulations are prioritizing public interests like the protection 
of the environment, health, etc. and even if foreign investors are only expected to be subject to 
the same policies as local investors. Furthermore, it subjects the developing countries’ policies to 
be reviewed and judged on by an international arbitration tribunal. 
 
This is an important restriction of the sovereign right of states to create and apply their laws with 
a scope that would govern all activities and the welfare of its citizens in their territory. It is in this 
sense that this becomes an indicator of structural power because although this restriction came 
with the developing countries’ agreement to the framework, developing countries never intended 
to be restricted in such a way that their sovereign actions would have to be reviewed by an 
arbitration tribunal.   
 
6.5. The International Investment Framework’s New Changes. 
 
Our world is not static. There is a continuous change because of the dynamic nature of 
relationships. The international investment framework was once governed by customary 
international law. BITs changed that and BITs provided specific rules that governed international 
investments. Not surprisingly, the rules that have been established for the current international 
investment framework are once again changing. 
 
The actors that are bringing about these changes are evenly spread in the BIT regime. There are 
changes coming out from the EU wanting to participate as a unitary actor and not by its member 
states; the US is introducing some changes in its rules for foreign investments; there are some 
changes proposed by international organizations but there are also changes that are being 
proposed by developing countries. Then, the question that is worth asking is: why are the rules 
for the international investment framework once again changing? Before I try to give an answer 
to this question, I will first give a description of the changes.   
 
The changes include accepting a new supranational actor like the EU; ICSID’s amendment for 
allowing public participation; a return to Calvo type doctrines for international investments; 
amendments in newest versions of BIT models concerning expropriation and MFN clauses, 
binding interpretations; and finally, the inclusion of obligations to invest in a sustainable manner. 
 
The significant change on the European level was the one brought about by the Treaty of 
Lisbon,620 which entered into force in 2009. By this treaty, FDI has been included in the 
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Common Commercial Policy of the EU.621 Initially there was a lack of clarity about the 
respective competences of member states and the EU on this matter. The reason was that the 
treaty extends the competence of the EU only on FDI matters and it expressly states that the 
“exercise of the competences conferred by this Article in the field of the common commercial 
policy shall not affect the delimitation of competences between the Union and the Member 
States...”622  
 
The EU Commission, however, has made its position clear in that this part of the treaty should be 
extensively interpreted.623 On the other hand, member states of the EU have been reluctant to 
accept this position and continue to keep their competences to sign BITs.624 However, the debate 
was cleared with the enactment of the European Parliament and Council Regulation No. 
1219/2012, which entered into force in January of 2013.625 This regulation clearly expresses the 
competence of member states towards either existing or future BITs, by which BITs signed after 
2009 will need to be reviewed by the EU Commission and those in process to be sign must be 
submitted to the Commission in order to make sure they comply with EU law.626 With this 
change the EU as a regional block will evidently be a strong actor in the framework of 
international investments.627 
 
The US has also introduced important changes to the international investment framework.  The 
first one concerns an issue that was once so fearcefully debated at multilateral level: the Calvo 
doctrine.  
 
Although the US during the 1970s rejected the Calvo doctrine that sustains that national and 
foreign investors should be subject to the same treatment, in 2012 the US administration declared 
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its intention to operate in the foreign investment area in the following way: “…the principal 
negotiating objectives of the United States regarding foreign investment are to reduce or 
eliminate artificial or trade-distorting barriers to foreign investment, while ensuring that foreign 
investors in the United States are not accorded greater substantive rights with respect to 
investment protections than United States investors in the United States, and to secure for 
investors important rights comparable to those that would be available under United States legal 
principles and practice…”.628 The US Trade Act of 2002 is in line with the Calvo doctrine.  
 
Furthermore, the US introduced changes in their BIT models. The first change can be found in 
that the US excluded certain activities from the expropriations clauses. The US expressly states 
in the latest US 2012 BIT Model that the state’s environmental, safety and public health 
regulations have been expressly excluded from the concept of expropriations.629 These changes 
in the framework amount to dramatically diminishing the sovereignty costs as compared to those 
that developing countries had when facing their restriction to legislate.630  
 
The second change in the 2012 US Model BIT is that the US excluded the application of MFN in 
the dispute settlement mechanism.631 This change will restrict investors in their capacity to do 
treaty shopping when submitting a claim and assure the host state of assuming the obligations 
they committed to with the party in question.632 
 
However, another change introduced by the US in their BITs is the restriction of the international 
arbitration tribunal’s capacity to interpret.633 While the 2004 US model BIT states that the parties 
(and not the tribunal) shall decide on the interpretation of annexes contained in the BITs and that 
their agreement shall be binding,634 the 2012 US model BIT extends this regulation for any 
interpretation of the treaty.635  
 
This might go away from achieving a more balanced framework as it enforces the asymmetries 
between the parties in which a relationship characterized by structural power will limit the choice 
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considerably, becoming the binding interpretation a reflection of the developed countries 
interests.636 
 
In regard to changes coming from international organizations, facing the complaints about the 
restriction of society’s participation in the dispute settlement process of international arbitration 
institutions, ICSID changed its arbitration rules in 2006. The ICSID’s Arbitration rules were 
amended by introducing the permission to submit written amicus curiae reports and allowing the 
attendance of non-parties at hearings.637 In this way, ICSID remedied this complaint. 
 
Another positive change is the one seeking to introduce obligations to foreign investors to make 
their investments in host countries in a sustainable manner. The inclusion of these provisions 
would involve an obligation for companies to respect environmental, labour and health 
regulations. In this regard, the International Bar Association (IBA) has developed a Model 
Mining Development Agreement in which mining companies are obliged to make their 
investment in a sustainable way.638 In 2012, the UNCTAD has launched an Investment Policy 
Framework for sustainable development and conducts regular courses for developing countries 
on these issues.639 Newer versions of BIT models also comprehend these changes, like the 
International Institute for Sustainable Development (IISD) BIT model, which also obliges 
companies to invest in a sustainable way.640   
 
In regard to developing countries, they too are making new proposals for a new investment 
regime. In the case of Ecuador, the Congress is working for creating a “Production Code” in 
which the dispute settlement mechanism for investments will still remain arbitration but at a 
regional arbitration tribunal.641 There have been regional efforts in South America, to use for 
example the Arbitration Centre of the Union of South American Nations (UNASUR) and its 
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dispute settlement to solve disputes concerning foreign investments, instead of international 
arbitration institutions.642 
 
However, there is a common cause that provokes these changes independently of the actor that it 
comes from. This helps explain the question of why these changes are happening: The worries 
about the effects of the BIT regime over sovereign costs are what have provoked this change.643 
 
Now emerging markets are becoming relevant players and the traditional roles of developed 
countries in the framework might change accordingly: developed countries might end up being 
the respondents in international investment disputes. In the case of the EU, what affects one 
European country will have consequences for the whole union.   
 
The changes introduced by the US also aim to prevent having sovereignty restrictions, such as 
those that developing countries have been having. The 2012 US model BIT completely excludes 
these restrictions by expressly stating that regulations regarding public health, safety and 
environment do not constitute indirect expropriations.644 The same can be said of changes 
towards Calvo clause-like provisions.  What developed countries saw as a signal of a form of 
protectionism by South American states (the requirement to submit a dispute to local courts) is 
the policy that they are now adopting themselves because Calvo type provisions mainly benefit 
the defendants.645 The change that also benefits the defendant is the restriction of the use of MFN 
in dispute settlement clauses. The effect of it is that if the parties in their treaty had not provided 
for the submission of disputes to international arbitration, then a treaty of a different country 
cannot be used to submit the dispute to international arbitration. 
 
The changes proposed by international organizations and developing countries are also 
concerned with sovereignty worries. To establish obligations for investors that did not exist 
before or creating alternative dispute settlement mechanism could be a way to prevent further 
sovereignty restrictions in host countries.  
Therefore, with these changes, actors are seeking to prevent any restriction to their acts as 
sovereigns. On the one hand, the costs that the current regime has given in terms to sovereignty 
to developing countries and on the other hand, the vulnerability of being on the respondent side, 
with the risk of having these same sovereignty costs, is what leads developed countries in 
particular to take precautionary measures and modify the rules of the framework.  
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Unfortunately, what has been decided for past cases will remain ‘res judicata’,  but the hope is 
that, for future cases, the tribunal will be aware of the impacts of these restrictions, the value of 
what is at stake, and consider the purposes of the BITs to make decisions on cases sensitive to 
issues of a state’s sovereignty. 
In conclusion, this chapter has shown the indicators that amount to the existence of structural 
power in the BIT regime. Firstly, the surrounding factors of the development and establishment 
of the rules for the international investment regime; secondly, the role that the conditionalities of 
financial aid played for developing countries; thirdly, the implications and costs for developing 
countries of the practice of the institutions established in the framework, like in the case of the 
ICSID; fourthly, the sovereignty cost that such a regime implies for developing countries, which 
were never intended by developing countries; and fifthly, that there is a manifest change of the 
current framework for international investment with a strong hint that it is directed once again 
towards developed countries’ convenience. Thus, again those with structural power continue to 
define the framework for international investments. 
All these indicators and the relationship among them provide the dim frame that holds the 
picture. This is why the indicators are picked up from the context of the agreement to the 
framework, from the conditionalities to these agreements, and from the chain reaction that 
appears only after the practice of the institutions of the regime, which end up being a trigger to 
once again modify the framework.  
Structural power is manifested in this context because all the different dimensions of the 
relationship play a role in an outcome aimed for, and these factors will have the effect of limiting 
the choices and agreeing on particular interests that precede those of the other party.  
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CONCLUSION 
Bilateral Investment Treaties (BITs) are more than just a traditional international agreement 
between two states because of the consequences that can derive from them. Although states have 
been the primary actors operating at international level, BITs, through their dispute settlement 
clause, have given a very important right to particular non-state actors, namely, foreign investors 
(i.e.companies). 
Before BITs, the only way foreign investors could bring forward a claim against a host state was 
through diplomatic protection of their home states.  BITs, apart from bestowing foreign investors 
with greater rights than those they had enjoyed under international law, have given foreign 
investors the right to directly sue sovereign states. The international arbitration mechanism 
contained in the dispute settlement clauses of BITs, which resulted from a state-state negotiation, 
is what has allowed companies to act sovereignly facing the host state on matters regarding their 
investments. In this sense, BITs have opened a doorway for companies to act at the international 
level in a pari passu level as states.  
Referring to this phenomenon Kaushal (2009) stated that the arrival of BITs collapsed the 
existing structure of the international legal and economic architecture with regard to two 
distinctions, namely the international/national and public/private distinctions.646 
According to Kaushal, the distinction of international/national collapsed due to BITs because 
foreign investments had been subject to domestic law, and regulated, for example, by concession 
agreements. However, with BITs the relationship was internationalized.647 Kaushal (2009) 
writes: “[F]oreign investors were endowed with international personality while the state’s 
sovereign power to act in its national interest was seriously restricted.”648 Furthermore, Kaushal 
argues that the private/public distinction collapsed due to BITs because public rights were now 
enforced by private actors in a private tribunal.  
Picciotto (2011) also suggested that the two distinguished levels of international and national law 
were losing their hierarchical order. Now we even have privatized justice because with BITs, 
foreign investors can challenge states’ decisions using an international arbitration mechanism 
which enforce their private rights. Picciotto states that “[t]he effect is to destabilize the 
legitimacy of national laws…The threat of such a claim, which could lead to an award which 
may run to hundreds of millions of dollars as well as the cost of defending it, gives foreign 
investors a powerful weapon especially against poor states.”649 It is not in vane that Alvarez and 
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Khamsi (2009) have pointed out that: “Most international investment agreements thereby 
empower foreign investors from the state parties –who are effectively the third party 
beneficiaries of these inter-state compacts- to assume the role of private enforcers of the 
investment rights contained in such agreements.”650 
 
While Kaushal and Picciotto only refer to the consequences and see the collapse or blurring of 
the ‘law’ in this regard, the effect of the phenomena refers to the involvement of companies in a 
pari passu type of relationship to states, which has been possible due to BITs.  Accordingly, 
foreign investors have gained more actorness.651 
 
Companies can now delocalize their claims from the host state’s jurisdiction and settle such 
claims privately. They have managed, as Kaushal (2009) pointed out, to bring states into a 
dispute settlement mechanism where states would be treated as if they were private actors. This 
is because states as sovereigns have certain immunities and prerogatives in international law, in 
contrast to private investors. However, the practice of the international tribunal has shown that in 
international investment disputes states are prevented from using state-prerogatives, because 
pursuant to the BIT, there is an obligation of an equal treatment between the state and the private 
investor. This is what happened for example in four ICSID cases submitted as a consequence of 
Argentina’s economic crisis. Argentina claimed the international principle of “state of 
necessity”, which is an international principle of law that sovereign states can allege to be 
exempted from liabilities for certain actions which they needed to take for the best interest of 
their people. Although the ICSID Tribunal analyzed it, they did not consider it applicable in 
these cases, making Argentina liable for not complying with its investment guarantees given to 
the investor. Moreover, by having the right to sue states, companies have also the power to claim 
and ask an international arbitration tribunal to revise the host state’s national policies that are not 
in accordance with their investment interests.  
 
There are two explanations of why this has been happening. On the one hand, there is the idea 
that there are corporate pressures behind all these changes and therefore, corporations are the 
ones creating international norms.652 On the other hand, following a more positivistic approach, 
there is the idea that because it is states themselves that are committing these changes, there is a 
change in the nature of states.  
 
Susan Strange (1995, 1996) already mentioned two ways in which there are changes happening 
that concerned the concept of the state. Firstly, by stating that the authority of the state has not 
remained in the state itself, it goes elsewhere (referring to deregulations). She compares the state 
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to a ‘hollow tree’. Secondly, the same idea is expressed when concerning power; for Susan 
Strange the state retreats its power from world politics.653 
 
The era of globalization has affected states. States are moving towards a regulation 
comprehending a mixture of public and private policies. Activities that were before only 
regulated by the state are now privatized, and by delegation of activities, the states mix the public 
and private spheres. For Picciotto (2011) the state is transforming itself, seeing the merge of 
public and private spheres of law as what she calls a transformation of the capitalist state, which 
involves “new types of formalized regulation, the fragmentation of the public sphere, the 
decentering of the state and the emergence of multi-level governance.”654 Picciotto sees gaps in 
the states’ regulation which are filled by companies’s soft law, for example code of conducts.655 
 
According to Picciotto, while the state is supposed to regulate less, there are now global 
regulatory networks which affect both spheres: public and private. Many assets that were state 
owned get privatized, and the state delegates activities that were traditionally reserved to the 
state to private enterprises, for example waste disposals. On the other hand, the economic 
activity gets more public and this, Picciotto claims, is because of the regulation which governs 
enterprises or the market.656 Picciotto stated: “Trying to deal with these differences has generated 
an exponential growth of networks of regulatory cooperation, coordination and harmonization. 
These are no longer primarily of an international character, but also supranational and 
infranational, frequently by-passing central government. They also reflect and reinforce changing 
public-private forms, since these regulatory networks are very often neither clearly state nor 
private but of a hybrid nature.”657 
 
Zumbansen (2011) has also been aware of the complex task of the state with regulation and 
governance.  He refers, though, primarily to market regulation.658 The state does not act alone 
when regulating, but it is involved in a complex collaboration with other actors, involving the 
market. Zumbansen also speaks of the need of analyzing the regulatory landscape of markets 
without the public/private, national/international distinctions.  Emerging from this is corporate 
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governance which has an autonomous set of rules. Corporate law becomes a mixture of public 
and private law, of state and non-state norms or principles and rules that go beyond boundaries 
and are therefore “transnational”.659   
 
In the same vein, Behrens (2009) referred to a new type of state, the competitive transnational 
state, characterized by “trasnationalizing parallel to their internationalisation.”660 These states 
create institutional conditions on weaker states by imposing their norms on them. Behrens (2009) 
stated: “[T]he transnational competitive state, as a political actor, imposes its national norms and 
regulations on other political systems.”661  
 
Strange and Picciotto, when claiming that the state is decentering, put emphasis on the fact that 
the state is retreating. Schneiderman, considering the fact that the state itself is the one who 
creates this system, claims the opposite, and Zumbansen thinks that states did not entirely retreat 
because it is thanks to the state’s regulation that markets can be more liberal and act with more 
freedom.662 
 
Schneiderman writes that as part of the liberalization process, states are deregulating their 
activities, by taking key elements of the economy away from politicians and democracy.663 The 
BIT regime fits into this scheme of the state that decenters itself and delegates activity. This is an 
indication that by accepting transnationalism countries are giving away part of their own power 
to control and regulate. 
 
In any event, what is remarkable from the considerations above is that the role of companies in 
the BIT regime is preponderant.  Thus, not only states, but also companies, are holders of the 
structural power that has defined the framework for international investments.  
 
Structural power confers the ability to define frameworks according to Strange, and it manifests 
in four structures, which are: production, security, finance and knowledge. The structural power 
over security was what made some countries have power in international trade. Susan Strange 
claimed that “the nuclear protection given to the allies by US missiles and nuclear weapons was 
translated into structural power over the rules of the international trading system.”664 The 
structural power in the production and knowledge structures result from the increasing power of 
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companies, an awareness pointed out by Susan Strange when claiming that  ‘Markets and 
Authorities’ should have been the title for her book “State and Markets” because firms are more 
and more dictating state development policies and that is evidence of them exercising power.665 
And finally, the structural power in the financial dimension is controlled by those who give 
credits, which can condition the actors that are receiving it.  
 
Therefore, actors that have control on these dimensions have structural power, or in other words, 
their preferences can be preceded over the preferences of other actors and thus, define the 
framework in which actors relate to each other.  Structural power confers those holding it the 
advantage of setting the rules of the game.  
 
The findings of Chapter VI show elements of structural power in connection to what is described 
above. These come about with how the rules were settled with the formation of the international 
investment framework, the financial conditionalities that were tied to the agreement to the 
framework, the chain reaction resulting from the enforcement of BITs in which investors brought 
disputes against host states, and how the framework can continue to change upon particular 
interests. 
 
In the BIT regime, the preferences of the developed countries (home states) and through them 
companies (investors) prevailed as the rules for the framework. The theory of structural power 
applied to the BIT regime also overcomes what the proponents of the competition theory could 
not achieved when saying that their theory could not explain why developing countries sign BITs 
among themselves.666 Developing countries could also have structural power because it all 
depends on the actors’ relationship. Structural power is a feature of relationships and that is why, 
for example, the emerging markets667 can have a type of structural power that is put into 
evidence when relating to other developing countries.668  
 
In the international investment framework, however, structural power has been manifest during 
both the formation and the maturity of the international investment regime, defined by BITs. So 
the analysis of the international investment framework or BIT regime through the lens of 
structural power is relevant and meaningful because the very same historical facts, which for 
some resulted in a paradox, explain why developing countries have agreed to the framework; 
why developing countries are reacting against the regime; why the international investment 
regime is once again evolving; and finally why the multilateral attempts to regulate investments 
failed. 
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a) Why developing countries agreed to the framework for international investments. 
 
In section 6.1., “The Formation of the Framework”, I have shown how the framework got 
established and under which provisions. I have also shown that the rules were the reflection of 
those that developed countries wanted and that these rules became established in spite of the 
existence of different multilateral rules that favoured developing countries. We have seen that the 
liberalization policies that developed countries proposed form part of the grounds in which 
developing countries have shown openness and have agreed to these policies, especially the US 
liberalization policies. This was of paramount importance for changing the rules of foreign 
investment and for accepting the current BIT regime. Although the BITs regime was masked 
with the promise of increasing FDI, what really resulted from the treaties were rules for 
delocalizing disputes from their domestic courts and the Hull principle as the principle for 
compensation of expropriations which were norms of another legal system and preferred by 
certain actors as the entrenched rules. 
 
Section 6.2., “Control in the Financial Dimension”, couples the description of the development 
of the framework to the constraint in another dimension, namely the financial dimension through 
the conditionalities for receiving credits. The international financial institutions, mainly created 
by the Bretton Woods system, had conditionalities imposed on developing countries for 
receiving credits, inter alias, accepting and entering BITs into force. The choice of the country 
that receives the credit gets limited so that the country accepts whatever conditions are imposed 
in order to receive the credit. 
 
The existence of structural power in the BIT regime explains why developing countries have 
agreed to the current framework for international investments in spite of the costs for them; costs 
that derive from the very same framework which was created by those bearing structural power 
and which have determined the rules of the game. 
 
b) Why developing countries are reacting against the BIT regime. 
 
In section 6.3., “The Costs of ICSID for Developing Countries”, and in section 6.4., “Developing 
Countries’ Sovereignty Costs”, I have shown the importance of the enforcement of BITs. This 
enforcement produces a chain reaction that directly affects developing countries. Through BITs, 
foreign investors are suing developing countries for their public policies that are not in 
accordance with their investment interests. 
 
Using the theory of structural power, the structures of production and knowledge explain why 
actors other-than-state, namely companies, play a significant role in the BIT regime. “Change in 
the production structure”, says Susan Strange, “deals out a new hand of cards from a reshuffled 
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pack”.669  The BIT regime has extended power to these non-state actors, which also become 
authorities in the system.670 
 
The decisions of the international arbitration tribunals in investment disputes cases have affected 
the sovereignty of developing countries, like for example, when restricting their sovereign right 
to legislate. These sovereignty costs go beyond other agreeable costs upon mere expectations of 
receiving more investments.  The reaction of developing countries against the BIT regime puts 
into evidence that developing countries did not intend to have these costs.  These costs, however, 
come from the framework that they have entered into because of structural power.  
 
c) Why the international investment framework is evolving. 
 
In the analysis, section 6.5., “The International Investment Framework’s New Changes”, has 
shown that the framework is experiencing new changes. These changes are pertaining to having 
yet different rules in the framework but only because of worries caused by sovereignty 
restrictions that so far only developing countries have been experiencing under the current 
framework.  
 
With the rise of the emerging markets, the balance of the established framework gets tipped over, 
as developed countries can end up being respondents in international investment cases and be 
subject to the sovereignty restrictions. The continuum of a framework by changing certain rules 
due to particular interests of certain parties, and because such rules would benefit them, evidence 
again the capacity to define frameworks which is achievable through structural power.  
 
d) Why the attempts to regulate investment in the multilateral level have failed. 
Section 6.1., “The Development of the framework”, section 6.2., “Control in the Financial 
Dimension”, and section 6.5., “The International Investment Framework’s New Changes”, show 
that the rules that have been established in a framework, in this case, the international investment 
framework, are the reflection of certain interests.  
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To have interests that take precedence over another actor’s interests is part of what comprehends 
the definition of structural power. Only when operating bilaterally, in this case through BITs, 
developed countries have managed to have their interests established.671 As the analysis in 
Chapter II has shown, this has not been the case for the multilateral level where they encounter 
another type of power, relative power, in the coalitions formed by developing countries, which 
can prevent them to have their interests established into the framework.  
Therefore, the alleged paradox can be rejected and answers can be given to all the challenging 
questions involving the international investment framework when considering the role of 
structural power. However, there is also a relative power of developing countries at the 
multilateral level.  
One may think that both systems, the bilateral and the multilateral, are supposed to go hand in 
hand to achieve a better flow of international relations among countries. “Bilateralism and 
multilateralism are but two strata in the more complex geology of international law”672; “they 
compose the architecture of international lawmaking”673 or as the Paraguayan representative 
stated in the 2001 WTO Ministerial Conference, bilateral agreements “amongst similar countries 
pave the way for multilateralism.”674 Multilateralism and bilateralism are the ways in which the 
framework for actors to operate is provided. 
However, these two powers, the structural power at the bilateral level and the relative power at 
the multilateral level, clash, allowing for the biggest consequence of BITs at the international 
level: by establishing a preference to operate bilaterally, in the aim to regulate international 
investments, BITs weaken the relative power of developing countries. 
There are two moments in history which showed how developing countries had relative power 
and these very same two moments in history showed how structural power weakens relative 
power. The way that developed countries achieved their objectives which were halted at 
multilateral level, is through bilateral relationships. For matters of foreign investments, in these 
two moments in history, BITs were at the center of the stage.  
At the UN multilateral level, the UN Resolutions reflected the developing countries interests, i.e. 
that compensation for expropriations where established to be according to the local law of the 
host state and that in case of disputes, they shall be solved in the courts of the host state. These 
paramount achievements of an intended framework were thanks to the coalitions of developing 
countries at a multilateral level. 
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However, BITs were signed by developing countries in which the agreed regulations for foreign 
investment stated that compensation shall be according to the Hull principle and that the disputes 
are going to be detached from the courts of the host state.  
The reaction of developed countries when facing the developing countries’ coalitions at the UN 
was to operate by bilateral negotiations and conclude treaties. Since the UN General Assembly 
resolutions’ value was that they “may have a role in the formation of legal norms, even though 
they are not formally binding upon states”675 developed countries could use the international law 
framework that they created to establish a framework with their preferences, because one of the 
sources of international law are treaties.676 In that way, developed countries -and behind them 
corporate interests- did not only overcome the coalitions, they could legally establish the 
framework for international investments they preferred. This explains the first booming of South 
American BITs, around the 1990s, which reflected the developed countries’ interests. 
However, South American countries continued to sign BITs even until the year 2007. Why? For 
a second time, something similar to what had happened at the UN, happened at the WTO. The 
WTO has been a more recent multilateral forum in which attempts for regulating foreign 
investments were pursued. At the 1996 Singapore, 1999 Seattle, the 2001 Doha and the 2003 
Cancun WTO Ministerial Conferences, it was developing countries which mainly opposed the 
industrialized countries propositions of multilateral developments in the area. Developing 
countries could opposed unilateral decisions and propose their own interests only because they 
did it as a coalition or alliance among many developing countries.  These propositions, however, 
were in return not accepted by the developed countries and so the negotiations did not reach an 
agreement. This is what was known as the deadlock at the WTO. 
However, while developing countries were able to reject propositions at the multilateral level, 
they did not do the same at a bilateral level. All the inclusion of investment regulations that were 
opposed by developing countries at the WTO, were put into force when developing countries 
signed BITs. 
The following table shows the above in a graphical manner. It shows how at the WTO 
Ministerial Conferences, South American countries rejected, for example, investment, labour and 
environmental issues. Although some countries changed their opinion in later WTO Ministerial 
Conferences, the table shows specifically at which of the WTO Ministerial Conferences which 
South American country rejected mainly investment issues. 
Furthermore, the table shows the year in which these South American countries signed BITs with 
the core regulation of investments and in some of them, the inclusion of labour and 
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environmental regulations connected to the regulation of investments in the BITs. Combining the 
two factors, we see that there are cases in which at the same time that the South American 
countries rejected the investment issues at the multilateral level, the respective South American 
country was signing a BIT, agreeing to the very same provisions. 
WTO 
Country Rejected When BITs after WTO 
(order per year of 
signature) 
Ecuador Investment (examine multilateral rules 
and have improved agreements) 
Singapore 1996 1996; 1997x2; 1999 
Bolivia Investment; Labour; Environmental 
issues 
Seattle 1999;  
Doha 2001;  
Cancun 2003 
1996;  
2001(US); 2002 
Uruguay Investment; Labour; Environmental 
issues 
Cancun 2003 1997x2; 2006 (US) 
Chile -Lack of implementation of TRIMS 
-Investment; Labour; Environmental 
issues 
Singapore 1996; 
Seattle 1999;  
Doha 2001 
1997; 2000 ;  
2002 (EU-FTA); 
2003 (US-FTA) 
Venezuela Further studies on investments Singapore 1996; 
Seattle 1999 
1996; 1997; 1998; 
2004 
Paraguay Without agriculture no agreement on 
investment 
Seattle 1999 
Doha 2001 
Cancun 2003 
1996; 1998 
Colombia Further study Singapore 1996 
Doha 2001 
2007 
Argentina All issues All conferences Already had BITs 
 
For example, Bolivia, Uruguay and Chile were not in favour or opposed to developed countries’ 
propositions, which included among the so-called new issues investments. The three countries 
then signed a BIT containing these issues (when signing BITs with the US or FTAs in the case of 
Chile). Ecuador specifically rejected investment issues in 1996 and on the same year they signed 
a BIT. Developed countries also wanted to include agricultural practices which considered 
environmental protection, landscape preservation, rural employment, food security, etc. It was 
also a concept that for example Uruguay opposed. However, the very same provisions that 
Uruguay had opposed at the WTO ministerial conferences were then accepted in the BIT that 
they signed with the US using a 2004 US BIT model.677  
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After noticing the resistance of the developing countries with the formation of the G-21 
developing countries’ coalition at the WTO Cancun Ministerial Conference, in September 2003, 
an article of the BBC the stated the following: “The big question now was whether the alliance 
could remain united, or whether the US would pick countries off one by one."678 
 
And indeed, after the collapse at the 2003 Cancun WTO Ministerial Conference,679 the US 
administration stated its intension to operate bilaterally.680 Therefore, once again, facing the 
coalitions at the WTO, developed countries are having the same reaction that they once had 
against developing countries’ coalitions at the UN. Facing the lack of agreement at the WTO, 
developed countries have decided to operate bilaterally to negotiate the issues connected to trade 
(the new issues, inter alias investment). In this way, developed countries have achieved their 
objectives halted at the multilateral level. In the bilateral setting, the outcome becomes more 
predictable. This explains why although there is no longer a boom of BITs, such as it has 
happened in the past, BITs nevertheless continued to be signed. 
 
In 2011, the Director General of the WTO said that “multilateralism is going through a patchy 
period”681; and indeed, developed countries have kept working on new versions for BIT models, 
renouncing continuing efforts for strengthening multilateral relationships on these issues. This 
suggests that this path remains open to them. In a joint statement issued by the Office of the 
United States Trade Representative and U.S. Department of State, it was declared: 
“…International investment is a significant driver of America’s economic growth, job creation, 
and exports. The 2012 U.S. model BIT text will help achieve several important goals of the 
Obama Administration ensuring that U.S. companies benefit from a level playing field in foreign 
markets, providing effective mechanisms for enforcing the international obligations of our 
economic partners, and creating stronger labor and environmental protections. 
The 2012 model BIT also supports our strategic international commitment to a robust economic 
agenda. It will play a critical role in ensuring that American firms can rely on strong legal 
protections when competing for the 95 percent of the world’s consumers who live outside the 
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United States, as well as in promoting good governance, the rule of law, and transparency around 
the world…”.682  
So updated versions of BITs are being used, which incorporate the issues that failed to be 
accepted at multilateral level. It seems, as if the resistance of developing countries to critical 
issues regarding investment and trade does not exist when dealing bilaterally.  
This is because the effectiveness of operating bilaterally lies in structural power, which provides 
the assurance to one party that the other party will be left with no alternative but to agree to the 
other party’s proposal. Developing countries, which did not accept the developed countries’ 
proposals at the multilateral level, did accept the same proposals at the bilateral level. They do so 
because their choice gets so limited because of the structural power that developed countries 
have which manifests in all the aspects summarized in Chapter VI. This cannot be balanced 
through their relative power because this is a power which they only have at multilateral level 
and when acting in coalitions. 
In other words, structural power results in a way that the action of those affected by it will make 
a tele-targeted decision because it limits their choice so much that their counterpart can be sure 
of the only possible decision, the outcome. 
A characteristic of structural power is that no party needs to be aware of it, the way it manifests 
is by restricting the choices. This however, does not mean that there is a lack of choice. 
Developing countries do have a choice. The alternative for developing countries is to not play 
nor be involved in the game, as practiced by Brazil, who can be less dependent in one of the 
dimensions and this tips the balance in its relationship with other actors.683 
However, developing countries that are not in a position comparable to Brazil might run risks for 
not following the rules of the game. Blockage, sanctions, retaliation, and to the extreme, war, are 
many examples of what can happen to those unwilling to stay in the game. Although Strange 
said that an actor with structural power over the security does not need to use military power 
because with its structural power the actor can limit the range of choices that others have, 
examples of these risks are also manifested in the BIT regime. In the case of Argentina, for 
example, it was subjected to a sanction from the US because it refused to comply with awards 
favourable to US investors.684 Argentina refuses to do so because the awards have not been 
submitted to their jurisdiction for enforcement. The US, by petition of the involved corporations, 
                                                 
682
 Joint Statement of the Office of the US Trade Representative and US Department of State. Available at 
http://www.ustr.gov/about-us/press-office/press-releases/2012/april/united-states-concludes-review-model-bilateral-
inves (last visited November 2013). Emphasis added. 
683
 If the emerging country has also structural power in one dimension, then it can circumvent the existing rules. 
Brazil did not sign any international arbitration convention nor BITs with developed countries and yet it is the 
country with the highest FDI in South America. 
684
 The cases that refer to this are mainly those that were brought against Argentina during the financial crisis of the 
year 2000 and that made Argentina pay as compensation to the US investors. Argentina, however, has not yet paid 
its awards.  
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has suspended Argentina from enjoying the benefits of the US Generalized System of 
Preferences (GSP), a suspension imposed for the first time on a country.685 
In matters concerning investments, the existence of an alternative path with bilateralism explains 
why decisions were not reached at the WTO Ministerial Conferences, from both the developed 
and developing countries’ perspective: On the one hand, developed countries did not need to 
make any concessions when knowing that they can have their interests agreed upon when acting 
in a consciously asymmetrical power relation. On the other hand, developing countries used the 
justification of the existing bilateral investment treaties to deny further agreement on investments 
at multilateral level. In the Cancun briefing notes, it was stated: “At the same time, many 
developing countries have made it clear that they consider that the Working Group had not 
completed its analysis and study of the subject. They argue that the existing bilateral investment 
treaties already provide adequate legal protection to investors, and question whether a WTO 
agreement would indeed increase investment flows. They have expressed concern that a 
multilateral agreement would add obligations to developing countries while limiting their ability 
to align investment inflows with national development objectives.”686 
 
It is easier and more effective for developed countries to make use of their powerful status, 
knowing the outcomes can then be determined by their preferences. To achieve their interests on 
investment issues, developed countries can apply their structural power through BITs and in that 
way they pass through their preferences which were halted at multilateral level. 
 
Involving foreign investors in this way in the investment regime puts developing countries at 
even more of a disadvantage in at least two ways. Developing countries will now have to deal 
and succumb to not just one but now two powerful actors, developed states and foreign investors. 
Due to companies’ involvement and use of the ICSID as the dispute settlement institution, 
developing countries lose an important multilateral agreement’s protection and right, namely to 
use the WTO dispute settlement mechanism for investment disputes. In this jurisdiction 
developing countries have relative power, with which they can fight the disparities.687 Maybe the 
choice of the BIT regime and consequently ICSID is a very rational and conscious choice of the 
two powerful sets of actors in the investment regime because by evading the WTO dispute 
settlement mechanism where developing countries have relative power, their structural power 
remains at its peak with the BIT regime. 
                                                 
685
 UNCTAD World Investment Report 2012. Sales no.: E.12.II.D.3 (New York: United Nations 2012) p. 87 and US 
Trade Representative Ron Kirk Comments on Presidential Actions Related to the Generalized System of Preferences 
available at http://www.ustr.gov/about-us/press-office/press-releases/2012/march/us-trade-representative-ron-kirk-
comments-presidenti (last visited Mar 11, 2012) 
686
 Cancun Ministerial briefing notes at 
http://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/minist_e/min03_e/brief_e/brief07_e.htm (last visited November 30, 2012) 
687
 There is the success of the Ecuador’s banana’s case at the WTO; See also Dieter, H. “Bilateral Free Trade 
Agreements” Journal of Australian Political Economy. Edition 58 December 2006. 
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Thus, the huge accomplishment of developing countries at multilateral level comes to ashes at 
the moment that developing countries face developed countries’ structural power bilaterally,688 in 
whichever setting. Narlikar and Wilkinson (2004), claim these actions speak against the main 
purpose of multilateralism because “[s]uch bilaterals actually change the nature of the Ministerial 
forum and tip the balance even further away from multilateralism.”689 So rightly Narkilar and 
Wilkinson (2004) concluded that “Although developing countries were able to find some 
comfort in the formation of large coalitions, they are unlikely to be similarly comforted outside 
the WTO.”690  
In conclusion, in both circumstances, first at the UN and then at the WTO, the shared interests of 
developing countries, united by coalitions, attempted to modify the framework for investments to 
include in it developing countries’ interests. However, in both circumstances, the use of 
developed countries of an alternative path of bilateralism made it possible for them to overcome 
these attempts. The fact that it first happened at the UN and then decades later, at the WTO, 
highlights Vico’s thought of history being characterized by “corsi e recorsi”691 because it has 
cycles that repeat throughout time. 
 
In the change of setting- from a multilateral to a bilateral- there is a shift of power, from relative 
to structural power in which the latter prevails. With this shift, developed countries’ preferences 
override the preference of developing countries in the area of international investments.    
 
This is how structural power weakens the relative power of developing countries at multilateral 
level. The issues which could not be agreed upon at multilateral level -because the provisions 
were not in the best interest of developing countries- are negotiated and agreed upon at bilateral 
level. This is why, as this work has shown, the international investment framework, defined by 
BITs, weakens the relative power of developing countries. 
 
Strange has claimed: “Law can institutionalize and legitimize both power derived from coercive 
force, or power derived from unequal wealth.”692 This is exactly what has happened in the 
regulations for international investments. Interests of particular parties are reflected in the 
framework for international investments that we have today, which is characterized by bilateral 
investment treaties. 
  
                                                 
688
 Consider also the structural power of developed countries in the financial dimension. 
689
 Narlikar, A., Wilkinson, R. “Collapse at the WTO: A Cancun Post Mortem” Third World quarterly, Vol 25. 
No.3. 2004.  p. 451 
690
 ibid  p. 458 
691
 Vico, G. (1668-1744) “Principj di scienza nuova d'intorno alla comune natura delle nazioni : concordanze e indici 
di frequenza dell'edizione Napoli 1744” by Veneziani, Marco. Firenze: L.S. Olschki. 1997. 
692
 Strange, S. States and Markets  Pinter Publishers Limited. London. 1988. p. 37 
176 
 
Appendix I. Responses of South American Countries to the Developed Countries’ 
Proposals at the WTO 
SINGAPORE, 1996 
EU and US: Investment, Trade facilitation (IT products), Environmental and Labour Standards 
EU: Competition.  
US: Government Procurement. Sustainable development (Kyoto protocol) 
 Agriculture & 
Lack of 
Reciprocity 
(complaints) 
Investment Competition Trade 
Facilitation 
Public 
Procurement 
Environment Labour 
Argentina O       
Bolivia O Y    Y X 
Ecuador O Y- X X X X X 
Uruguay O       
Paraguay O Y- Y- Y- Y- Y- Y- 
Brazil O Y Y Y Y Y X 
Guyana O     X X 
Venezuela O -O -O O O  X 
Chile O    Y Y Y 
Colombia  - -   X X 
Suriname  Y Y  Y  X 
Peru  Y Y   -Y  
Results: AGREEMENT TO ESTABLISH WORKING GROUPS, ONE FOR INVESTMENTS 
SEATTLE, 1999 
EU and US: Singapore issues 
EU: - Reference to protectionism and demonstrations reflecting the importance of the issues negotiated 
       - Multi-functionality: preserving landscape, rural labour, environmental protection and food security. 
US: - Reduce agriculture trade barriers if their terms were accepted.  
       - Biotechnology. 
       - Technical Assistance for LDC if their agenda was accepted 
 Agriculture & 
Lack of 
Reciprocity 
(complaints) 
Investment Competition Trade 
Facilitation 
Public 
Procurement 
Environment Labour Multi-
Functionality 
Argentina O     X x X 
Bolivia O     x x X 
Ecuador O Y- Y Y  Y   
Uruguay O     x x X 
Paraguay O     x x X 
Brazil O     X X x 
Colombia O      X X 
Chile O     X X  
Peru O     X X  
Guyana O      X  
Suriname         
Venezuela O -   Y X X  
Results: COLLAPSE 
DOHA, 2001 
EU: - Mentioned lack of success on environment, trade liberalization, Singapore issues labour standards 
       - Flexibility on investment, competition, and environment but not on agriculture 
       - TRIPS and access to Medicine 
       - sustainability 
US: -Open their market and liberalize agriculture (lifting 300 million people out of poverty) 
       - TRIPS and access to Medicine: restating patent protection and said that compulsory licenses could be use, only willing to give extra 
time to developing countries to comply with TRIPS 
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 TRIPS 
& 
health 
Agriculture 
& Lack of 
Reciprocity 
(complaints) 
Investment Competition Trade 
Facilitation 
Public 
Procurement 
Environment Labour Multi- 
Functio
-nality 
Argentina O O     X   
Bolivia O O     X   
Ecuador O O        
Uruguay  O Y Y Y Y    
Paraguay O O        
Brazil O O        
Chile  O     X   
Colombia  O -       
Guyana O         
Peru  O        
Venezuela O O   X Y X X  
Results: LACK OF AGREEMENT 
CANCUN, 2003 
EU: Singapore issues 
      - That they are willing to look at the Agriculture Agreement (but only with the US) 
US: Not publicly available 
 Agriculture & 
Lack of 
Reciprocity 
(complaints) 
Investment Competition Trade 
Facilitation 
Public 
Procurement 
Environment Labour Multi-
Functionality 
Argentina         
Bolivia O        
Ecuador         
Uruguay O        
Paraguay O        
Brazil O        
Chile O **       
Colombia O        
Guyana         
Peru O        
Venezuela O     O O  
Results: NO CONSENSUS 
 
Source: WTO Ministerial Conferences at Singapore, Seattle, Doha and Cancun. Available at 
http://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/minist_e/minist_e.htm Suriname Statement in Doha and Cancun Ministerial 
Conferences is not publicly available.  
Note: 
O…means that South American countries did complain. 
X… means that South American countries were against including the issues. 
x… means that by rejecting multi-functionality it is implicit that South American rejected the labour and environmental issues 
(although these were not mentioned). 
Y… means that South American countries were in favour of including the issues. 
Y- …means to consider them in the light of interests of developing countries. 
- …means that South American countries proposed further studies on the area and with another forum. 
** means that they have concluded bilateral agreements because WTO negotiation process was slow. 
The spaces left in blank means that nothing was said by South American countries in regard to these issues. 
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Appendix II. Chronology of BITs in South America 
Treaty for the reciprocal promotion 
and protection of investments. (BIT) 
Signature date* Entry into force* Obs. 
Paraguay-France Sep 30,1978 Dec 1, 1980  
Bolivia-UK May 24, 1988  Feb 16, 1990   
Guyana-UK Oct 27, 1989 April 11, 1990  
Uruguay-Germany 4 May 1987** June 29, 1990  
Bolivia-Germany Mar 23, 1987 Nov  9, 1990  
Paraguay-UK Jun4, 1981 April 23, 1992  
Argentina-Spain  Oct 3, 1991 Sep 28, 1992  
Argentina-UK Dec 11, 1990 Feb 19, 1993  
Argentina-France Jul 3, 1991 Mar 3, 1993  
Argentina-Germany Apr 9, 1991 Nov 8, 1993  
Guyana-Germany Dec 6, 1989 Mar 8, 1994  
Peru-UK Oct 4, 1993 April 21, 1994  
Chile-Spain Oct 2, 1991 April 27,1994  
Uruguay-Spain April 7, 1992 May 6, 1994   
Argentina-US Nov 14, 1991  Oct 20, 1994  
Chile-France Jul 14, 1992 Dec 5, 1994  
Ecuador-UK May 10, 1994  Aug 24, 1995 Terminated by Ecuador’s National 
Assembly (Sep, 2010)*** 
Ecuador-France Sep 7, 1994  June 10, 1996  Terminated by Ecuador’s National 
Assembly (March 2011)*** 
Brazil-UK Jul 19, 1994 --  
Brazil-France Mar 21, 1995 --  
Brazil-Germany  Sep 21, 1995 --  
Peru-France Oct 6, 1993 May 30, 1996**  
Peru-Spain Nov 17,1994 Feb 16, 1996  
Venezuela-UK Mar 15, 1995 Aug 1, 1996  
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Bolivia-France Oct 25, 1989  Oct 12, 1996**  
Paraguay-Spain Oct 11, 1993 Nov 22, 1996  
Peru-Germany Jan 30,1995 May 1,1997**  
Ecuador-US Aug 27, 1993 May 11, 1997 Request of termination by Ecuador’s 
National Assembly (Sep, 2009)*** 
Ecuador-Spain June 26, 1996  June 18, 1997  Request of termination by Ecuador’s 
National Assembly (Sep 2009)*** 
Chile-UK April 24, 1995 Jun 23, 1997  
Uruguay-France Oct 14, 1993  Jul 9, 1997  
Uruguay-UK Oct 21, 1991  Aug 1, 1997**  
Venezuela-Spain Nov 2, 1995 Sep 10, 1997  
Paraguay-Germany Aug 11, 1993 Jul 3, 1998  
Venezuela-Germany May 14, 1996 Oct 16, 1998** 
 
 
Ecuador-Germany Mar 21, 1996  Feb 12, 1999  Terminated by Ecuador’s National 
Assembly (Sep, 2010)*** 
Chile-Germany April 14, 1997 Nov 17,2000  
Bolivia-US April 17, 1998 June 6, 2001 Terminated on June 10
th
 2012* 
Bolivia-Spain Oct 29, 2001  Jul 9, 2002  
Venezuela-France Jul 2, 2001 April 30, 2004**  
Uruguay-US Nov 4, 2005** Nov 1, 2006**  
Colombia-Spain Mar 31, 2005 Sep 22, 2007  
Source: (*) Dates provided by the database of the Organization of American States, available at http://www.sice.oas.org/countries_e.asp  (last 
visited October 25, 2012).  
(**) Dates provided by the database of the UNCTAD, available at 
http://unctad.org/en/Pages/DIAE/International%20Investment%20Agreements%20(IIA)/Country-specific-Lists-of-BITs.aspx  (last visited 
October 25, 2012). 
(***) 2011 Investment Climate Statement Report. US Bureau of Economic, Energy and Business Affairs. March 2011, available at 
http://www.state.gov/e/eb/rls/othr/ics/2011/157270.htm (last visited Oct 26, 2012); Ecuador’s Legislative Brief No. 179 submitted by the 
“Comisión de Soberanía, Integración, Relaciones Internacionales, y Seguridad Integral de la Asamblea Nacional” Sessions dated September 9 
and 14, 2010; Observatorio CIADI. “Ecuador derogó tratados de inversión que reconocían a CIADI”. March 17, 2011, available at 
http://observatoriociadi.info/2011/03/17/ecuador-derogo-tratados-de-inversion-que-reconocian-al-ciadi/ (last visited Oct 26, 2012); “Ecuador 
denuncia tratados de inversión con países América latina y Rumania” El Universo. January 29, 2008. 
Note 1: This list includes South American countries BITs with the US, Germany, France, United Kingdom and Spain. 
Note 2: The first BIT recorded in South America is one between two South American countries. It is the General Treaty of Commerce and 
Investments between Brazil and Paraguay [hereinafter Paraguay-Brazil BIT], signed on October 27, 1956 and entered into force on September 6, 
1957. Dates provided by the database of the Organization of American States, available at 
http://www.sice.oas.org/ctyindex/BRZ/BRZBITs_e.asp (last visited October 25, 2012). 
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Appendix III. Definition of Investment in South American BITs. 
1. Definition of Investment in South American countries BITs with France, Germany, UK and Spain. 
France 
BITs with: 
Germany 
BITs 
with: 
UK BITs 
with: 
Spain BITs 
with: 
 
Argentina 
Bolivia  
Chile 
Ecuador
693
  
Paraguay  
Uruguay 
Venezuela 
Argentina, 
Bolivia 
Chile 
Guyana 
Ecuador 
Paraguay 
Uruguay 
Venezuela 
Argentina 
Bolivia 
Chile  
Guyana 
Ecuador  
Paraguay 
Peru 
Uruguay 
Venezuela 
Argentina 
Bolivia 
Chile  
Colombia 
Ecuador  
Paraguay 
Peru 
Uruguay 
Venezuela 
-Movable and immovable property and 
property rights; 
-Shares, stocks and debentures in either 
territory, 
- Obligations with economic value 
-Intellectual property rights and 
- Business concessions 
   Colombia Expressly excludes: 
-Credit operation that do not comply with 
the domestic law 
-Public debt 
-Pecuniary claims derived from sale and 
service contracts 
2. Definition of Investment in South American countries BITs with the US. 
US BITs with: 
Argentina 
Bolivia
694
 
Ecuador
695
 
Uruguay 
-Every kind of investment in the territory of one Party, owned or controlled directly 
or indirectly by nationals or companies of the other Party, such as equity, debt, and 
service and investment contracts:  
-Tangible and intangible property. 
-A company or shares of stock or other interests. 
-A claim to money or a claim to performance having economic value. 
-Intellectual property.  
-Any right conferred by law or contract, and any licenses and permits pursuant to 
law. (So basically, also concessions) 
The differences among these BITs are in the following: 
US-Argentina 
BIT 
- It states “without limitation” 
US-Bolivia BIT - It also states “contractual rights” and that the list is illustrative and not exhaustive. 
US-Ecuador 
BIT 
- It adds to the definition of investment “such as social capital, debts and service 
and investment contracts” 
US-Uruguay 
BIT 
- It makes the distinction that the activities should have the characteristics of an 
investment. 
 
  
                                                 
693
 France-Ecuador BIT has been terminated.  
694
 US-Bolivia BIT has been terminated. 
695
 US-Ecuador BIT has a request for termination at the Ecuadorian Congress.  
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Appendix IV. Purposes contained in South American BITs. 
With the US 
- Promote greater economic cooperation. Argentina 
Bolivia
696
  
Ecuador
697
 
Uruguay 
- Stimulate the flow of private capital and the economic development of the Parties. Argentina 
Bolivia 
Ecuador  
Uruguay 
- Encouragement of reciprocal protection of investment. Argentina 
Bolivia  
Ecuador  
Uruguay 
- Stable framework for investment and maximum effective use of economic 
resources and improvement of living standards. 
Argentina 
Bolivia 
Ecuador 
Uruguay 
- Fair and equitable treatment of investment.  
 
Bolivia and Uruguay contain this purpose but not only as a goal but as obligation and 
that is why is not stated in the preamble, it is rather on the text of the BIT.  
Argentina 
Ecuador 
Bolivia: Article II.3 
Uruguay: Article 5.1 
  
-Recognizing that the development of economic and business ties can contribute to 
the well-being of workers in both Parties and promote respect for internationally 
recognized worker rights.  
 
The Uruguayan BIT also includes this in its preamble but much more extensive to 
other issues, namely: “Desiring to achieve these objectives in a manner consistent 
with the protection of health, safety, and the environment, and the promotion of 
consumer protection and internationally recognized labor rights” 
Argentina 
Bolivia 
Ecuador 
  
 
 
-To achieve the objectives without relaxing health, safety and environmental 
measures of general application. 
 
 
Bolivia 
- Recognizing the importance of providing effective means of asserting claims and 
enforcing rights with respect to investment under national law as well as through 
international arbitration. 
 
Uruguay 
With France 
-Reinforce the economic cooperation Argentina  
Bolivia  
Chile 
Ecuador
698
 
Paraguay 
Venezuela 
-Create favorable conditions for investments Argentina 
                                                 
696
 US-Bolivia BIT has been terminated.  
697
 US-Ecuador BIT has a request for termination at the Ecuadorian Congress. 
698
 France-Ecuador BIT has been terminated. 
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Bolivia 
Chile 
Ecuador 
Paraguay 
Venezuela 
-Encouragement of investment and stimulation of capital and technology transfer in 
order to increase economic development 
Argentina 
Bolivia 
Chile 
Ecuador 
Paraguay 
Venezuela 
With UK: 
- Create favourable conditions for greater investments Argentina 
Bolivia 
Chile 
Ecuador 
Guyana 
Paraguay 
Uruguay 
Venezuela 
- Encouragement and reciprocal protection of investments conducive to stimulation 
of individual business initiative 
 
Argentina 
Bolivia 
Chile 
Ecuador 
Guyana 
Paraguay 
Uruguay 
Venezuela 
-Increase the prosperity of both states 
 
Argentina 
Bolivia 
Chile 
Ecuador 
Guyana 
Paraguay 
Uruguay 
Venezuela 
With Spain 
- Intensify the economic cooperation for the mutual benefit of both countries  
 
Argentina 
Bolivia 
Chile 
Colombia 
Paraguay 
Peru 
Uruguay 
Venezuela 
- Create favourable conditions for investments Argentina 
Bolivia 
Chile 
Colombia 
Ecuador
699
 
                                                 
699
 Spain-Ecuador BIT has a request for termination at the Ecuadorian Congress. 
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Paraguay 
Peru 
Uruguay 
Venezuela 
-Recognizing that the promotion and protection of investments under this 
Agreement will stimulate initiatives in this field. 
Argentina 
Bolivia 
Chile 
Colombia 
Ecuador 
Paraguay 
Peru 
Uruguay 
Venezuela 
With Germany: 
- Intensify economic cooperation between the two States 
 
Argentina 
Bolivia 
Chile 
Ecuador
700
 
Guyana 
Uruguay 
Venezuela 
- Create favourable conditions for investments  
 
Argentina 
Bolivia 
Chile 
Ecuador 
Guyana 
Paraguay 
Uruguay 
Venezuela 
- Stimulate private business initiative 
 
Argentina 
Bolivia 
Chile 
Ecuador 
Guyana 
Paraguay 
Uruguay 
Venezuela  
- Increase the prosperity of the two nations Argentina 
Bolivia 
Chile 
Ecuador 
Guyana 
Paraguay 
Uruguay 
Venezuela 
Source: BITs texts submitted to the Organization of American States, available at http://www.sice.oas.org/countries_e.asp  (last visited October 
25, 2012.)  
Note 1: This list includes South American countries BITs with the US, Germany, France, United Kingdom and Spain. 
  
                                                 
700
 Germany-Ecuador BIT has been terminated.  
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Appendix V. Expropriation Provisions in South American BITs 
US BITs Expropriation provision 
With Argentina Investments shall not be expropriated or nationalized either directly or indirectly through measures 
tantamount to expropriation or nationalization ('expropriation-) except for a public purpose; in a non-
discriminatory manner; upon payment of prompt, adequate and effective compensation (Art. IV (1)) 
With Bolivia Neither Party shall expropriate or nationalize a covered investment either directly or indirectly through 
measures tantamount to expropriation or nationalization ("expropriation") except for a public purpose; in 
a non discriminatory manner; upon payment of prompt, adequate and effective compensation. (Art 3.1) 
With Ecuador Investments shall not be expropriated or nationalized either directly or indirectly through measures 
tantamount ot expropriation or nationalization (“expropriation” except: for a public purpose; in a 
nondiscriminatory manner, upon payment of prompt, adequate and effective compensation. (Art 3.1.) 
With Uruguay Neither Party may expropriate or nationalize a covered investment either directly or indirectly through 
measures equivalent to expropriation or nationalization ("expropriation”), except: (a) for a public purpose; 
(b) in a non-discriminatory manner; (c) on payment of prompt, adequate, and effective compensation. 
(Art 6.1.) 
France Expropriation provision 
With Argentina  …payment of a prompt and adequate compensation …such compensation be effectively realizable… (Art 
5.2.) 
With Bolivia  …payment of a prompt and adequate compensation …such compensation be effectively realizable… 
(Art.5.2.) 
With Chile … prompt and adequate compensation…effectively realizable… (Art. 5.2.) 
 
With Ecuador  …payment of a prompt and adequate compensation …such compensation be effectively realizable… (Art 
6.1.) 
With Paraguay Just compensation… effectively realizable and freely transferable (Art 5) 
With Uruguay Any measure of expropriation shall award prompt and adequate payment of a compensation…this 
compensation shall be effectively realizable… (Art 5.2.) 
With Venezuela …payment of a prompt and adequate compensation …such compensation shall be effectively realizable, 
paid without delay and freely transferable… (Art 5.1.) 
Germany Expropriation provision 
With Argentina  Compensation shall correspond to the value of the expropriated investment before the public date of 
expropriation…compensation should be paid without delay…it shall be effectively realizable and freely 
transmitted… (Art 4.2.) 
With Bolivia Compensation shall be equivalent to the value of the investment expropriated immediately before the 
date of actual impending expropriation, nationalization or comparable measure was publicly announced. 
The compensation shall be paid without delay and shall carry the usual bank interest until the time of 
payment; it shall be actually realizable and freely transferable…. (Art 4.2.) 
With Chile Compensation shall be equivalent to the value of the investment expropriated immediately before the 
date of actual impending expropriation, nationalization or comparable measure was publicly announced. 
The compensation shall be paid without delay and shall carry the usual bank interest until the time of 
185 
 
payment; it shall be effectively realizable and freely transferable (Art. 4.2.) 
 
With Ecuador  Compensation shall be equivalent to the value of the investment expropriated immediately before the 
date of actual impending expropriation, nationalization or comparable measure was publicly announced. 
The compensation shall be paid without delay and shall carry the usual bank interest until the time of 
payment; it shall be effectively realizable and freely transferable (Art. 4.2.) 
With Guyana Compensation shall be equivalent to the value of the investment expropriated immediately before the 
date of actual on which the actual or proposed expropriation, nationalization or comparable measure has 
become publicly known. The compensation shall be paid without delay and shall carry the usual bank 
interest until the time of payment; it shall be effectively realizable and freely transferable (Art. 4.2.) 
 
With Paraguay Compensation shall be equivalent to the value of the investment expropriated immediately before the 
date of actual on which the actual or proposed expropriation, nationalization or comparable measure has 
become publicly known. The compensation shall be paid without delay and shall carry the usual bank 
interest until the time of payment; it shall be effectively realizable and freely transferable (Art. 4.2.). 
With Uruguay  Compensation shall be equivalent to the value of the investment expropriated immediately before the 
date of actual impending expropriation, nationalization or comparable measure was publicly announced. 
The compensation shall be paid without delay and shall carry the usual bank interest until the time of 
payment; it shall be effectively realizable and freely transferable (Art. 4.2.) 
With Venezuela Compensation shall be equivalent to the value of the investment expropriated immediately before the 
date of actual on which the actual or proposed expropriation, nationalization or comparable measure has 
become publicly known. The compensation shall be paid without delay and shall carry the usual bank 
interest until the time of payment; it shall be effectively realizable and transferable in exchangeable 
currency (Art. 4.1.). 
UK Expropriation provision 
With Argentina  (I)  Investments  of investors of either Contracting  Party  shall  not  be nationalised, expropriated  or  
subjected to measures having  effect equivalent  to nationalisation or expropriation  (hereinafter referred 
to as " expropriation ") in the territory of the other Contracting  Party  except for a public purpose  related  
to  the internal needs of that Contracting  Party  on  a non-discriminatory basis and  against  prompt, 
adequate and effective compensation. (Art 5.1.) 
With Bolivia  Compensation… shall be made without delay, be effectively realizable, and be freely transferable (Art 
5.1.) 
With Chile (I)  Investments  of investors or companies of either Contracting  Party  shall  not  be nationalised, 
expropriated  or  subjected to measures having  effect equivalent  to nationalisation or expropriation  
(hereinafter referred to as " expropriation ") in the territory of the other Contracting  Party unless the 
measures are taken for a public purpose  related  to  the internal needs of that Contracting  Party in a non 
discriminatory manner, by authorization of a formal law and against prompt, adequate and effective 
compensation. (Art 4.1.) 
 
With Ecuador  (I)  Investments  of investors or companies of either Contracting  Party  shall  not  be nationalised, 
expropriated  or  subjected to measures having  effect equivalent  to nationalisation or expropriation  
(hereinafter referred to as " expropriation ") in the territory of the other Contracting  Party  except for a 
public purpose  related  to  the internal needs of that Contracting  Party  and  against  prompt, adequate 
and effective compensation. (Art 5.1.) 
With Guyana (I)  Investments  of investors or companies of either Contracting  Party  shall  not  be nationalised, 
expropriated  or  subjected to measures having  effect equivalent  to nationalisation or expropriation  
(hereinafter referred to as " expropriation ") in the territory of the other Contracting  Party  except for a 
public purpose  related  to  the internal needs of that Contracting  Party  on  a non-discriminatory basis 
and  against  prompt, adequate and effective compensation. (Art 5.1.) 
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With Paraguay against  prompt, adequate and effective compensation. (Art 5.1.) 
Peru  
(I) Investment made in the territory of one Contracting Party by nationals and companies of the other 
Contracting Party shall not be expropriated, nationalised or subjected to other measures having effect 
equivalent to expropriation or nationalization (hereinafter referred to as expropriation) except for 
reasons of public necessity and for a public purpose or in a social interest related to the internal needs of 
that Party on a non-discriminatory basis and, in such cases, they shall be subject to prompt, adequate 
and effective compensation. (Art. 6) 
With Uruguay  (I)  Investments  of investors or companies of either Contracting  Party  shall  not  be nationalised, 
expropriated  or  subjected to measures having  effect equivalent  to nationalisation or expropriation  
(hereinafter referred to as " expropriation ") in the territory of the other Contracting  Party  except for a 
public purpose  related  to  the internal needs of that Contracting  Party  on  a non-discriminatory basis 
and  against  prompt, adequate and effective compensation. (Art 5.1.) 
With Venezuela against  prompt, adequate and effective compensation. (Art 5.1.) 
Spain Expropriation provision 
With Argentina …shall pay to the investor… without delay, an adequate compensation… (Art 5) 
With Bolivia  Prompt, adequate and effective compensation (Art 5.1.) 
With Chile …shall pay to the investor… without delay, an adequate compensation… (Art 5) 
 
With Colombia Prompt, adequate and effective compensation (Art 4.1.) 
With Ecuador  …shall pay to the investor… without delay, an adequate compensation… (Art 5) 
With Paraguay …shall pay to the investor… without delay, an adequate compensation… (Art 5) 
With Peru ..shall pay to the investor…without unjustified delay, an adequate compensation, in convertible currency 
and freely transferable… (Art 5) 
With Uruguay  …appropriate provision is made for effective and adequate compensation. The amount of the indemnity, 
including interest thereon, shall be determined in freely convertible currency and shall be paid without 
delay to the investor affected by the measure. (Art. 7.) 
With Venezuela Prompt, adequate and effective compensation (Art 5.1.) 
Source: BITs texts submitted to the Organization of American States, available at http://www.sice.oas.org/countries_e.asp  (last visited October 
25, 2012.) 
Note 1: This list includes South American countries BITs with the US, Germany, France, United Kingdom and Spain. 
Note 2: Author´s translation into English of BIT texts in Spanish.  
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Appendix VI. Investment Dispute Settlement Clauses in South American BITs 
USA Amicably Consultation or 
Negotiation 
Local 
Courts/Local 
Jurisdiction 
International 
Arbitration 
ICSID   UNICTRAL 
Argentina X X X          (6 months)       X X            (OR)     X 
Bolivia X  X                 (OR)          X X            (OR)     X 
Ecuador X  X          (6 months)       X X            (OR)     X 
Uruguay  X     X X            (OR)     X 
UK Amicably Local 
Courts/Local 
Jurisdiction 
International 
Arbitration 
ICSID   UNICTRAL Other particularities 
Argentina X X    (18 months)            X X        (OR)     X 3 months with no 
agreement: 
UNCITRAL 
Bolivia X                                   X X        (OR)     X        
Chile X 
(consultations) 
 X X  
Ecuador                                     X X   
Guyana  X     (3 months)               X           X   
Paraguay  X     (3 months)                 X           X  Award not complied: 
International claim 
Peru X X     (3 months)                 X           X   
Uruguay X X     (18 months;             X 
        unjust decision)           
X        (OR)     X 3 months with no 
agreement: 
UNCITRAL 
Venezuela X  X X  When ICSID is not 
available or per express 
agreement of parties, 
then UNCITRAL 
Spain Amicably Local 
Courts/Local 
Jurisdiction 
International 
Arbitration 
ICSID   UNICTRAL Other particularities 
Argentina X X       (18 months)     X X        (OR)     X  When no agreement: 
ICSID 
Bolivia X X             (OR)           X X        (OR)     X  
Chile X X             (OR)           X X        (OR)     X  
Colombia X X             (OR)           X X        (OR)     X When dispute is about 
an administrative 
(public) act must 
exhaust local remedy 
when required by law 
Ecuador X                                          X X        (OR)     X  
Paraguay X X              (OR)             X X        (OR)     X  ICC 
Peru X X             (OR)              X X        (OR)     X  
Uruguay X X       (18 months;        X 
           unjust decision)           
X        (OR)     X When no agreement: 
ICSID 
Award not complied: 
International claim 
Venezuela X X             (OR)            X X  When ICSID is not 
available or per express 
agreement of parties, 
then UNCITRAL 
France Amicably Local 
Courts/Local 
Jurisdiction 
International 
Arbitration 
ICSID   UNICTRAL Other particularities 
Argentina X X             (OR)             X X        (OR)       X  
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Bolivia X            X X        (OR)       X  
Chile X X             (OR)                X X  
Ecuador                                            X X           
Paraguay            X X          
Uruguay X X             (OR)                X X        (OR)     X Award not complied: 
International claim 
Venezuela X            X X   
Germany Amicably Local 
Courts/Local 
Jurisdiction 
International 
Arbitration 
ICSID   UNICTRAL Other particularities 
Argentina X X (18 months or           X 
disp. subsistence)        
X        (OR)       X No agreement: 
ICSID 
Bolivia X          X X  
Chile X X       (18 months;        X 
          decision breaches  
          the treaty or  
          common agreement)           
X  
Ecuador X X    (18 months or        X 
court  negligence)                              
X           
Guyana X          X X   
Paraguay X          X X           
Uruguay X X       (18 months;        X 
           unjust decision)           
  ICC 
Venezuela X          X X   
 
Source: BITs texts submitted to the Organization of American States, available at http://www.sice.oas.org/countries_e.asp   
(last visited October 25, 2012.) 
Note 1: This list includes South American countries BITs with the US, Germany, France, United Kingdom and Spain. 
 
  
189 
 
Appendix VII. List of South American Countries’ BITs 
WITH THE US: 
1.Treaty between the United States of America and the Argentine Republic concerning the reciprocal encouragement 
and protection of investment,  November 14, 1991, and entered into force on October 20, 1994 [hereinafter US-
Argentina BIT], available at http://www.sice.oas.org/Investment/BITSbyCountry/BITs/US_Argentina_e.asp  (last visited 
Oct 19, 2012). 
2. Treaty between the United States of America and the Republic of Bolivia concerning the reciprocal encouragement and 
protection of investment,  April 17, 1998, and entered into force on July 6, 2001 [hereinafter US-Bolivia BIT], available at 
http://www.sice.oas.org/Investment/BITSbyCountry/BITs/US_Bolivia_e.asp   (last visited Oct 19, 2012). Currently 
terminated. 
3. Treaty between the United States of America and the Republic of Ecuador concerning the reciprocal encouragement 
and protection of investment,  August 27, 1993, and entered into force on May 11, 1997 [hereinafter US-Ecuador BIT], 
available at  http://www.sice.oas.org/Investment/BITSbyCountry/BITs/US_Ecuador_e.asp   (last visited Oct 19, 2012). 
Request for termination. 
4. Treaty between the United States of America and the Republic of Uruguay concerning the reciprocal encouragement 
and protection of investment,  November 4, 2005, and entered into force on November 1, 2006 [hereinafter US-Uruguay 
BIT], available at http://www.sice.oas.org/Investment/BITSbyCountry/BITs/URU_US_e.asp  (last visited Oct 19, 2012). 
WITH FRANCE: 
1. Treaty between the Republic of France and the Argentine Republic concerning the reciprocal encouragement and 
protection of investment,  July 3, 1991, and entered into force on March 3, 1993 [hereinafter France-Argentina BIT], 
available at http://www.sice.oas.org/Investment/BITSbyCountry/BITs/ARG_France_f.pdf  (last visited Oct 19, 2012). 
2. Treaty between the Republic of France and the Republic of Bolivia concerning the reciprocal encouragement and 
protection of investment,  October 25, 1989, and entered into force on October 12, 1996 [hereinafter France-Bolivia BIT], 
available at http://www.sice.oas.org/Investment/BITSbyCountry/BITs/BOL_France_f.pdf   (last visited Oct 19, 2012). 
3. Treaty between the Republic of France and the Republic of Chile concerning the reciprocal encouragement and 
protection of investment,  July 14, 1992, and entered into force on  December 5, 1994 [hereinafter France-Chile BIT], 
available at http://www.sice.oas.org/Investment/BITSbyCountry/BITs/CHI_France_s.pdf (last visited Oct 19, 2012). 
4. Treaty between the Republic of France and the Republic of Ecuador concerning the reciprocal encouragement and 
protection of investment,  September 7, 1994, and entered into force on June 10, 1996 [hereinafter France-Ecuador BIT], 
available at http://www.sice.oas.org/Investment/BITSbyCountry/BITs/ECU_France_f.pdf  (last visited Oct 19, 2012). 
Currently terminated. 
5. Treaty between the Republic of France and the Republic of Paraguay concerning the reciprocal encouragement and 
protection of investment,  November 30, 1978, and entered into force on December 1, 1980 [hereinafter France-
Paraguay BIT], available at http://www.sice.oas.org/Investment/BITSbyCountry/BITs/PAR_France_f.pdf  (last visited Oct 
19, 2012). 
6. Treaty between the Republic of France and the Republic of Peru concerning the reciprocal encouragement and 
protection of investment,  October 6, 1993, and entered into force on May 30, 1996 [hereinafter France-Peru BIT], 
available at http://www.sice.oas.org/Investment/BITSbyCountry/BITs/PER_France_s.pdf   (last visited Oct 19, 2012). 
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7. Treaty between the Republic of France and the Republic of Uruguay concerning the reciprocal encouragement and 
protection of investment,  October 14, 1993, and entered into force on July 9, 1997 [hereinafter France-Uruguay BIT], 
available at http://www.sice.oas.org/Investment/BITSbyCountry/BITs/URU_France_s.pdf  (last visited Oct 19, 2012). 
8. Treaty between the Republic of France and the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela concerning the reciprocal 
encouragement and protection of investment,  Jul 2, 2001, and entered into force on  April 30, 2004 [hereinafter France-
Venezuela BIT] 
WITH GERMANY 
1. Treaty between Germany and the Argentine Republic concerning the reciprocal encouragement and protection of 
investment,  April 9, 1991, and entered into force on November 8, 1993 [hereinafter Germany-Argentina BIT].  
2. Treaty between Germany and the Republic of Bolivia concerning the reciprocal encouragement and protection of 
investment,  March 23, 1987, and entered into force on November 9, 1990 [hereinafter Germany-Bolivia BIT], available at 
http://www.sice.oas.org/Investment/BITSbyCountry/BITs/BOL_Germany.pdf   (last visited Oct 19, 2012). 
3. Treaty between Germany and the Republic of Chile concerning the reciprocal encouragement and protection of 
investment,  April 14, 1997 and entered into force on Nov 17, 2000 [hereinafter Germany-Chile BIT], available at 
http://www.sice.oas.org/Investment/BITSbyCountry/BITs/CHI_Germany_s.pdf   (last visited Oct 19, 2012). 
4. Treaty between Germany and the Republic of Ecuador concerning the reciprocal encouragement and protection of 
investment,  March 21, 1996, and entered into force on February 12, 1999 [hereinafter Germany-Ecuador BIT], available 
at   http://www.sice.oas.org/Investment/BITSbyCountry/BITs/ECU_Germany_ger.pdf   (last visited Oct 19, 2012). 
Currently terminated. 
5. Treaty Between The Cooperative Republic of Guyana and the Federal Republic of Germany Concerning the 
Encouragement and Reciprocal Protection of Investments Dec 6, 1989 and entered into force on Mar 8, 1994 [hereinafter 
Germany-Guyana BIT], available at  http://www.sice.oas.org/ctyindex/GUY/GUYBITs_e.asp   (last visited Oct 19, 2012). 
6. Treaty between Germany and the Republic of Paraguay concerning the reciprocal encouragement and protection of 
investment,  August 11, 1993, and entered into force on July 3, 1998 [hereinafter Germany-Paraguay BIT], available at  
http://unctad.org/sections/dite/iia/docs/bits/germany_paraguay_esp.pdf  (last visited Oct 19, 2012). 
7. Treaty between Germany and the Republic of Peru concerning the reciprocal encouragement and protection of 
investment,  January 30, 1995, and entered into force on May 1, 1997 [hereinafter Germany-Peru BIT], available at  
http://www.sice.oas.org/Investment/BITSbyCountry/BITs/PER_Germany_s.pdf   (last visited Oct 19, 2012). 
8. Treaty between Germany and the Republic of Uruguay concerning the reciprocal encouragement and protection of 
investment,  May 4, 1987, and entered into force on June 29, 1990 [hereinafter Germany-Uruguay BIT], available at 
http://unctad.org/sections/dite/iia/docs/bits/uruguay_germany_sp.pdf   (last visited Oct 19, 2012). 
9. Treaty between Germany and the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela concerning the reciprocal encouragement and 
protection of investment,  May 14, 1996 and entered into force on Oct 16, 1998 [hereinafter Germany-Venezuela BIT] 
WITH UK 
1. Treaty between the United Kingdom and the Argentine Republic concerning the reciprocal encouragement and 
protection of investment,  December 11, 1990, and entered into force on February 19, 1993 [hereinafter UK-Argentina 
BIT], available at http://www.sice.oas.org/Investment/BITSbyCountry/BITs/ARG_UK_1993.pdf  (last visited Oct 19, 2012). 
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2. Treaty between the United Kingdom and the Republic of Bolivia concerning the reciprocal encouragement and 
protection of investment,  May 24, 1988, and entered into force on February 16, 1990 [hereinafter UK-Bolivia BIT], 
available at http://www.sice.oas.org/Investment/BITSbyCountry/BITs/BOL_UK_1986.pdf   (last visited Oct 19, 2012). 
3. Treaty between the United Kingdom and the Republic of Chile concerning the reciprocal encouragement and 
protection of investment,  April 24, 1995, and entered into force on Jun 23, 1997 [hereinafter UK-Chile BIT], available at 
http://www.sice.oas.org/Investment/BITSbyCountry/BITs/CHI_UK_1997.pdf (last visited Oct 19, 2012). 
4. Treaty between the United Kingdom and the Republic of Ecuador concerning the reciprocal encouragement and 
protection of investment,  May 10, 1994, and entered into force on August 24, 1995 [hereinafter UK-Ecuador BIT], 
available at  http://www.sice.oas.org/Investment/BITSbyCountry/BITs/ECU_UK_1996.pdf    (last visited Oct 19, 2012). 
Currently terminated. 
5. Treaty Between the United Kingdom and The Cooperative Republic of Guyana Concerning the Encouragement and 
Reciprocal Protection of Investments Oct 27, 1989and entered into force on April 11, 1990 [hereinafter UK-Guyana BIT], 
available at  http://www.sice.oas.org/Investment/BITSbyCountry/BITs/GUY_UK_1990.pdf   (last visited Oct 19, 2012). 
6. Treaty between the United Kingdom and the Republic of Paraguay concerning the reciprocal encouragement and 
protection of investment,  June 4, 1981, and entered into force on April 23, 1992 [hereinafter UK-Paraguay BIT], available 
at http://www.sice.oas.org/Investment/BITSbyCountry/BITs/PAR_UK_1981.pdf  (last visited Oct 19, 2012). 
7. Treaty between the United Kingdom and the Republic of Peru concerning the reciprocal encouragement and 
protection of investment,  Oct 4, 1993 and entered into force on April 21, 1994 [hereinafter UK-Peru BIT], available at 
http://www.sice.oas.org/Investment/BITSbyCountry/BITs/PER_UK_1993.pdf  (last visited Oct 19, 2012). 
8. Treaty between the United Kingdom and the Republic of Uruguay concerning the reciprocal encouragement and 
protection of investment,  October 21, 1991, and entered into force on August1, 1997 [hereinafter UK-Uruguay BIT], 
available at http://www.sice.oas.org/Investment/BITSbyCountry/BITs/URU_UK_1991.pdf  (last visited Oct 19, 2012). 
9. Treaty between the United Kingdom and the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela concerning the reciprocal 
encouragement and protection of investment,  Mar 15, 1995 and entered into force on Aug 1, 1996 [hereinafter UK-
Venezuela BIT], available at http://www.sice.oas.org/Investment/BITSbyCountry/BITs/VEN_UK_1991.pdf  (last visited Oct 
19, 2012). 
WITH SPAIN 
1. Treaty between Spain and the Argentine Republic concerning the reciprocal encouragement and protection of 
investment,  October 3, 1991, and entered into force on September 28, 1992 [hereinafter Spain-Argentina BIT], available 
at http://www.sice.oas.org/Investment/BITSbyCountry/BITs/ARG_Spain_s.pdf   (last visited Oct 19, 2012). 
2. Treaty between Spain and the Republic of Bolivia concerning the reciprocal encouragement and protection of 
investment,  October 29, 2001, and entered into force on July 9, 2002 [hereinafter Spain-Bolivia BIT], available at  
http://www.sice.oas.org/Investment/BITSbyCountry/BITs/BOL_Spain_s.pdf  (last visited Oct 19, 2012). 
3. Treaty between Spain and the Republic of Chile concerning the reciprocal encouragement and protection of 
investment,  Oct 2, 1991, and entered into force on April 27,1994 [hereinafter Spain-Chile BIT], available at 
http://www.sice.oas.org/Investment/BITSbyCountry/BITs/CHI_Spain_s.pdf  (last visited Oct 19, 2012). 
4. Treaty between Spain and the Republic of Colombia concerning the reciprocal encouragement and protection of 
investment,  Mar 31, 2005, and entered into force on Sep 22, 2007 [hereinafter Spain-Colombia BIT], available at 
http://www.sice.oas.org/Investment/BITSbyCountry/BITs/COL_Spain_s.pdf  (last visited Oct 19, 2012). 
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5. Treaty between Spain and the Republic of Ecuador concerning the reciprocal encouragement and protection of 
investment,  June 26, 1996, and entered into force on June 18, 1997 [hereinafter Spain-Ecuador BIT], available at 
http://www.sice.oas.org/Investment/BITSbyCountry/BITs/ECU_Spain_s.pdf     (last visited Oct 19, 2012). Request for 
Termination 
6. Treaty between Spain and the Republic of Paraguay concerning the reciprocal encouragement and protection of 
investment,  October 11, 1993, and entered into force on November 22, 1996 [hereinafter Spain-Paraguay BIT], available 
at http://www.sice.oas.org/Investment/BITSbyCountry/BITs/PAR_Spain_s.pdf  (last visited Oct 19, 2012). 
7. Treaty between Spain and the Republic of Peru concerning the reciprocal encouragement and protection of 
investment,  Nov 17,1994, and entered into force on Feb 16, 1996 [hereinafter Spain-Peru BIT], available at 
http://www.sice.oas.org/Investment/BITSbyCountry/BITs/PER_Spain_s.pdf  (last visited Oct 19, 2012). 
8. Treaty between Spain and the Republic of Uruguay concerning the reciprocal encouragement and protection of 
investment,  April 7, 1992, and entered into force on May 6, 1994 [hereinafter Spain-Uruguay BIT], available at 
http://www.sice.oas.org/Investment/BITSbyCountry/BITs/URU_Spain.pdf  (last visited Oct 19, 2012). 
9. Treaty between Spain and the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela concerning the reciprocal encouragement and 
protection of investment,  Nov 2, 1995, and entered into force on Sep 10, 1997 [hereinafter Spain-Venezuela BIT], 
available at http://www.sice.oas.org/Investment/BITSbyCountry/BITs/VEN_Spain_s.pdf (last visited Oct 19, 2012). 
Note:  A Total of 39 BITs (including 4 Terminated and 2 under Request for Termination)  
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Appendix VIII. List of Countries’ Statements at the WTO 
Singapore 1996 
Commission of the European Communities. Statement by Sir Leon Brittan Q.C. Vice-President of the European 
Commission. Singapore, 1996. WT/MIN(96)/ST/2 
 
United States’ Statement by the Honourable Charlene Barshefsky. Acting United States Trade Representative. 
Singapore, 1996. WT/MIN(96)/ST/5 
 
Argentina’s Statement by H.E. Mr. G.J. Campbell, Minister of International Economic Relations. Singapore, 1996. 
WT/MIN (96)/ST/4.  
 
Bolivia’s Statement by Mr. Victor Rico Frontaura. Minister of International Economic Relations. Singapore. 1996. 
WT/MIN(96)/ST/38 
 
Brazil’s Statement by H.E. Mr. Luiz Felipe Lampreia. Minister for External Relations. Singapore, 1996. 
WT/MIN(96)/ST/8 
 
Chile’s Statement by H.E. Mr. Alvaro Garcia, Minister of Economic Affairs, Singapore, 1996. WT/MIN(96)/ST/36  
 
Colombia’s Statement by H.E. Dr. Felipe Jaramillo, Vice-Minister of Foreign Trade.  Singapore, 1996. 
WT/MIN(96)/ST/23 
 
Ecuador’s Statement by H.E. Mr. Ruben Flores. Deputy-Minister of Foreign Trade. Singapore, 1996. 
WT/MIN(96)/ST/68 
 
Guyana’s Statement by H.E Michael Shree Chan, Senior Minister of Trade, Tourism and Industry. Singapore, 1996. 
WT/MIN(96)/ST/56 
 
Paraguay’s Statement by Mr. Ruben Melgarejo Lanzoni. Minister of Foreign Relations. Singapore, 1996. 
WT/MIN(96)/ST/75 
 
Peru’s Statement by Mrs. Lilliana Canale, Special Presidential Envoy. Singapore, 1996. WT/MIN(96)/ST/106 
 
Suriname’s Statement by H.E. Mr. Ewald C. Leeflang, Ambassador, Permanent Representative of Suriname to the 
WTO. Singapore, 1996. WT/MIN(96)/ST/88 
 
Uruguay’s Statement by H.E. Mr. Alvaro Ramos. Minister of Foreign Affairs. Singapore, 1996. WT/MIN(96)/ST/17 
 
Venezuela’s Statement by H.E. Mr. Werner Corrales Leal, Permanent Representative to the United Nations and 
Other International Organizations. Singapore 1996. WT/MIN(96)/ST/100 
 
Seattle 1999 
Commission of the European Community. Statement by Mr. Pascal Lamy. Commissioner for Trade. Seattle, 1999. 
WT/MIN(99)/ST/3 
 
United States’ Statement by the Honourable Daniel Glickman. Secretary of Agriculture. Seattle, 1999. 
WT/MIN(99)/ST/12 
 
Argentina’s Statement by H.E. Mr. Guido Di Tella. Minister for Foreign Affairs, International Trade and Worship. 
Seattle, 1999. WT/MIN(99)/ST/153 
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Bolivia’s Statement by H.E. Dr. Javier Murillo de la Rocha. Minister for Foreign Affairs and Worship. Seattle, 1999. 
WT/MIN(99)/ST/58 
 
Brazil’s Statement by H.E. Mr. Luiz Felipe Lampreia. Minister of Foreign Relations. Seattle, 1999. WT/MIN(99)/ST/5 
 
Chile’s Statement by H.E. Mr. Juan Gabriel Valdés. Minister for Foreign Affairs. Seattle, 1999. WT/MIN(99)/ST/51 
 
Colombia’s Statement by H.E. Mrs. Marta Lucía Ramírez de Rincón. Minister of Foreign Trade. Seattle 1999. 
WT/MIN(99)/ST/137 
 
Ecuador’s Statement by H.E. Mr. José Luis Ycaza Pazmiño. Minister of Foreign Trade, Industry, Fisheries and 
Tourism. Seattle, 1999. WT/MIN(99)/ST/35 
 
Guyana’s Statement by the Honourable Clement J . Rohee, M.P. 
Minister of Foreign Affairs. Seattle, 1999. WT/MIN(99)/ST/111 
 
Paraguay’s Statement by H.E. Dr. Guillermo Caballero Vargas. Minister, Economic Advisor of the Presidency. 
Seattle 1999. WT/MIN(99)/ST/49  
 
Peru’s Statement by H.E. Mr. Juan Carlos Hurtado Miller. Minister for Industry, Tourism, Integration and 
International Trade Negotiations. Seattle, 1999. WT/MIN(99)/ST/91 
 
Suriname’s Statement by H.E. Mr. Erroll G. Snijders. Minister of Foreign Affairs. Seattle, 1999. WT/MIN(99)/ST/126 
 
Uruguay’s Statement by H.E. Dr. Didier Opertti, Minister of Foreign Affairs. Seattle, 1999. WT/MIN(99)/ST/47 
 
Venezuela’s Statement by H.E. Dr. Juan de Jesús Montilla Saldivia.Minister of Production and Trade. Seattle, 1999. 
WT/MIN(99)/ST/56 
 
Doha 2001 
European Communities Commission. Statement by Mr Pascal Lamy, Commissioner for Trade. Doha, 2001. 
WT/MIN(01)/ST/4 
 
United States’ Statement by H.E. Mr. Robert B. Zoellick. United States Trade Representative. Doha, 2001. 
WT/MIN(01)/ST/3 
 
Argentina’s Statement by H.E. Mr Alfredo Vicente Chiaradia. Ambassador, Foreign Trade Representative. Doha 
2001. WT/MIN(01)/ST/16 
 
Bolivia’s Statement by H.E. Mrs Ana María Solares Gaite. Vice-Minister for International Economic Relations and 
Integration. Doha 2001. WT/MIN(01)/ST/125 
 
Brazil’s Statement by H.E. Mr Celso Lafer.Minister of Foreign Relations. Doha 2001. WT/MIN(01)/ST/12 
 
Chile’s Statement by H.E. Mr. Heraldo Muñoz, Under-Secretary of Foreign RelationsDoha, 2001. 
WT/MIN(01)/ST/48 
 
Colombia’s Statement by H.E. Mrs Marta Lucía Ramirez de Rincón, Minister of Foreign Trade. Doha, 2001. 
WT/MIN(01)/ST/91 
 
Ecuador’s Statement by H.E. Mr Richard Howard Moss Ferreira. Minister of Foreign Trade, Industry and Fisheries 
and Competitiveness. Doha 2001 WT/MIN(01)/ST/46 
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Guyana’s Statement by the Honourable Clement James Rohee, MP. Minister of Foreign Trade and International 
Cooperation. Doha, 2001. WT/MIN(01)/ST/87 
 
Paraguay’s Statement by H.E. Mr Luís Maria Ramírez Boettner. Ambassador, Permanent Representative to the 
WTO, Former Minister of Foreign Affairs. Doha 2001. WT/MIN(01)/ST/73 
 
Peru’s Statement by H.E. Mr Jorge Voto-Bernales, Ambassador, Permanent Representative to the WTO. Doha, 
2001. WT/MIN(01)/ST/130 
 
Uruguay’s Statement by H.E. Mr Gonzalo Enrique Gonzalez Fernandez. Minister of Livestock, Agriculture and 
Fisheries. Doha 2001. WT/MIN(01)/ST/35 
 
Venezuela’s Statement by H.E. Dr Luisa Romero Bermudez, Minister of Production and Commerce. Doha, 2001. 
WT/MIN(01)/ST/128 
 
Cancun 2003 
European Communities Commission. Statement by Mr Pascal Lamy. Commissioner for Trade. Cancun, 2003. 
WT/MIN(03)/ST/5. 
 
Bolivia’s Statement by H.E. Dr Carlos Saavedra Bruno.Minister of Foreign Affairs and Worship. Cancun 2003. 
WT/MIN(03)/ST/83 
 
Brazil’s Statement by H.E. Mr Celso Amorim.Minister of External Relations. Cancun 2003. WT/MIN(03)/ST/28 
 
Chile’s Statement by H.E. Mrs Maria Soledad Alvear, Minister for Foreign Affairs. Cancun 2003. WT/MIN(03)/ST/47 
 
Colombia’s Statement by H.E. Mr Jorge Humberto Botero, Minister of Commerce, Industry and Tourism. Cancun 
2003. WT/MIN(03)/ST/60 
 
Guyana’s Statement by the Honourable Clement James Rohee, MP. Minister of Foreign Trade and International 
Cooperation. Cancun 2003. WT/MIN(03)/ST/37 
 
Paraguay’s Statement by H.E. Mrs. Leila Rachid de Cowles.Minister for Foreign Relations. Cancun 2003. 
WT/MIN(03)/ST/54 
 
Peru’s Statement by H.E. Mr Jorge Voto-Benales, Ambassador, Head of Delegation. Cancun 2003. 
WT/MIN(03)/ST/97 
 
Uruguay’s Statement by H.E. Dr Didier Opertti Badan. Minister for Foreign Affairs. Cancun 2003. 
WT/MIN(03)/ST/25 
 
Venezuela’s Statement by H.E. Mr Ramón Rosales Linares, Minister of Production and Trade. Cancun 2003. 
WT/MIN(03)/ST/48 
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Appendix IX. List of International Conventions 
- United Nations Charter. 
- Agreement establishing the World Trade Organization.1994. 
- Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties. 1969. 
- Fundamental International Labour Conventions:  
- Forced Labour Convention, 1930. 
- Freedom of Association and Protection of the Right to Organise Convention. 1984. 
- Right to Organise and Collective Bargaining Convention. 1949. 
- Equal Remuneration Convention. 1951. 
- Abolition of Forced Labour Convention. 1957. 
- Discrimination (Employment and Occupation) Convention. 1958. 
- Minimum Age Convention. 1973. 
- Worst Forms of Child Labour Convention. 1999. 
- Convention establishing the Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agency. 1988. 
- Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes between States and Nationals of other 
States.1965 (as amended 2006). 
- New York Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards.1958. 
- World Health Organization Framework Convention on Tobacco Control (FCTC). 2003-2005. 
- Treaty of Lisbon. 2009. 
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Appendix X. List of UN Resolutions 
- UN General Assembly Resolution No. 626 of 21 December, 1952, “Right to exploit Freely Natural 
Wealth and Resources”  
 
- UN General Assembly Resolution No. 1803 (XVII) of 14 December 1962, "Permanent Sovereignty over 
Natural Resources" 
 
- UN General Assembly Resolution No. 2158 (XXI) of 25 November, 1966, “Permanent Sovereignty over 
Natural Resources” 
 
- UN General Assembly Resolution No. 3171 (XXVIII), of 17 December, 1973, “Permanent Sovereignty 
over Natural Resources” 
 
- UN General Assembly Resolution No. 3201(S-VI) of 1 May, 1974,”Establishment of a New International 
Economic Order” 
 
- UN General Assembly Resolution No. 3281(XXIX), of 12 December, 1974 “Charter of Economic Rights 
and Duties of States” 
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Appendix XI. List of Cases 
International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID)  
- Emilio Agustin Maffezini vs Spain (ICSID Case No. ARB/97/7)  
- Siemens A.G v Argentine Republic (ICSID Case No. ARB/02/8);  
- Wintershall Aktiengesellschaft v Argentine Republic (ICSID Case No. ARB/04/14);  
- Azurix Corp. v. The Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/01/12;  
- CMS Gas Transmission Company v. The Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/01/8;  
- Enron Corporation and Ponderosa Assets, L.P. v. Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/01/3, 
- LG&E Energy Corp. LG&E Capital Copr. And LG&E International Inc vs Argentine Republic (ICSID Case 
No. ARB/02/1) 
- Sempra Energy International vs Argentine Republic (ICSID Case No. ARB/02/16) 
- Compañía de Aguas del Aconquija S.A. and Vivendi Universal v. Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No. 
ARB/97/3. 
- Continental Casualty Company v. Argentine Republic (ICSID Case No. ARB/03/9) 
- Tecnicas Medio Ambientales Tecmed SA vs Mexico. ICSID Case No. ARB(AF)/00/2. 
- Philip Morris Brand Sarl, Philip Morris Products S.A. v. Oriental Republic of Uruguay. ICSID Case No. 
ARB/10/7.  
- Salini Costruttori SpA and Italstrade SpA v The Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan ICSID Case No.ARB/02/13, 
decision of November 15, 2004 
- Plama Consortium Ltd v Republic of Bulgaria ICSID Case No. ARB/03/24, decision of February 8, 2005 
- Tza Yap Shum v Peru, ICSID Case No. ARB/07/6 
 
Permanent Court of International Justice (PCIJ) 
Mavrommantis Palestine Concessions Case (Greece v. UK), Jurisdiction. (1924) P.C.I.J. Rep., Ser. A, No.2 
Chorzow Factory case, PCIJ ser. A No 17. At 68 
 
International Court of Justice (ICJ) 
Texaco Overseas Petroleum Company v. The Government of the Libyan Arab Republic, International 
Legal Materials, Vol. 17 No. 1 1978 
 
US Cases 
Underhill v Hernandez (168 U.S. 250, 18 S. Ct. 83, 42 L. Ed. 456 (1897) 
Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabattino. 376 U.S. 398 (1964) 
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Appendix XII. Other Materials 
Digest of International Law. Vol.3 655 1942 
 
The compact edition of the Oxford English dictionary. Complete text reproduced micrographically. 
Oxford University Press, 1971. 
 
GATT 1955 Resolution for International Investment and Economic Development. 
 
Punta del Este Ministerial Declaration of September 20, 1986. 25ILM 1623-27 (1986). 
 
Cancun Ministerial Briefing Notes. Available at 
http://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/minist_e/min03_e/brief_e/brief07_e.htm (last visited 
November 29, 2012) 
 
Business Guide to the World Trading System. Published jointly by the International Trade Centre 
UNCTAD/WTO and the Commonwealth Secretariat. 1999. 
 
Decree related to the performance and industry incentive and improvement of the Republic, dated May 
20, 1845. El Paraguayo Independiente. Vol. 20-22. 1845. Paraguay Portal Guarani. (last visited November 
15, 2013). 
 
Statement of Hon, Daniel K. Tarullo, Assistant Secretary of State for Economic and Business Affairs. 
United States. Congress. Senate. Committee on Foreign Relations. 
 
Statement of Eugene J. Mcallister, Assistant Secretary for Economic and Business Affairs, US Department 
of State. United States. Congress. Senate. Committee on Foreign Relations. 
 
US Department of State Dispatch, Vol 2, No 25, June 24, 1991.  White House Press Secretary Marlin 
Fitzwater. 
 
US Department of State Dispatch, Vol 2, No 25, June 24, 1991. The White House, Office of the Press 
Secretary,   Washington, DC. 
 
The Enterprise for the Americas Initiative: Description and Up-date October 1992. News report of the 
Development Group for Alternative Policies Inc. Washington DC. 
 
2011 Investment Climate Statement Report. US Bureau of Economic, Energy and Business Affairs. March 
2011. 
 
US Trade Act of 2002. 
 
US Trade Representative Ron Kirk Comments on Presidential Actions Related to the Generalized System 
of Preferences available at http://www.ustr.gov/about-us/press-office/press-releases/2012/march/us-
trade-representative-ron-kirk-comments-presidenti (last visited Mar 11, 2012). 
 
World Bank Group, Guidelines on Treatment of Foreign Direct Investment. Legal framework for the 
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treatment of foreign investment, Vol 2  Guidelines 1992. 
 
International Bank of Reconstruction and Development (IBRD) Articles of Agreement. 
 
Ecuador’s Official Registry No. 632. July 13, 2009. 
 
Ecuador’s Legislative Brief No. 179 submitted by the “Comisión de Soberanía, Integración, Relaciones 
Internacionales, y Seguridad Integral de la Asamblea Nacional” discussed in the sessions dated 
September 9 and 14, 2010. 
 
Argentina’s Draft of Law. File No. 1311-D-2012. H. Cámara de Diputados de la Nación. March 21, 2012. 
 
Regulation (EU) No 1219/2012 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 12 December 2012 
establishing transitional arrangements for bilateral investment agreements between Member States and 
third countries. 
 
International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID) Arbitration Rules. 
 
Talk given by Meg Kinnear, Secretary-General, ICSID “The Present and Future Challenges of ICSID” at 
Vale Columbia Center on Sustainable International Investment. January 31, 2013. 
 
Request of Arbitration of FTR Holdings S.A. (Switzerland) v. Oriental Republic of Uruguay, ICSID case no. 
ARB/10/7 (February 19, 2010). 
 
UNCTAD, Transnational Corporations in World Development: Trends and Prospects, U.N. Doc. ST/CTC/89 
(1988) p. 336. Available at http://unctc.unctad.org/aspx/allDocsYear.aspx (last visited February 13, 
2013). 
 
UNCTAD, Bilateral Investment Treaties in the Mid-1990s. U.N. Doc. UNCTAD/ITE/IIT/7 (1998). 
 
UNCTAD World Investment Report 2000. Sales No. E.00.II.D.20 (New York and Geneva:United 
Nations.2000). 
 
UNCTAD World Investment Report 2005, Sales No. E.05.II.D.10 (New York and Geneva: United Nations 
2005). 
 
UNCTAD 2005 Report UNCTAD/WEB/ITE/IIT/2005/1.  
 
UNCTAD Denunciation of the ICSID Convention and BITS: Impact on the Investor-State Claims. IIA Issue 
note No. 2. December, 2010. 
 
UNCTAD World Investment Report. 2011. Available at 
http://unctad.org/en/docs/wir2011_embargoed_en.pdf (last visited February 13, 2013). 
 
UNCTAD World Investment Report 2012. Sales no.: E.12.II.D.3 (New York: United Nations 2012).  
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